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1. A Dialogue on Dialogue
After luncheon in Tedesco's dining room

TEDESCO: Have you noticed how nowadays the word dialogue is on
everyone's lips, and yet no dialogues to speak of are being written?
LANGLEY: Ah, that's because modern writers have less need of this
form than Plato had. They have various means at their disposal
to convey their thoughts or to set forth their discoveries. The
treatise, the essay, even the novel, have all been developed since
Plato composed his dialogues. And can you imagine Plato, who
excluded poets from his Republic, giving admittance to novelists
there?
FRANCIS: But the Protagoras and the Symposium could almost be
called contes philosophiques like Voltaire's Candide or Micromegas, if
not novels in dialogue form like Diderot'sjacques lefataliste. And
must we not agree with Diderot that the Apology, the Crito, and
the Phaedo are acts in a moving drama?
TEDESCO: Couldn't we say that the heritage of the dialogue form
has been divided up among several descendants, and that only a
meager share still remains for the dialogue strictly so-called? It
has been reduced to the status of a poor relation. That learned
historian of the genre, Rudolf Hirzel, deplored its fall from the
lofty rank it once occupied, ruling like a king of literature, to the
lowly position of a beggar that scarcely deserves a second glance!
Hirzel's voluminous, if not thorough, survey has not been
supplanted by any work of scholarship down to our own day.
And it is noteworthy that out of nearly a thousand pages, he
devoted only a few to modern writers, whether Bruno, Galileo,
or Leibniz.
FRANCIS: Doesn't Hirzel ever reach Joseph de Maistre or Ernest
Renan? I realize that he wrote too early to discuss Paul Valery.
TEDESCO: He was aware of Renan, of course, but his plan did not
include more recent times.
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LANGLEY: There was a survey of the dialogue in English literature
published by Elizabeth Merrill before the First World War that
added a good deal to what Hirzel had done. It was pretty comprehensive down to that time, but she omitted American literature. Of course I can recall only Oliver Wendell Holmes's Breakfast Table series in that area. Those are mostly monologues,
however, with the Autocrat or the Professor in complete control.
FRANCIS: We ought not forget that Edgar Allan Poe composed
several dialogues, such as Monos and Una.
LANGLEY: You would remember that! Wasn't Poe more important
for French literature than for English, I won't dare say for
American? I know that Valery, whom you just mentioned, took
him quite seriously.
FRANCIS: I think Valery was more struck by Poe's short dialogue
entitled The Power of Words. It was Charles Maurras, prior to
founding his Action Franc,;aise movement, who admired the
anti-democratic sentiments expressed in Monos and Una. Besides
the two mentioned, Poe wrote another, The Conversation of Eiros
and Charmion. They are all dialogues of the dead, or rather,
dialogues of the recently deceased. Thus they don't fall into the
category invented by Lucian, for their speakers are neither historical or legendary. Moreover, these dialogues are not satirical.
TEDESCO: Most of Lucian's are indeed satirical, but some have a
philosophical bearing. Therefore we cannot exclude them.
FRANCIS: Certainly not, for then we should have to exclude Fontenelle's Dialogues des morts, not to mention VaU:ry's Eupalinos.
LANGLEY: Evidently we are going to talk mostly about philosophical dialogues. But before that, shouldn't we try to define the
types that exist? We can then concentrate on the types that most
interest us and avoid drifting from one to another. An Imaginary
Conversation by Landor draws a line between conversation and
dialogue: "In Conversation, as in the country, variety is pleasant
and expected .... In Conversation we ought not to be didactic, in
Dialogue we may be: Galileo has done it. There are other authorities but none so great." Elizabeth Merrill's book distinguished the philosophical, the satirical, the polemical, and the
expository. Sir Herbert Read found three types: the dialogue of
ideas, the dialogue of wit, and the dialogue whose purpose is to
exhibit character and personality. These three have Plato, Lucian, and Landor, respectively, as their exemplars.
FRANCIS: That division would serve for content. Your quotation
from Landor reminds me of similar stylistic distinctions. Such a
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classification was suggested by Joseph de Maistre in Les Soirees de
Saint-petersbourg. Actually it is the speaker designated as "Ie
Chevalier" who proposes the classification. There are, first, conversations, formless and random by their very nature, unadapted
for publication. More formal but still issuing from real-life discussions are the entretiens, exemplified by the Soirees, which "Ie
Chevalier" proposes to publish, despite the raillery of his friends.
The entretien, for dramatic reasons, must not have more than
three speakers, just the number in the Soirees. The third type is
the dialogue which is purely artificial, a literary composition like
any other, which issues fully formed, like Minerva, from the
brain of the author. This type includes the dialogues des morts.
TEDESCO: That is all very interesting, but won't be useful for us.
Entretien is too hard to translate.
LANGLEY: I agree. Since Merrill's survey, there has been renewed
interest in English dialogues of the dead. Frederick Keener's
recent book contains a critical history and an anthology. Incidentally, the historian Peter Gay has written a book-length dialogue
featuring Lucian, Erasmus, and Voltaire entitled The Bridge of
Criticism. An older and more famous twentieth-century example
is George Santayana's Dialogues in Limbo.
TEDESCO: Nevertheless dialogues of the dead are probably still
more dead today than philosophical dialogues in general. This
special type depends on conventional belief in an afterlife. In
Lucian's time one could still picture philosophers and heroes
meeting for chats in the Elysian Fields. After Fontenelle, the
Shades would become the shadows of shadows.
LANGLEY: That is Keener's point: "The dead were not so remote
then [1760] as they later became."
FRANCIS: The form itself may be outmoded, but certain elements
of the genre survive under other names. For example, there is a
well-known work of Jean-Paul Sartre which might belong with
dialogues of the dead. That is Huis-clos. At various points in the
play one is reminded of Lucian; I mean the conversations of
Menippus with Tantalus or Chiron, of Hercules with Diogenes.
And if we compare Huis-clos with its analogue, Ferencz Molnar's
Liliom, this feature becomes even more conspicuous; Molnar's
play is more dramatic and less philosophical than Sartre's play.
The mawkishness of Liliom is carried further in the musical
Carousel, which was derived from it. It is amusing to make these
comparisons with the irony and the austerity of Sartre'sHuis-clos.
Its characters are not allowed to return to earth. That is part of
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the philosophical message. Yet Sartre used precisely this element
of a return to life in his filmscript Les Jeux sont faits, which is
therefore closer to the Liliom that he and Simone de Beauvoir
perhaps saw performed, as they certainly did in the case of a
similar play that was less well-known, Sutton Vane's Outward
Bound.
LANGLEY: Now you remind me of Thornton Wilder's Our Town,
and also Edgar Lee Masters's Spoon River Anthology, which is not a
play, of course. These are directions that can be taken by bastard
forms of the genre. Thus the dialogue of the dead is reincarnated in other shapes.
TEDESCO: One direction had already been taken by Orpheus. The
pathos of the theme is much more effective in the story of Orpheus and Eurydice. But that is not a dialogue of the dead.
FRANCIS: There is a danger of contamination that the dialogue of
the dead is subject to, and that is perhaps another reason for the
rarity of the type nowadays. In Huis-clos the characters cannot
forget their personal lives. Garcin, for example, is interested in
what is happening among the living only if their memory of him
is involved. Pierre and Eve in Les Jeux sont faits are interested in
the fate of their friends and intimates, but their intervention
does not alter this fate. Yet how can they remain interested if
they can accomplish nothing in the world of their survivors?
That is a reflection one cannot avoid making while reading such
a lengthy dialogue as Maurice Joly's Dialogue aux enfers entre
Machiavel et Montesquieu. How can these speakers be so engrossed
in current politics when they can do nothing to affect the situation? In the much shorter di~logues of Lucian and Fontenelle it
is not a problem. But in reading Joly we tend to forget that the
speakers are dead, and that is what saves the dialogue for us.
TEDESCO: Isn't the dialogue saved rather by the fact that the ideas
associated with those names are alive? These ideas involve vital
political issues. The names provide handy labels for the ideas.
LANGLEY: If contamination is a danger, it's because you wish to set
up a pure type of dialogue somehow distinct from drama and
narrative. I don't think we have to be worried about contamination if the dialogue has merits which please us, as in the case of
certain Imaginary Conversations of Landor.
FRANCIS: Valery'S Eupalinos is free from the sort of contamination
that I object to. In this work, Socrates illustrates the pathos of lost
opportunities, choosing the path of thought rather than action in
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his earthly life, but this choice was itself a philosophical, not a
tactical one.
TEDESCO: That doesn't sound like the Socrates I know, whose
thought was certainly a form of action.
LANGLEY: One of the possible defects in dialogues of the dead is
such distortion of the figures known to us from history. That
may be a fault of Landor's Diogenes and Plato: Plato is caricatured
and Diogenes beautified. Matthew Prior's Locke and Montaigne is
much fairer to Montaigne than to Locke, while Richard Hurd's
Uses of Foreign Travel makes both Locke and Shaftesbury seem
trivial. Locke in his bluff xenophobia sounds like Colonel Blimp.
FRANCIS: That is the challenge that the dialogue des morts offers to
the writer. The great thinkers and heroes so often seem diminished to us, if we know enough about them beforehand. A
horrible example is Montaigne, Bayle andJean-Jacques Rousseau, by
the eighteenth-century writer La Dixmerie. He makes Montaigne into a pettifogging critic of Rousseau, resentful of not
being properly honored by his alleged plagiarist. And the author
has Bayle, of all people, reproach Rousseau for exhausting his
reader and his subject. Bayle quotes: "Le secret d'ennuyer, est
celui de tout dire." He is not being ironical about Bayle, we can
be sure.
TEDESCO: Lest you say more about La Dixmerie, let's get back to
the mainstream, to that point made by Hirzel about the decline
of dialogue. A noble species it was. Socrates's death left a tragic
aura about the genre that persisted in some way through the
ages. Of course there is no close connection between the
dialogues of Seneca or Cicero and the pathos of their final fate.
Nor can I claim that the tragic aura covers those who wrote in a
lighter vein in Greek, Plutarch and Lucian. But later on, there is
Boethius's Consolations of Philosophy, the memorial of a man imprisoned and condemned by the government to die for his religious affiliation. Admittedly, the dialogue between Boethius and
his "nurse Philosophy" contains little interplay of ideas. It is
made up entirely of his briefly worded assents to her discourses
on perfection and sovereign goodness.
At the dawn of modern times, the martyrdom of Giordano
Bruno gave to his Dialoghi a heroic dimension. To some degree,
this might also be said of Vanini, burned at the stake in
Toulouse. And Galileo's trial was a later act in a drama which
began with his Dialogues on the Two World Systems.
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The genre is associated with danger. Prior to Bruno and
Galileo, in 1492 of ambivalent memory, the Lisbonese Leo Hebraeus had to flee Seville for Naples. As Leone Ebreo he was to
write his Dialogues of Love in Italian. A few decades later, two
descendants of conversos, the brothers Juan and Alfonso de Valdes also found Italy a little safer than Spain. Yet even there,
Alfonso's two books of dialogues were placed on the Index. I refer
to his Dialogos de La cosas ocurridas en Roma and his Dialogo de
Mercurio y Caron, both on political subjects. Juan produced his
Dialogo de la lengua on a somewhat less touchy matter.
LANGLEY: The Renaissance was notable for the large number of
authors who used the form. Merely because of the odds, it may
be expected that some dialogue writers would risk their peace
and safety at one time or another. It was a period of strife and
danger. Still, Leon Battista Alberti, Lorenzo Valla, and even
Erasmus were not persecuted on account of their dialogues. The
Colloquies of Erasmus were Latin readers, not fighting dialogues.
TEDESCO: That's not entirely correct. I can think of one modeled
on Lucian which attacked warmongers. But it is true that many
dialogues were neither polemic nor philosophical. For example,
in sixteenth-century Venice, there appeared one by G. B. Vi mercato on sundials! But Erasmus's English friend, Sir Thomas
More, wrote a well-known dialogue connected, I believe, with his
struggle with Henry VIII.
LANGLEY: You are right. It is a long one, composed in prison before his martyrdom, entitled A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation. Its aim was to strengthen religious faith against the threat of
suffering and death. One section has particularly been praised by
literary historians as something that Socrates might have envied.
It is the conversation between the old prisoner, Anthony and his
nephew Vincent in which Anthony demonstrates that his captivity is not totally different from the condition of men outside. The
world is a prison, and all men are condemned to die.
FRANCIS: A thought expressed eloquently by Pascal. As for
polemic dialogues, in sixteenth-century France, one might ask
whether we have to wait until the philosophes put real fighting
spirit into the genre. I concur that the heroic annals of French
dialogue owe very little to such figures as Pontus de Tyard and
Jacques Tahureau, with all due respect to them. But we cannot
overlook Bonaventure des Periers's Cymbalum mundi nor Jean
Bodin's Heptaplomeres. It is true that Bodin did not put his book
into print. For a genuinely combative spirit long before the
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philosophes came on to the scene, we could look into Pascal's'provincial Letters. Through the intermediary of Louis de Montalte,
Pascal treats the Jesuits as Plato does the Sophists through the
intermediary of Socrates. Pascal does it with more animus and
with more esprit, if not with more spirit. The first ten letters are
all in dialogue. They express the tenacity of a beleaguered sect.
The annals of Port-Royal will be annals of defeat, to be sure,
regardless of Pascal's triumphs in college courses on French literature,-a Pyrrhic victory indeed!
TEDESCO: I think it would be interesting to examine more closely
the writings referred to, as human documents and as dramatizations of vital issues, from the Age of the Renaissance and the
Reformation to the Age of the Enlightenment and after. In fact,
I'd like to propose that we set aside an evening for just such a
discussion.
LANGLEY: If we have time we could carry the survey down to the
present day. I suppose we'll find less and less as we proceed.
TEDESCO: There may be more dialogues than we assume offhand
and excellent ones too. And how many are planned and never
get finished? This question occurred to me while reading Georg
Lukacs's foreword to his Theory of the Novel. He describes his state
of mind during the First World War. The young Hungarian was
deeply troubled by the war and strongly opposed to it. It was in
this frame of mind that he first conceived the book. In the beginning, he thought of preparing a series of dialogues. The speakers
would have been a group of young men trying to escape from the
prevailing war psychosis, like the storytellers of the Decameron
trying to escape the plague. Their conversations were to have led
them gradually to the problems treated in the book, from the
perspective of a Dostoyevskian world view. But thinking it over,
he gave up this plan and wrote the book as we have it. I wish we
could invite him here to explain just why he abandoned the
dialogue for the treatise. It would have countered Boileau's
Dialogue des heros de roman.
FRANCIS: That's the first time I ever heard Boileau mentioned with
Lukacs! I fail to see any resemblance. I suppose you mean that
whereas in the time of Boileau it was natural to utilize dialogue
for the topic, for Lukacs it had become impossible.
TEDESCO: That's really all I meant. But there is another theme we
should not lose sight of when we consider why the genre declined
in importance, and I should hope that you gentlemen would
assent to devoting still another evening or afternoon to this sub-
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ject. I have in mind something like this. With Plato, the dialogue
form engendered dialectic. It was his instrument for seeking
truth through the intercourse of minds. Socrates was the midwife
for the delivery of this wisdom from the brains of his disciples. As
Minerva was born from the head of Jupiter; the truth was born
from the mind of Phaedo, of Phaedrus, of Meno's slave-boy.
Thus, it was precisely in and through the dialogue that Plato
philosophized. Later philosophers did not compose dialogues, or
if they did, it was with other purposes in mind. It was not to
discover truth but only to present their conceptions of truth in a
persuasive way that Leibniz, Malebranche, Berkeley, and Hume
chose the dialogue form. Now it seems to me worthwhile to ascertain whether, in fact, the Platonic dialogue really came to an end
with Plato. I recall that Galileo, for example, has his spokesman
Salviati proceed with Simplicio almost like Socrates with Meno's
slave. Salviati interrogates Simplicio about a stone held on a
swinging stick. How will the stone move when it is released? With
his questions Salviati clears up the phenomenon for Simplicio,
who really knows but doesn't know he knows!
LANGLEY: I am fascinated by the idea of such a discussion. As we
have other things to do this afternoon, why don't we get together
tonight in Tedesco's comfortable study and resume the conversation, if the shade of Joseph de Maistre does not object to the use
of the word?
TEDESCO: You see how awkward it is to follow any of the classifications mentioned. The philosophical dialogue falls in naturally,
but the satirical and polemical types must be taken together. How
may we utilize the dialogues that have been produced through
the centuries to illustrate the fundamental religious, cultural, or
political issues of successive periods? We could all pool our intellectual resources. We might even go so far as to prepare ourselves in advance, so that our discussions may prove mutually
instructive. Or would you agree to risk falling into the pedantry
that this might involve?
LANGLEY: Since pedantry seems to be the only danger, I'm game!
TEDESCO: I propose we plan to meet next week for that. We can set
the details tonight.
FRANCIS: I take it that we're all in agreement. We'll meet tonight as
philosophers. And next week as historians.
LANGLEY: That's a large order! Ah, to be Bertrand Russell or
Hegel for an hour!
TEDESCO: Oh, be content to be yourself!

2. The Philosophical Dialogue
Evening in Tedesco's study.
Tedesco, Langley, Francis are present.

TEDESCO: I have been struck by the frequency of the word seminar
nowadays. It's like dialogue. It's become a catchword for almost
any gathering for the purpose of distributing information or of
sharing random thoughts. As seminaries become less influential,
seminars become more common. But the catchword is perhaps
an unconscious tribute to Socrates since a little bit of maieutics
makes for a successful seminar.
LANGLEY: Perhaps even the popularity in certain circles of brainstorming is also a tribute to Socrates. Isn't brainstorming an
aberrant form of maieutics? By the way, Francis, how would they
say that in the language of Descartes and Voltaire?
FRANCIS: I have heard the expression remue-meninges, but I doubt
Descartes would have approved of it. If brainstorming suggests
barnstorming, remue-meninges springs from remue-menage. Valery
might have enjoyed the coinage.
LANGLEY: Thank you, Francis. Now Tedesco, I wish you would
explain what you were saying about Galileo's Simplicio and the
stone thrown from a swinging stick.
TEDESCO: Well it concerns the angle of motion and angular
momentum. On the second day of their dialogue, Salviati remarks to Simplicio: "You yourself know that it cannot turn out
otherwise: although you pretend or try to pretend that you do
not know. But I am such a good midwife of brains that I'd make
you confess it by force." As long as people could believe that
dialogue might bring out new truths, the genre of dialogue could
thrive in philosophy. But when it became clear that science
needed observation and experiment, not to speak of mathematics, the philosophical dialogue began to decline in importance.
Galileo stands at a climacteric point in the history of thought.
9
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LANGLEY: But surely observation and experiment had been used
by Aristotle and his Lyceum, and mathematics by the Pythagoreans and by the Academy.
TEDESCO: Long before Galileo, what was once vital in that tradition
had become ossified. Scholars preferred the authority of Aristotle to the very practice of observation that Aristotle had pursued himself to become "il maestro di color che sanno."
FRANCIS: I have found in a Paris dissertation on Cicero a very apt
statement of the problem of Platonic dialogue. "Socratic discourse, of which the purest example is the Phaedrus, was something unique of its kind and had of necessity to become
exhausted eventually. Getting farther away from life, Plato approached the dogmatic manner of the school, and the first sign
of this transformation was the abandonment of maieutics in
favor of diairesis, the analysis of the concept, that is, the substitution of consecutive discourse for the series of questions and responses. Plato saved only the form of the dialogue ... but the
fiction is broken, Socrates would express himself sometimes as if
he knew the subject of his investigation in advance." Indeed, in
Theaetetus Socrates laid down limits for the maieutic method. It
was natural that Aristotle should break with what had become a
mere fiction. Hirzel was perhaps wrong to conclude that there
was an aesthetic decadence in the genre. It was the transformation of the old philosophical spirit that caused a break with the
old form. The evolution is very clearly to be seen in Cicero's
imitations of Greek philosophical dialogue.
TEDESCO: Cicero probably did not understand the maieutic
method and hence could not convey its essence to readers who
depended more on him than on the original works of Plato to
gain their conception of Socrates the thinker. Cicero's dialogues,
such as The Orator, fall into separate orations delivered by successive speakers. There is little opportunity for Socratic interchange
to arise. His Republic and his Laws suggest their models, but they
are more like the model of the latter than that of the former.
FRANCIS: French writers like Montaigne and La Mothe Le Vayer
saw Socrates not as the midwife of ideas but as the sage. That
view would be in accord with Cicero.
LANGLEY: None of the outstanding thinkers after Galileo and
down to Leibniz seems to have used the dialogue. Isaac Newton,
for example, had apparently little use for dialogue, except with
himself, if we are to accept Wordsworth's conception of him.
Referring to his statue and silent face, the poet wrote, as you
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recall:
The marble index of a mind forever
Voyaging through strange seas of thought, alone.

Doubtless a modern like Bertrand Russell would have considered
that a highly romantic idea of what a mathematician does. Still,
the more abstract reaches of mathematics must be too difficult to
be treated in dialogue.
FRANCIS: Could you, Langley, tell us whether Russell discussed
this?
LANGLEY: Yes, as I am sure Tedesco also knows, Russell comments
on the Socratic method in his History of Philosophy. He declares
that empirical science is unsuitable for treatment in this way. But
mathematics is not specifically mentioned in the passage which
runs as follows: "When in the Phaedo and in the Meno, [Socrates]
applies his method to empirical problems, he has to ask leading
questions which any judge would disallow. The method is in
harmony with the doctrine of reminiscence, according to which
we learn by remembering what we knew in a former existence.
As against this view, consider any discovery that has been made
by means of the microscope ... it can hardly be maintained that
such knowledge can be elicited from a previously ignorant person by the method of question and answer."
FRANCIS: Doesn't Russell grant it some usefulness in other respects?
LANGLEY: He goes on to say: "The matters that are suitable for
treatment by the Socratic method are those as to which we have
already enough knowledge to come to a right conclusion, but
have failed through confusion of thought or lack of analysis to
make the best logical use of what we know. A question such as
'What is justice?' is eminently suited for discussion in a Platonic
dialogue .... But when our inquiry is concluded, we have made
only a linguistic discovery, not a discovery in ethics."
TEDESCO: I believe that Russell is highly critical of Plato throughout his account. He even suggests that Socrates would not have
been so brave in facing death had he not believed in immortality.
FRANCIS: I cannot help but think of how certain celebrated freethinkers, or atheists, for that matter, have faced death for their
acts or their opinions, Vanini, for example. As for fictional figures, there is Brotteaux des Ilettes of Anatole France's novel
dealing with the French Revolution, Les Dieux ont soif. Brotteaux
pauses to contemplate the pretty features of the girl Athenais
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before saying farewell to life. At a corresponding moment, Socrates strokes the fair locks of Phaedo. Socrates perhaps expected
to see him again, not so Brotteaux after the guillotine. The motif
reminds me of Albert Camus's stranger Meursault and his evaluation of his girlfriend's hair as against the spurious hope of an
afterlife, spurious for him that is.
LANGLEY: We shouldn't get sidetracked here. It strikes me that the
case of Vanini would more appropriately come up at our next
discussion, since it involved religious issues. Going back to Russell, at least he values the Socratic method as a means of eliminating prejudice and misunderstanding. But is that still the Socratic
method? It becomes something much more general, a meeting of
minds rather than a seeding of minds, if you will excuse the
expression.
TEDESCO: Certainly we owe much credit to Socrates for the ideal of
free, unfettered discussion, free from outside pressure, unfettered by chains of any sort. But insofar as there was method to it,
Socratic discussion was not free; he was there to guide it in his
unassuming, if not imperceptible, way. When discussion becomes
free even from guidance, it is called conversation. The Socratic
method stops short of free association.
FRANCIS: Aren't there other values to the method which even disbelievers in anamnesis would acknowledge? By the way, did Bertrand Russell write any dialogues?
LANGLEY: Oh, he wrote a philosophical tale called "The
Perplexities of John Forstice," but it's only partly in dialogue.
We could go back to an earlier British philosopher who did write
dialogue, and who outlined several valuable uses for it.
FRANCIS: Bishop Berkeley? But Berkeley was Irish, not English.
LANGLEY: No, I have in mind David Hume, who wasn't English
either, but Scottish. In justifying his choice of the form in his
Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Hume adduces two advantages possessed by the procedure for this topic in particular: "To
deliver a SYSTEM in conversation scarcely seems natural," he remarks, perhaps in allusion to Berkeley. "There are some subjects, however, to which dialogue-writing is peculiarly
adapted .... Any point of doctrine which is so obvious, that it
scarcely admits of dispute, but at the same time so important,
that it cannot be too often inculcated ... where the vivacity of
conversation may enforce the precept." But this method is evidently not Socratic, it is simply didactic. Hume did offer another
use of dialogue: "Any question of philosophy ... which is so
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obscure and uncertain, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to it; if it should be treated at all; seems
to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue." Socrates, you
recall, already said in the Philebus that the theory of Ideas will
probably always continue to be a theme for the ingenuity of
young dialecticians. Hume's sentence ends with a note we can
hope will always be in harmony with our own conversations here:
dialogue "unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human
life, study and society." The topic of natural religion combines
these circumstances. What truth so obvious, so important, yet so
obscure as the Being of God? How could the skeptic Hume make
this statement? Well, at the end of the discourse, he declares: "To
be a philosophical Sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and
most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian."
FRANCIS: How like Pascal, yet how different the tone!
LANGLEY: Could we now summarize the several uses of the
philosophical dialogue mentioned? First, the maieutic, which I
presume only Platonists would allow, or try to apply.
TEDESCO: Hold on, I don't think you should dismiss it so hastily.
There must be more to it than that. And how can you say "only
Platonists"? That's a lot of people.
LANGLEY: Perhaps I was hasty. But for the sake of clarity, maybe
we should defer discussion of that point until later, and finish
with an outline of uses. The second use of dialogue is for unfettered discussion, which, we may agree with Russell, helps to eliminate prejudice and the uncritical acceptance of comfortable but
contradictory beliefs. Third, as Hume suggested, to give a fresh
turn to trite but important truths. And fourth, again following
Hume, for the discussion of obscure and uncertain philosophical
questions.
FRANCIS: That seems to be a good outline. Yet I suspect that we
might find still other uses, if we tried. Now, however, I'd like to
ask Tedesco whether Hegel had anything pertinent to say on the
subject.
TEDESCO: Here is what he stated in his History of Philosophy: "The
dialogue seems to be the form best suited for representing an
argument, because it sways hither and thither; the different sides
are allotted to different persons, and thus the argument is made
more animated. The dialogue has, however, this disadvantage,
that it seems to be carried on arbitrarily, so that at the end the
feeling always remains that the matter might have turned out
differently . . . . Just as in the Catechism the answers are pre-
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scribed to the questions asked, so it is in these dialogues, for they
who answer have to say what the author pleases."
LANGLEY: Hegel seems to disapprove of Plato as much as Russell
does.
TEDESCO: No, not entirely. For his next sentence reads: "The question is so framed that quite a simple answer is alone possible, and
thanks to the artistic beauty and power of the dialogues, such an
answer appears at the same time perfectly natural." I confess that
this is, in a way, damning with high praise, for such art may be
deceptive. Our consultation of Hegel reminds me that his remarks on anamnesis are even more interesting, and we should
bring them in when we take up the question of maieutics later on.
But may I ask Francis what other uses of dialogue he was hinting
at just now?
FRANCIS: What I meant was that there may be another motive for
writing dialogue, and one which actuated Hume, although he
did not specify it. I mean, in order to avoid trouble in the presentation of controversial ideas.
LANGLEY: Ah, but he left this book to be published only after his
death; whereas he published bolder works himself during his
lifetime that were not in dialogue, like his Essay on Miracles.
FRANCIS: Well, if prudence was not a motive for H ume, it certainly
must have been for others. It must have been the case in less
tolerant intellectual climates. Instances would be the Cymbalum
mundi and the Heptaplomeres in sixteenth-century France or
seventeenth-century libertins like La Mothe Le Vayer with his
mouthpieces Orasius Tubero and Tubertus Ocella.
TEDESCO: Quite so! In fact Albert Einstein surmised that it was the
motive for Galileo's choice of the dialogue form.
FRANCIS: But that didn't help him! And it had helped Giordano
Bruno even less!
LANGLEY: Perhaps because it was too obvious what their maneuver
was.
FRANCIS: There is another use of dialogue which occurs to me. It is
for intellectual sport.
TEDESCO: Do you mean what Huizinga says about it in his book
Homo ludens?
FRANCIS: I think his treatment is too sweeping. The concept of
play is not a master key that opens all locks. To state that every
activity can be reduced to play leaves playas something so general that little is really explained. However, what he writes about
"play-forms in philosophy" fits our lock very well.
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TEDESCO: Or, to divert Kant's phrase to another context:
Z weekmiissigkeit ohne Z week?
FRANCIS: That may be it indeed. The dialogues of Ernest Renan
are good examples of "play-forms in philosophy." Renan was
once held to be the very model of a dilettante of ideas. Nevertheless, his attitude was not purely frivolous. In the preface to his
Dialogues philosophiques he wrote that he chose the dialogue form
to state his philosophy because the form is not dogmatic and
permits presenting successively the different aspects of the problem without the obligation to come to a conclusion. As he put it:
"The problems treated are those we never cease thinking of,
even while knowing very well that we'll never solve them."
LANGLEY: But that's precisely one of the functions designated by
Hume: "Any question of philosophy ... which is so obscure and
uncertain that we can reach no fixed determination with regard
to it ... seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue."
FRANCIS: There is a more personal and, may I say, playful, note in
Renan's description of the procedure: "These are the peaceful
dialogues to which the separate lobes of my brain customarily
devote themselves, when I allow them to digress in complete
freedom."
TEDESCO: How does that differ essentially from Plato's description
in The Sophist of thought and discourse: "It is the interior voiceless converse of a soul with itself to which we have given this
particular name, thought."
FRANCIS: The difference consists in that complete freedom Renan
emphasized. Later examples in French of the playful style are
provided by Anatole France, Remy de Gourmont, and even Paul
Valery. Their forerunner was Diderot, with his pleasantry in Le
Neveu de Rameau: "Mes pensees sont mes catins," echoed perhaps
in Valery'S poem "Aurore": "Mattresses de l'ame, Idees, Courtisanes par ennui?"
TEDESCO: In a very different spirit, didn't Martin Luther call Reason: diese Hure?
LANGLEY: I must say that I find more elegant those phrases of
Diderot and Valery about ideas being like ladies of the night. Yet
I think they're all on the wrong track. Maieutics involves thinking
that produces results as against thinking as an end in itself, a
mere pleasure. Renan and the others like him seem to be intellectual voluptuaries, condemned, willingly it would seem, to sterility.
TEDESCO: You can't say that they haven't had a lot of descendants.
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Just look around us.
FRANCIS: It seems to me that we are being cavalier with Renan. His
playful remark about his dialogues being the diversion of the
lobes of his brain should be taken in conjunction with other
things. As he wrote in his introduction, many ideas in the
dialogues were the brain children born from the conversations
he had held through the years with his friend, the chemist
Marcelin Berthelot. In his Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse, Renan
describes their friendship, which started in early manhood, as a
sort of common fermentation of ideas. It was an intellectual
friendship consisting in what they learned together.
LANGLEY: I realize that Renan accomplished a great deal of real
work as a historian and philologist. What I said about him applies
only to his dialogues. Yet it seems to me that this attitude of his
led him to a distorted view of Plato's dialogues also. I quote
Renan's opinion given by Paul Shorey in Platonism Ancient and
Modern: "Plato is an incomparable philosopher. I only regret the
wrong that has been done him in exposing him to the rather
pedantic admiration of young disciples who have undertaken to
discover a fixed and systematic body of doctrine in the delightful
philosophic fantasies that this rare mind has left us."
TEDESCO: Renan perhaps saw Plato too much in his own image.
FRANCIS: I am inclined to agree. One who was of Renan's lineage
in a way, Andre Maurois, echoes Renan's phrases to a different
purpose. In his Portrait d'un ami qui s'appelait moi, he wrote:
"Monologue is not my strong point, whether it is in a novel or in
essay, my instinct goes straight to dialogue .... I feel an imperious need of impartiality, a need to retouch and correct my focus.
Dialogue lends itself to that. . . . I am in turn each of the two
interlocutors that I put on the scene. That does not imply lack of
will. There comes the moment for decision, for imposing silence
on the two interlocutors-for action. But until then, methodical
doubt and dialogue of 'the two lobes of my brain.' "
LANGLEY: Maurois makes me think of Hamlet. There seems to be
little connection between his philosophical speculations and his
decisions to act. He cuts his own Gordian knot.
TEDESCO: Perhaps we are on a rather superficial level with
Maurois. Suppose we go back to Hegel's observations on the
method of Socrates. That brings us to grips with the doctrine of
anamnesis. Hegel did not believe that Plato's concept of recollection should be taken literally. In his Lectures on the History of
Philosophy he states: "When Plato speaks of knowledge as of a
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recollection, he knows all the time that this is only putting the
matter in similes and metaphors; he did not ask, as the theologians used gravely to do, whether the soul had existed before its
birth, and, if so, in what particular place. It cannot be said of
Plato that he had any such belief. ... But what Plato expressed as
the truth is that consciousness in the individual is in reason the
divine reality and life; that man perceives and recognizes it in
pure thought, and that this knowledge is itself the heavenly
abode and movement. ... learning is only a recollection, and this
implies that the soul is already implicitly what it becomes. We
must not think that the bald conception of innate ideas is hereby
indicated-such an expression implies the existence of ideas by
nature."
Hegel remarks further: "In one sense recollection [Erinnerung]
is certainly an uriforfunate expression in the sense that an idea is
reproduced which has already existed at another time." It is here
that Hegel's German is clearer than the English translation:
"Aber Erinnerrung hat auch einen anderen Sinn, den die
Etymologie giebt, - den: Sichinnerlichmachen, Insichgehen;
diess ist der Tiefe Gedankensinn des Wortes." (But recollection
has another sense, which is given by its etymology, namely that of
making oneself inward, going inward, and this is the profound
thought embodied in the word.) I proceed, quoting from the
translation: "Plato represents the implicit existence of mind in
the form of a pre-existence in time, as if the truth had already
been for us in another time. But ... we must remark that he does
not propound this as a philosophical doctrine, but in the form of
a saying received from priests and priestesses who comprehend
what is divine ... an Egyptian idea."
LANGLEY: You've served up something there that takes some chewing. It reminds me of Jerome Eckstein's words on the Meno in his
book The Platonic Method: "I believe that Plato intends his slaveboy 'demonstration' to be taken as a farce and not as a paradigm
of teaching."
TEDESCO: Hegel denied that Plato believed in recollection as a
philosophical doctrine, but he didn't call it a farce.
FRANCIS: I imagine both Hegel and Plato were serious about it,
although the Athenian could be playful at the same time. Farce
certainly doesn't seem to be the mot juste.
TEDESCO: May we go back for a moment to the Renaissance, to the
Platonists of that time? There is Marsilio Ficino, whose Commentary on the Symposium bears the words: "That the soul is born
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endowed with truth .... That is what Socrates proved to children
like Phaedo, Theaetetus, and Meno, and he taught that children
could give true replies in all arts, if one questioned them judiciously, for they are endowed by nature with the reasons of all arts
and disciplines." And there is Peter Ramus, who discussed the
Meno at some length, in his Dialectique. They didn't take it for a
farce.
FRANCIS: You remind me of Guy de Brues's Dialogues, and also of
Antoine d'Urfe's pious words in his dialogue: "God having endowed our mind naturally with the seeds of all truth."
TEDESCO: We may mention Galileo's unhappy contemporary, Vanini, who wrote in a dialogue: "The human soul possesses in
itself the knowledge of all things, the knowledge of all tongues,
for it is of celestial origin and partakes of the divine essence: but
it finds in deploying its forces the same resistance that a burning
coal does that is covered with ashes; thus the fires of our mind
need to be excited in order to dispel the thick humors that cover
it and in order to shine with a pure and resplendent light; thus
did Plato say that our science is but a reminiscence." In another
dialogue, however, he quotes Cardan, who questions its validity
as an argument for immortality. How can a newborn babe possess a memory of a prior existence? Vanini denies that the
hypothesis could even be tested.
LANGLEY: I have been troubled all along by what seems to me to be
a confusion between the two concepts of anamnesis and maieutics. For Socrates and Plato, they went together, no doubt, whatever precise meaning we adopt for them. Nevertheless, they can
be distinguished, and I think they should be when we examine
some of the examples that have been produced. For all these
authors did not understand them to be integrally connected,
perhaps because certain authors were using one or both of these
terms as mere catchwords which would serve to prove that the
notions themselves were indeed obsolescent.
TEDESCO: In order to avoid the confusion, we could speak of
maieutics as the method and of reminiscence as the basis of the
method. The first belongs to epistemology, the second to ontology. Our whole argument comes down to determining whether
they must stand or fall together. Perhaps they're not even dependent on each other in Plato. Jowett inferred that the
Theaetetus was of later date because the doctrine of recollection is
absent from it. Yet this dialogue, along with the earlier Meno, is a
prime source for the concept of maieutics.
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FRANCIS: That doesn't disprove that there was a connection, that
is, a genetic, not necessarily a logical connection.
TEDESCO: I imagine the history of ideas contains other examples of
the parent notion dying and the offspring surviving. But I believe Langley wanted to say something that I interrupted.
LANGLEY: I wanted to introduce Shaftesbury, who, by the way, also
wrote dialogue. In The Moralists, he refers to both anamnesis and
maieutics, but in separate passages, speculating about the first
while embracing the second. Toward the beginning of the
dialogues, Theodes exhorts his friend Philodes, who has expressed his skepticism about the value oflife: "Now to be assured
that we can never be concerned in anything hereafter, we must
... truly know ourselves, and in what this self of ours consists.
We must determine against pre-existence, and give a better reason for our never having been concerned in aught before our
birth than merely 'because we remember not, nor are conscious.'
For in many things we have been concerned to no purpose, of
which we have now no memory or consciousness remaining. And
thus we may happen to be again and again to perpetuity, for any
reason we can show to the contrary." It is an exhortation to his
friend to reflect that life may indeed be a less indifferent thing
than he imagines. But whereas the hypothesis of pre-existence is
mentioned, the notion of anamnesis is not positively entertained.
Furthermore, there is no direct connection with a much later
passage which elaborately develops the metaphor of the birth of
ideas. Allow me to read a few pertinent excerpts: "'Tis you,
Theodes, must help my labouring mind, and be as it were the
midwife to those conceptions; which else, I fear, will prove abortive." Theodes replies: "You do well ... to give me the midwife's
part only; for the mind conceiving of itself, can only be, as you
say, assisted in the birth. Its pregnancy is from its nature." Philodes asks: "Do you maintain ... that these mental children, the
notions of fair, just, and honest, with the rest of these ideas, are
innate?" Theodes's answer indorses innate ideas, while stopping
short of anamnesis: "Anatomists tell us that the eggs, which are
the principles in body, are innate, being formed already in the
foetus before the birth. But when it is, whether before, or at, or
after the birth, or at what time after, that either these or other
principles, organs of sensation, or sensations themselves, are first
formed in us, is a matter, doubtless, of curious speculation, but of
no great importance." Thus Shaftesbury dispenses with anamnesis, while retaining maieutics.
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FRANCIS: The conclusion of Voltaire's "Dialogues entre Lucrece et
Posidonius" is almost an echo of that. Lucretius asks Posidonius if
ideas were created at the moment of conception of the animal
body, or were they created before? Do they wait for bodies before entering them or do they lodge there only when the animal
is ready to receive them? Finally, is it in the Supreme Being that
each animated creature sees the ideas of things? Po sidon ius
avows his ignorance almost like Theocles, declaring his belief in
deism to be enough for him. But Voltaire doesn't mention midwives.
TEDESCO: Without embracing the notion of anamnesis, unless his
pre-established harmony is a version of it, Leibniz did adopt the
maieutic concept. In the Nouveaux Essais, Theophile cites the
Meno: "All arithmetic and all geometry are innate and within us
in a virtual manner, so that we can find them by considering
attentively what we have in our minds, without using any fact
learned by experience or from tradition, as Plato showed in a
dialogue where he presents Socrates leading a child to abstruse
truths merely by asking questions without telling him anything."
FRANCIS: Leibniz's contemporary Malebranche is perhaps an even
more striking example. He employed a sort of maieutic method
in his dialogues. His Conversations chretiennes presents three
speakers discussing the question "That there is a God and it is
only He who truly acts within us." Theodore leads the discussion
and serves as midwife for the young Eraste, almost like Socrates
in the Meno. Eraste is guided into finding the truth of the proposition in his own mind. Theodore calls upon the third speaker,
Aristarque, to bear witness to the process: "You, Aristarque, have
you observed how he proceeds? He consults the master who
teaches him in the secret places of his reason. He answers only in
accord with himself; he certifies only what he sees: and that's why
I challenge you to derive directly any false consequence from his
replies." Theodore underlines the point: "See, Aristarque, when
it's God who speaks, when it's the Inner Truth that replies, there
is no creature that doesn't lead us to the Creator." Aristarque
seems almost convinced as he answers: "I cannot express to you
the joy that I feel in this new way of philosophizing. I rejoice to
see that children and ignorant people are the most capable of
true wisdom, and I am charmed to learn from Eraste truths I had
never thought of." But oddly enough, Theodore senses no irony
in these remarks. Malebranche's Theodore anticipates
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Wordsworth: "The youth ... still is Nature's priest ... Thou best
philosopher. "
The exchange between Theodore and his friends is amusing in
a way that perhaps Malebranche had not intended. Eraste thinks
it is self-evident that a corporal thing cannot act of itself. There
had to be a Creator who established certain general laws to regulate the movement of bodies. Aristarque protests that Eraste is
going too fast and is losing himself. But Theodore denies that,
and asks Eraste for confirmation: "Do you understand, Eraste?"
And Eraste replies that he does. Whereupon Theodore brushes
aside Aristarque's objections. It is true that Malebranche makes
the latter appear to be in the wrong, and he lends himself to this
maneuver. Yet his objections do have some pertinence he is not
allowed to pursue.
The editor of one critical edition, L. Bridet, is quite convinced,
however, by Theodore, and concludes: "Theodore excels in the
practice of maieutics with his auditors. Thus he demonstrates, or
rather has them discover, the existence of God."
LANGLEY: That is quite similar to a passage in Berkeley's Alciphron.
Let me see if I can locate it. Yes, Alciphron says: "For my part, I
have no interest in denying a God. Any man may believe or not
believe a God, as he pleases. But after all, Euphranor must allow
me to stare a little at his conclusions." Euphranor answers: "The
conclusions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them
by your own concessions .... You, it seems, stare to find that God
is not far from everyone of us."
FRANCIS: By the way, is there anything to the story of Berkeley's
visit to Malebranche and the argument that excited the latter so
much that it led to his death? It is reported by Thomas De Quincey in "Murder as a Fine Art."
LANGLEY: That anecdote must have been invented by some London wits.
TEDESCO: Plato believed that ideas have their source in some kind
of recollection, whereas Malebranche, after Descartes, believed
that true ideas come from God, who would not deceive. Would
you agree that Berkeley was close to Malebranche in this respect?
LANGLEY: It has been said that Malebranche's conception of seeing
all things in God was at the back of the Berkeleyan idea. Malebranche's dialogues have not been favored with the praise accorded to Berkeley's. G. Dawes Hicks said of the Entretiens sur fa
metaphysique, sur fa religion et sur fa mort: "The Entretiens do not
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have the artistic charm of Alciphron, although they may be compared ... with Hylas and Philonous ... the dramatic setting is not
without its attractiveness, and one derives from it a fairly clear
impression of the kind of atmosphere in the midst of which
Malebranche's life was lived."
FRANCIS: Hippolyte Taine denies there was any real-life
background to them. In an essay on Plato's young men, Taine
drags in Malebranche by the hem of his cassock. Nor does he
forget Leibniz: "Plato is the only philosopher who has been able
to give life to dissertations. Malebranche's Theotime, Leibniz's
Philalethe are abstractions under the names of men. . . . The
dialogue is only a borrowed ornament, added to hide the dryness
of subject. ... On the other hand, if Plato writes dialogues, it's
because he listens to them." I don't quite agree with Taine. I'd
agree rather with your Mr. Hicks. Malebranche might well have
modeled parts of his dialogues on seminary debates. It is true
that we sometimes catch sight of his hand moving his marionettes. Plato's hand is not so visible, although we suspect he occasionally distorts those real-life models bearing the names of Protagoras or Gorgias. And we cannot identify Malebranche's models so easily, except in the case of his obvious mouthpieces.
FRANCIS: I can produce an example of so-called maieutics of the
period.
TEDESCO: I'd like to hear it.
FRANCIS: It is from Fontenelle. In the dialogue des morts between
Socrates and Montaigne, the two are heard debating one of Fontenelle's favorite topics, the Quarrel of the Ancients and the
Moderns. Montaigne believes men have degenerated since antiquity, whereas Socrates expects that they can only have improved. Montaigne is obliged to admit that men never change
much through the ages, and Socrates seizes on this admission to
prove that Montaigne erred in assuming the Moderns were
worse than the Ancients. Montaigne exclaims that Socrates had
misled him into saying what he hadn't intended to say, "here I
am delivered of a proposition quite contrary to what I set forth."
Yet the exchange of remarks hardly justifies this construction.
Montaigne had made his admission inadvertently, not prompted
by Socrates, who really has not been given enough time by Fontenelle to perform any obstetrics. If Fontenelle was being subtle,
his irony would be lost on most readers. I refer here to the effort
by an editor of the dialogue to explain Fontenelle's purpose: "In
the conversation where Socrates convicts Montaigne of being il-
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logical, the dialectic gains an illusory success. Montaigne, floored,
doubtless is laudatory of maieutics .... But the eulogy is so extreme that irony is born from the excess of praise ... regarding
the reputedly invincible dialectic. Considering the difficulty over
which it triumphs, one is led to doubt that the triumph is worth
such praise. A little common sense would suffice. Socrates ... has
the air of a sleight-of-hand performer. ... Fontenelle copies the
procedure, in order to parody it." The editor sees the irony as
exposing maieutics to be an overrated method. But what if Fontenelle simply failed to understand the method? Fontenelle himself was to confess the weakness of this dialogue in hisJugement de
Pluton. He has Montaigne make this avowal: "I am caught and I
give birth stupidly .... I assure you that if I had to do it again, I
would give my midwife a lot more trouble; for I who claim that
the Ages have degenerated, can I then say that all men have the
same dispositions, the same penchants? My defeat should be a
littk more difficult, if only for the greater glory of Socrates."
Pluto's judgment follows: "Let not Socrates employ his familiar
Demon in disputes to divine the thoughts of others, and let not
Montaigne bear offspring so easily."
It seems evident that Fontenelle acknowledged that his
dialogue was superficial. In other words, his presentation of the
Socratic method was somewhat frivolous and irresponsible, and
not subtly ironic. This is not the only time in his Jugement de
Pluton that Fontenelle made amends to Socrates or Plato!
TEDESCO: With respect to his use of irony, as well as his
philosophical position, Fontenelle seems closer to Lucian than to
Plato.
FRANCIS: His position is the relativism of the honnele homme of the
beginning of the French Enlightenment. This can be seen in
some other dialogues, where his Anacreon opposes Aristotle, his
"False Demetrius" opposes the traditional Descartes, just as
Lycinus opposes the philosophers in the Hermotimus. In fact, in
the dialogue with the "False Demetrius," Descartes turns even
against himself, that is, against the historical Descartes.
TEDESCO: I am glad that you agree with me that in these dialogues
Fontenelle follows Lucian rather than Plato. It brings us here to
the distinction we should establish between irony and maieutics.
Socratic irony is understood as being apparent self-denigration
with the aim of exposing the fallacies of the adversary. It may
lead the adversary to stumble through overconfidence. Facing a
Sophist, Socrates might use this maneuver, just as Pascal's Mon-
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talte does in confronting the Jesuit. But this is not maieutics. The
irony is used against the Sophist in order that Socrates's disciple
and Plato's reader may see the truth. The irony thus serves the
maieutic purpose, but is not to be confused with it. Now Lucian's
satires may utilize such irony against the philosophers, but they
are not maieutic dialogues. Lucian is thus a touchstone enabling
us to distinguish the later uses of Socratic irony. In the didactic
dialogues of Cicero, there is little irony-there is no maieutic
either. In Erasmus's Colloquies there is Lucianic irony rather than
Socratic, despite the worshipful admiration Erasmus felt for Socrates.
LANGLEY: Webster defines irony as "pretended ignorance, with the
intention of irritating or perplexing an opponent in dispute."
However, Socrates sought truth not only against but also with his
opponent.
TEDESCO: Now may we loo~ at anamnesis from another angle, for
example, from an evolutionist angle? We knew things before we
were born because our ancestors' survival depended on their
adaptation to the external world. It could be called the survival of
the fittest beliefs about space, time, weight, volume, and so forth.
FRANCIS: That would imply the inheritance of patterns of thought.
LANGLEY: Yes, of innate ideas. And Locke refuted those!
FRANCIS: Evidently not to Leibniz's satisfaction. The point brings
us to Leibniz's dialogues, which he entitled Nouveaux Essais sur
l'entendement humain precisely in rejoinder to Locke's Essay on
Human Understanding. As I need not remind you, he replied to
Locke's scholastic slogan "Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in
sensu" with "Nothing but the Intellect itself!"
TEDESCO: Leibniz was a Platonist ~n his way, believing in his own
version of innate ideas. It is unfortunate for our purpose that he
did not write dialogues like Plato, allowing the antagonist that
chance for give-and-take in an actual clash of opinions. Leibniz's
work is not much more than Descartes's replies to the objections
to his Meditations, for Descartes also quoted the objections quite
fully before rebutting them.
LANGLEY: That is another illustra,tion of how difficult genuine
Socratic dialogue has become since Plato.
FRANCIS: And we have already noted that Plato himself abandoned
it in his later dialogues.
LANGLEY: It would be valuable to have Aristotle's lost dialogues, if
only to check whether Aristotle also did that, before adopting the
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treatise and the lecture for conveying his thoughts and discoverIes.
TEDESCO: Before we get too far away from what I ventured about
anamnesis in the light of evolution, I'd like to try to clarify it. I
was thinking that the geometry lesson in Plato's Meno has antecedents in the descent of man. Research in the evolution of intelligence might even help to clear up the problem of innate ideas.
FRANCIS: Obviously you mean the descent of man in the Darwinian
sense, and not in the sense of the neo-Platonists who thought of
man as a sort of fallen god!
LANGLEY: I have sometimes wondered if Darwin would have had
less opposition if he had entitled his book The Ascent of Man, like
Jacob Bronowski.
FRANCIS: I don't think that that would have helped at all! Besides,
Bronowski's title is obviously an echo of Darwin's.
TEDESCO: What I have in mind is the coordination through evolution of all the senses involved in space and location, sight and
touch, and the kinesthetic sense.
LANGLEY: Why not go farther and seek a forerunner to Meno's
slave in the salmon finding its-way upstream to its home pool for
breeding.
FRANCIS: Now I would say that that analogy is pretty fishy! There
was no Socratic salmon prompting the fish's ancestors.
TEDESCO: Nevertheless, there might have been in the evolution of
that species a phase where learned behavior of a rudimentary
sort became fixed in instinct. I found a fascinating treatment of
another species of fish in a recent book on The Evolution of Intelligence by David Stenhouse. He refers to the goby living in tidal
pools which has "such an accurate knowledge of the relevant
spatial relationships that at low tide, when the pools are separated by dry areas of rock, the fish can leap from pool to pool
without much risk of missing the target."
LANGLEY: I have the impression that pursuing this particular line
of thought would require getting extremely technical. I confess
that I would find myself out of my depth in those pools, shallow
as they may be!
FRANCIS: Certainly maieutics cannot be part of the salmon's or
goby's equipment! There have, however, been writers who see in
animal behavior a proof of the doctrine of innate ideas, Joseph
de Maistre, for example.
TEDESCO: Well, suppose we approach the subject from another
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direction-the past of the human race understood as a repository of ancient knowledge, which can be drawn upon for the
good of mankind if we have the proper means. Here we enter
the domain of comparative mythology, which Jung sought to
clarify with his concept of the collective unconscious. As Mircea
Eliade put it: "The world of the archetypes of Jung somewhat
resembles the world of Platonic Ideas: the archetypes are transpersonal and do not partake of the historical Time of the individual, but of the Time of the species, indeed of Organic Life."
LANGLEY: That sounds a little like your quotation of Hegel in
which he termed Platonic reminiscence an Egyptian idea. We
could thus go even farther and by way of the Pythagoreans get as
far as India, where it is said Buddha remembered all his previous
existences, not just one, as in the disputed case of Plato.
TEDESCO: We should perhaps stick to Plato and his tradition. In
this respect, the German romantic Friedrich Schlegel follows the
current. He provides a background of Hegel. Do we not read in
Shlegel'sPhilosophy of History these remarks on reminiscence? "By
this doctrine of reminiscence, which is the fundamental tenet of
the Platonic system, this philosophy has a strong coincidence or
affinity with the Indian doctrine of Metempsychosis, by the supposition it involves of the prior existence of the human soul. ...
If we would understand this notion in a more spiritual sense-as
the awakening of the consciousness of the divine image implanted in our souls-as the soul's perception of that image, this
theory would then perfectly coincide with the Christian doctrine .... " Another example is that of the romantic philosopher
Friedrich Schelling, contemporary and rival of Hegel. Here are a
few extracts from his writings which show how persistent the
belief in some form of anemnesis has been in modern thought:
"What we call knowledge is just striving after conscious recollection." He also said, "We struggle and strive for that knowledge
just because it ought to be within us, because it belongs to our
nature. Plato already set up the doctrine-and, of course, even
as a tradition from a still older time-that all true knowledge is
only reminiscence .... In knowledge we only strive toward where
we were, i.e., where what is essentially human in us was before."
LANGLEY: How does that fit in with what you said about archetypes?
TEDESCO: Well, Schelling discusses them in the very same passage:
" ... this archetype of things slumbers in the soul like an
obscured and forgotten, even if not completely obliterated, im-
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age. Perhaps it would never awaken again, if the divining and
yearning toward discernment did not lie in that same dark region."
FRANCIS: How suggestive of Marcel Proust's own quest for essencel
TEDESCO: Schelling's statement is interesting for another reason
for he deals with the very subject of philosophical dialogue that
we are trying to clear up. I cite only the sentence that is especially
relevant: "This separation, this duplication of ourselves, this secret intercourse in which there are two essences, an asking one
and an answering one, an ignorant one which, however, seeks
knowledge, and a knowing one which, however, does not know
its knowledge-this silent dialogue, this inner art of conversation, the peculiar secret of the philosopher, is that of which the
external, therefore called dialectic, is the imitation .... Thus,
according to its nature, everything known is retold. The known,
however, is not something lying finished and ready to hand from
the beginning but something always first arising from within."
Schelling is, perhaps, not too far from Hegel here. And Plato
referred to that inner art of conversation in The Sophist.
FRANCIS: Joseph de Maistre has something along this line. His
main spokesman is the Count, a believer in innate ideas. He
declares: "although there are original notions common to all
men, without which they would not be men, and which are consequently accessible, or rather, natural, to all men, nevertheless,
these ideas are not all accessible to the same degree. There are,
on the contrary, some ideas which are more or less dormant, and
others more or less dominant in each mind." This is strikingly
like what you quoted from Vanini. The Count also reminds us of
Ficino: "The essence of intelligence is to know and to love. The
limits of its knowledge are those of its nature. The immortal
being does not learn anything: it knows by essence all that it is to
know .... This need, this hunger for knowledge, which stirs
man, is but the natural tendency of his being that bears him
toward his primordial state and gives the evidence to him of what
he is."
TEDESCO: I'm glad you reminded us of Vanini and of the ashes
covering that divine spar k within us. Since I have just mentioned
Schlegel, may I produce a passage from his Dialogue on Poetry?
"We can perceive the music of the universe and the beauty of the
poem because ... a spark of the poet's creative spirit lives in us,
glowing with secret strength under the ashes of our self-induced
unreason."
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LANGLEY: I still don't get the connection with Jung's archetypes.
TEDESCO: Mircea Eliade may help us on this point. In Aspects of
Myth, he wrote: "It is not a question of forgetting previous existences-that is, the sum of personal experience, of 'history'but of forgetting the trans personal and eternal truths, the
Ideas." That is by now very familiar to us. Where Eliade offers us
something quite new is in the concept of historiographic anamnesis,
which is the effort of modern Western thinkers to resuscitate the
total past of mankind by a joint enterprise of comparative
mythology and history, as well as psychology.
LANGLEY: And here I thought that anamnesis was an obsolescent,
if not an obsolete, idea!
TEDESCO: Aside from Jung and Eliade, it is amazing how often it is
still invoked by thinkers of divergent schools of thought. I have
even encountered it in a book called The Far Side of Madness by
the psychiatrist]. W. Perry. And it is simply in the medical sense,
found also in Freud, where one might think the term case history
would be just as apt.
LANGLEY: But that would lack the aura of mystery. On this line, we
may add the theological usage. In Christian communion, the
congregation is said to share by anamnesis in the Passion of the
Lord.
FRANCIS: Platonic reminiscence certainly preserves a poetic value,
as Tedesco indicated in connection with Schlegel. The French
poet St. John Perse declaims in his long poetic work Vents: "Mais
si tout m'est connu, vivre n'est-il que revoir? ... Et tout nous est
reconnaissance. Et toujours, 0 memoire, vous nous devancerez,
en terres nouvelles ou no us n'avions encore vecu." The rest of
the passage casts a strange light on archeology:
et les signes qu'aux murs retrace l'ombre remuee des
fouilles en tous lieux, nous les avions deja traces.

TEDESCO: That is quite suggestive of Jung's archetypes.
LANGLEY: I think the authors of such passages depend not only on
the Platonic notion of Reminiscence but also on our reminiscences of our cultural heritage. These passages are resonant with
echoes of deja vu, a psychological phenomenon of memory, of
"the shock of recognition," perhaps of the theological usage I
mentioned before, and of such religious phrases as Pascal's "You
would not seek me if you hadn't already found me." We have
here a confusion of echoes from which it would be impossible to
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isolate a clear idea still useful for modern thought or for scientific inquiry. Take the word "reconnaissance" in Perse's poem.
Isn't it perfectly ambiguous? Contaminated, in fact?
FRANCIS: It is true that the French means not only recognition, but
also gratitude.
LANGLEY: Not only that, but doesn't it also imply reconnaissance,
in other words, scouting, exploration? Anamnesis may be richly
suggestive, poetically, but not a pregnant scientific concept.
TEDESCO: Ah ... are we back to maieutics again?
LANGLEY: I grant that our use of the word pregnant owes something to the concept. Still, maieutics is not a common term in
English. In spite of Shaftesbury, even the metaphor of the midwife seems queer. Just as an example, take Emerson's phrase:
"Socrates' profession of obstetric art is good philosophy."
FRANCIS: Yet I remember reading an article in the Times Literary
Supplement entitled "A portrait of the artist as a midwife." To be
sure, it was about a French writer, the late Lucien Goldmann. It
is curious that the analogy is so much more common in French.
At least it would seem so, for I have noticed several examples in
recent years. The scholar Jacques Scherer used the expression in
his study of Diderot's dialogues entitled Le Cardinal et l'orangoutang. The popular novelist Jean d'Ormesson in his novel Au
plaisir de Dieu presents a family tutor as follows: "Jean-Christophe
Comte ... as a true disciple of Socrates, claimed he taught us
nothing. He simply revealed what we bore within ourselves. We
bore a world in us, but we didn't know it. The instrument of this
discovery, which I can truthfully say shook up our lives, this
instrument was books. M. Comte accomplished perhaps only one
thing, but it was decisive: he taught us how to read." Writers for
the newspaper Le Monde seem especially addicted to the word.
During just this year of 1975, the philosopher Vladimir JankeIevitch was headlined as "a Socrates who delivers himself."
And the critic and editor Jean Paulhan was described as a "Socratic midwife of talents who was not in favor of painless childbirth."
A much more ambitious effort has been that of Doctor Jacques
Menetrier, the author of philosophical dialogues called Mon Socrate and De la mesure de soi. His term for his eschatological speculations is "maieutique intime." In the second of these books his
mouthpiece says to his friend: "So you propose that I should
recast My Socrates applying maieutics to my own examination of
conscience." As one may suspect, several of these examples are
somewhat irresponsible, perhaps heralding the day when self-
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respecting writers will avoid slipshod use of the expression.
LANGLEY: I quite agree with you. The expression has become a
catchword, often without any clearer meaning than the word
dialogue we started out to discuss.
FRANCIS: There is a different metaphor in Jean Piaget's Sagesse et
illusions de la philosophie, which for the sake of variety might be
proposed instead of midwifery. It is symbiosis, for the human
being never succeeds in producing anything except "in symbiosis
with another, even in the solitude of internal work."
TEDESCO: The analogy would certainly be more suitable for us,
since not one of us has really been performing as a midwife here.
FRANCIS: Before we finish, I have another example I'd like to
bring up. It is the religious existentialist Gabriel Marcel. Yes,
Tedesco?
TEDESCO: How could I have forgotten that other religious existentialist Martin Buber with his principal theme of ich und duo However, first please permit me to cite one of the recent developments in Italian thought. It concerns Guido Calogero. I'd like to
think that once again the dialogue form is taking on a renewed
life in Italy, after the great age of the Renaissance and following
the later examples of Galileo and then of Leopardi. Calogero's
writings perhaps may prove that philosophical dialogue is not
dead. The dialogue inserted in his Logo e dialogo is a gem. The
author's spokesman Filolete confronts the dogmatist Eudeme
and the skeptic Sofisomene. Filolete proves the necessity of
dialogue by facing Eudeme with a dilemma: "Do not listen to me,
for I have gone mad!" By obeying, Eudeme would be disobeying.
Sofisomene confronts him with another dilemma: "Suppose that
I have had a revelation that allows no doubt and that I announce
that I will convey it to you in one hundred words, no more and
no less, after which I no longer wish to be listened to whatever I
say." The two dilemmas, widely as they differ, lead to the same
conclusion. In each case Eudeme will continue to listen! The
principle is summarized in these words: Nothing should be beyond discussion except the need for discussion itself.
LANGLEY: But as Maurois remarked, there comes a moment when
discussion yields to action. Francis gave us that reference the
other day.
FRANCIS: I don't suppose Calogero wants discussions to be interminable.
TEDESCO: In order that this one won't be, may I add just a little to
that? Dialogue is the foundation of Calogero's thought as it was
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for Plato, although he is not a Platonist in metaphysics. Dialogue
is methodological for him as doubt was for Descartes. And if one
has a message to deliver, one must understand his interlocutor.
One must not only speak but listen.
FRANCIS: I'm reminded of Sartre's "Dialogue psychanalytique."
TEDESCO: Calogero explained his point in his article "Metaphysics
and the Philosophy of Dialogue in Italy." The term "dialogue" is
often used simply to indicate that certain people are, or should
be, on "speaking terms" with each other. His philosophy is more
than that. In a debate with a compatriot, V. Spirito, he defended
his conception of the basic importance of "the rule of dialogue"
against Spirito's agrument that the supreme rule is provided by
"science," which by its hypothetical and experimental approach
to all problems of life is already "unifying the world" beyond all
contrasting philosophies.
LANGLEY: Spirito is like Bertrand Russell.
FRANCIS: And like Bacon, as Diderot described him.
TEDESCO: As far as public affairs are concerned, Calogero follows
the tradition of free discussion of Diderot and Russell. Speaking
in Belgium, nearly twenty years back, he commented: "I have the
impression that one doesn't run the risk in Belgium that one does
in Italy when one speaks of dialogue, of being taken for the advocate of a certain politics of rapprochement [between Catholics
and Communists] .... The law of dialogue determines the very
ideal of democracy." Calogero takes the liberal socialist path in
politics. Philosophically he differs from the Marxist for whom
dialogue has been transformed via Hegel into the dialectic. The
Marxist dialectic-the negation of the negation-is dialogistic
on a different level.
FRANCIS: The dialogue between Communists and Catholics was
engaged in France. Roger Garaudy was one leading Communist
interlocutor. But I hear he has returned to religious faith.
TEDESCO: I suppose Calogero would say that that is the risk one
must take, if it's true dialogue!
LANGLEY: Speaking of religion, doesn't the Jewish thinker Martin
Buber also have what he calls a philosophy of dialogue?
TEDESCO: That is true. It would be interesting to compare Buber
and Calogero. One is a religious existentialist; the other is a liberal rationalist. The style of the one is oracular and often
obscure; the style of the other is perfectly lucid. The central role
of dialogue in the philosophy of Buber is indicated by one of his
admirers: "From Buber's basic premise: 'As I become, I say
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Thou,' it follows that our belief in the reality of the external
world comes from our relationship to other selves." The same
writer states in another context that Buber leads those "who see
dialogue, communication, and the I-Thou relationship ... as the
reality in which the self comes into being." Among those cited are
Gabriel Marcel and Albert Camus.
FRANCIS: Perhaps it is relevant that Gabriel Marcel is treated in a
survey of French philosophy under the title "Le Socratisme chretien de Gabriel Marcel."
LANGLEY: I hope that's more than an echo of your Guez de Balzac's Socrate chretien!
FRANCIS: It is not just an echo, as we can see from a passage of
Presence et immortalite: "The function of the philosopher consists
in bringing to the light of reflection, by a new type of maieutic,
the implications of the life of thought, or rather of the life of
faith ... the term ... brings out very well the Socratic aspect of
my thought." Tedesco associated Buber with Marcel. Now Marcel recognized Buber as a fellow spirit, though he read Buber's
Ich undDu long after developing his own conception of dialogue.
I might add in connection with Socrates that the philosopher
Paul Ricoeur observed in a conversation with Marcel that his
colleague was Socratic, but not Platonic, "if Platonism means
being carried off to an "elsewhere" or to an "over there." Still,
Marcel was certainly a Platonist in another sense, as his]oumal
metaphysique indicates in these words: "Intelligibility itself transcends all principles and forms of a [certain] kind; it cannot be
defined other than by an appeal to the very life of thought
(which is what Plato saw better than anyone)."
TEDESCO: How near that is to Buber's remarks on Plato-on
thinking as "a voiceless colloquy of the soul with itself." Buber
tries to clarify the process in this way: "the first trying and testing
of the thought ... before the 'inner' court, in the platonic sense
the stage of monologue, has besides the familiar form of its appearance another form in which dialogue plays a great part,
well-known to Plato if to anyone." I could go on at length quoting
from Buber. The term "dialogue" is found upon almost every
page of certain of his works. Still, I must avoid becoming involved in a discussion of the theological ideas of Buber, for that's
where more quoting would lead.
FRANCIS: Just as I must refrain from going into the theology of
Gabriel Marcel. I believe we have established the importance of
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done briefly.
LANGLEY: Apparently they both wrote a good deal about the principle, but did they practice it? I realize that they conversed a lot,
but did they write any dialogues at all? Unless you can produce
some, I don't grant that you have proved your case beyond question.
FRANCIS: I concede that Marcel wrote essays and philosophical
dramas, but not dialogues.
TEDESCO: As for Martin Buber, his only dialogue known to me,
Daniel, was published in 1913, years before his dialogistic philosophy culminated inlch und Du. Daniel is divided into five parts in
which the spokesman delivers his eloquent utterances on unity
and self-realization to different listeners in each case. The beauty
of the conversations cannot be denied. Yet there is no "vortex of
dialectic" as with Santayana, little dialectic tension as in Calogero's exemplary piece. In fact, there is ambiguity in the very use
of the term dialogue. At least I find it ambiguous to say, as Daniel
does, "All poetry is dialogue, because all poetry is the shaping of
polarity." He assigns this attribute to lyrical, epic, as well as dramatic poetry. It may be true, but it sounds too vague.
LANGLEY: I might, therefore, infer that neither Gabriel Marcel nor
Martin Buber quite succeeded in using dialogue to present their
views, in spite of their "dialogistic" philosophy and that Calogero
used it only once, if in a very significant way. The questionable,
or at any rate problematic, nature of the genre in our century
could perhaps receive no better demonstration.
FRANCIS: I'll try to think of an answer to that. But it seems to be
getting late. You recall that we had planned to arrange for our
next evening at the end of our conversation tonight. However,
before our discussion of dialogue as a weapon in religious and
political controversy, there remains something incomplete with
respect to Platonic dialogue. That is the question of Platonic love.
It happens that day after tomorrow we are to join our wives to
attend a performance of Congreve's Way of the World by the university players. Wouldn't we have time before they return from
their luncheon to discuss the subject?
LANGLEY: So we'll meet for that purpose in our apartment.

3. The Dialogue of Love
Afternoon in Langley's apartment.
Present are Langley, Tedesco, Francis,
joined later by Mrs. Langley and Mrs. Tedesco.
TEDESCO: The other evening some passages of our conversation
brought us close to the question of Platonic love, but we never
really undertook to explain it. We should try to clarify the sexual
implications, especially the association with a special kind of love
that has not been openly discussed in our culture until recent
times. It is a topic not easy to discuss impartially, although we
should be able to do so. It is not surprising that there has been so
much confusion about Platonic love from the very beginning,
when the dialogues Phaedrus and The Symposium leave such an
ambivalent impression. Plato seems to condemn boy-love as a
debasement, to recommend it as a stage toward a higher stage of
love of beauty in the Absolute, and to ridicule its vulgar forms.
Socrates is made to distinguish the types and grade them according to their degrees of refinement; yet does he clearly repudiate
even the vulgar types? The confusion seems to be reflected
throughout the entire course of Platonism down to modern
times.
LANGLEY: It is reflected in the very title of Giordano Bruno'sEroici
furori, which suggests both erotic and heroic. In his translation of
The Heroic Frenzies Paul E. Memmo encountered this problem.
He wrote in the introduction that Bruno meant by the phrase to
identify that species of intellectual aspiration Plato describes in
The Symposium, "which partakes of the highest nobility, erotic in
character, heroic in dignity, the fourth of the divine madnesses
of Plato." In the Cratylus, Socrates sees in the word heroes only a
slight alteration of Eros, "from whom the heroes sprang."
TEDESCO: Kierkegaard has something similar in his book The Concept of Irony with constant reference to Socrates. After comparing
Socrates to Christ with respect to the emancipation of the latent
powers of the individual, Kierkegaard goes on to say: "this ...
34
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calls to mind that species of love which Plato everywhere attributes to Socrates: 'pederasty' naturally with reference to the initial
awakening of youth from the slumber of childhood and the coming to self that ensues." Kierkegaard quotes from The Symposium:
"For they love not boys, but intelligent beings whose reason is
beginning to be developed, much about the time when their
beards begin to grow."
LANGLEY: There may be a parallel with a scoutmaster and his
troop or with a priest preparing a child for a communion, but
that involves an earlier age of the child.
FRANCIS: In Rousseau's Emile, the age for religious initiation corresponds approximately, like the age for baptism of certain Christian sects or the rite of passage for certain tribes. However, I'd like
to go back to the point about the misunderstanding of Platonic
love through the ages. The two extremes of misunderstanding in
France might be represented by Antoine d'Urfe and Nicolas
Boileau. D'Urfe's brother, by the way, was the author of the
Platonizing pastoral romance L'Astree. In Antoine d'Urfe's
dialogue on "La Vaillance," his spokesman Uranophile declares:
"Always remember above all that the true means of acquiring
valor is to separate and divert the soul from that too vile love
which binds it to the body-in order to convert it to a loftier
love, one worthier of its celestial origins." D'Urfe, nevertheless,
did not misunderstand Plato as egregiously as did Boileau in the
opposite direction. Boileau wrote in his twelfth satire, Sur
l'equivoque: "What was Socrates, honor of profane Greece, if
more closely examined, but a mortal drawn to evil, and despite
the virtue he paraded, a most equivocal friend of the young
Alcibiades?"
LANGLEY: Isn't the most egregious error of all the one enshrined in
Fran~ois Villon's Ballade? I mean the line which changes the sex
of the young friend:
Dictes-moy ou, n'en que! pays,
Est Flora, la belle Rommaine:
Archipiada, ne Thais
Qui fut sa cousine germaine;

FRANCIS: Evidently that transvestism was not of Villon's making.
Various mediaeval writers thought the handsome Greek was a
woman.
TEDESCO: I have another example of transsexual translation, so to
speak, in the shift between the passage on sexual attraction in The
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Republic and a similar passage in Lucretius. In Shorey's version,
Socrates speaks as follows to Glaucon: "all adolescents in some
sort sting and stir the amorous lover of youth and appear to him
desirable .... One, because his nose is tip-tilted, you will praise as
piquant, the beak of another you will pronounce right royal ...
the swarthy are of manly aspect, the white are children of the
gods divinely fair ... some lover ... can feel no distaste for
sallowness when it accompanies the blooming time of youth."
Apparently a strong libido will find a suitable target in any young
person. Lucretius changes the sex of the love object, but he also
adds the notion of sexual selection, the notion of differing tastes.
Here are a few phrases from Munro's old translation: "men ...
blinded by passion, attribute to the beloved those advantages
which are not really theirs .... the stringy and wizened [is] a
gazelle; the dumpy and dwarfish is one of the graces ... the big
and overgrown is full of dignity." You get the idea: the boys have
been replaced by girls.
FRANCIS: Why, that's just the passage that Moliere did little more
than set it into neat alexandrines.
TEDESCO: Yes, the significant change took place between Plato and
Lucretius.
LANGLEY: A deep cultural change or merely a change in tolerated
attitudes?
FRANCIS: More a matter of what was no longer openly tolerated, I
imagine. The prominent apologist Andre Gide, in his dialogue
Corydon, chides the old French translators of bucolic poetry for
changing the homosexual episodes into heterosexual ones.
There were conscious efforts by early writers to make Socrates
acceptable. The erudite libertin of the seventeenth century La
Mothe Le Vayer undertook to defend him in De fa vertu des payens
against the charges of drunkeness and pederasty leveled by early
Christian writers. According to La Mothe, his love for Alcibiades
was just Platonic in the ideal sense. He wished to inspire in the
youth the love of virtue and guide him in a quest for "cette belle
Philosophie" which would give him knowledge of one sole God.
La Mothe then goes on: "that is why Xenophon has Socrates
pride himself on being an excellent go-between, which must be
understood in a spiritual sense." La Mothe's next remark is just
as ingenuous: "Plato has him say with the same boldness that all
he knows is about love. Ifwe mustjustify him by other evidence,
everyone knows that besides his Xanthippe, he had still another
wife: this may show that his affections did not offend nature."
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This work of La Mothe's is not a dialogue, unlike many of his
compositions.
LANGLEY: So La Mothe Le Vayer composed Platonic dialogues?
FRANCIS: Indeed he did, even a "Banquet sceptique" that recalls
The Symposium in a rough way. Here, however, he does not discourse on Platonic love. The dialogue is a grab bag of reports of
curious sexual customs he'd read about in miscellaneous travel
accounts. There is no clash of opinions in it, no Socratic irony
either.
TEDESCO: Socrates and Plato do turn up in the strangest shapes in
some of the modern writers.
FRANCIS: One of the oddest is that in which Plato appears in Fontenelle's dialogue pitting him against Margaret of Scotland. This
Plato is like the womanizer Hircan of another Margaret's Heptameron: his love· is for the physical realities. Margaret, on the
other hand, is like Parlamente in the Heptameron. She has
addressed herself to the wrong consultant if she expects him to
defend ideal love against lust. Fontenelle was aware of the distortion, and made partial amends in hisJugement de Pluton, where
the real Plato complains that Margaret is made to speak like a
platonist, whereas he is made to speak as perhaps Margaret
would have done: "I am no longer the divine Plato in that
Dialogue." He is no longer a homosexual either. I waive the
question whether the historical Plato ever was one in reality.
LANGLEY: This reminds one of the bowdlerizing of Shakespeare,
except that there it was sexuality that was expurgated, not the
aberrant forms. It would interest a sociologist of literature to
trace the full extent of this expurgation of Platonic love. Much of
it was unconscious, I am sure. This idea is suggested by the
ambiguity of the term itself. It may be of interest to note how
Shelley, who certainly knew what the words meant, handled the
passages of Pausanias's speech in the Symposium which refer to
the practice of love. In his translation, Shelley ommitted some
parts and translated other references in such a way that the sex
of the persons who are the objects of love and desire is difficult to
guess. I shall give only one sentence of Shelley's translation: "The
votaries of this deity (Venus Pandemos) seek the body rather
than the soul, and the ignorant rather than the wise, disdaining
all that is honorable and lovely, and considering how they shall
best satisfy their sensual necessities." It may be compared with
Jowett's version which runs: "The love who is the offspring of the
common Aphrodite is essentially common, and has no discrimi-
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nation, being such as the meaner sort of men feel, and is apt to be
of women as well as of youths."
TEDESCO: How can you be sure that Shelley deliberately neutralized the passage?
LANGLEY: Well, the essay on this dialogue, which he left unfinished, shows clearly that he was .embarrassed by the subject
and torn between his admiration for the Greek genius and his
reprobation of certain practices.
FRANCIS: The case of Hippolyte Taine is rather curious in this
connection. I can scarcely believe that he did not know what he
was doing when he wrote his essay on "Les Jeunes Gens de Platon," first dated 1855, when he was twenty-seven. An uninformed reader would never suspect that the friendships described might contain homosexual features. Taine describes
Lysis and Menxenus in these words: "That is generous and
charming. . .. What I like here is that it is so natural. These
children let themselves go; it is nature that does everything in
them. How far are we from that! We have been deformed, not
formed, by our education. Twenty centuries of precepts weigh
on our festivals." Regarding Socrates and Alcibiades, Taine gives
no hint as to their relationship. He could hardly have been unmindful of the ambivalence of the following passage: "I would
call attention to the statue of Charmides in the museum. The
beauty of the body is marvelous, slender and strong, exquisitely
proportioned. These sculptors would never have shaped that
massive Venus, nor the three fleshy Graces of Raphael." Was
Taine unconscious of his own feelings?
TEDESCO: Nietzsche was not so naive. In Gotterdiimmerung, under
the caption "The Problem of SQcrates," he calls him a great "erotic." In the same book, he writes: "Philosophy in the manner of
Plato should rather be defined as an erotic contest, as a further
development and inward intensification of the old agonal gymnastics ... What finally emerged from this was a new artistic
form of the Greek agon, dialectics."
LANGLEY: You have already quoted for us the remarks of Kierkegaard in the same vein. It is evidently from Nietzsche that
Huizinga derived his concept of the play element in philosophy.
TEDESCO: I do believe that it was more than a game for Nietzsche.
It became a war!
LANGLEY: It is interesting that a writer like D. H. Lawrence has one
of the characters in The First Lady Chatterley reflect on Socrates
and Plato in the way that he does. He is struck by the excitement
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which they got out of argument, reason, and thought. "They're
awfully like little boys who have just discovered that they can
think and are beside themselves about it. They're so thrilled that
nothing else matters, only thinking and knowledge." It's as if
Lawrence considered thinking to be an adolescent activity.
FRANCIS: Allow me to throw in this document from the correspondence of Marcel Proust. He wrote at the age of seventeen to a
friend: "I'd like to talk to you about two Masters of fine wisdom
who in their lives gathered only the flower, Socrates and Montaigne. They permit very young men to 'amuse themselves' so as
to learn about all pleasures and to release the surplus of their
tender feelings. They believed that these sensuous and intellectual friendships are better than liaisons with foolish and depraved women when one is young, yet has a vivid sense of
beauty, as well as 'senses'!" Notwithstanding, young Proust insisted that he disagreed with these masters of delicate wisdom. "I
don't consider myself a pederast. The very idea gives me pain.
Morally I endeavor, were it only for the sake of elegance, to
remain pure." One can imagine with what alacrity the author of
Corydon would have seized upon this! Unlike Gide, Proust would
never be free from a sense of guilt. Perhaps that's why his portrayal of the subject in his great book is so much more powerful
than that of Gide in Les Faux-Monnayeurs.
TEDESCO: Isn't Proust's reference to Montaigne one more example
of the propensity of homosexuals to coopt figures of the past,
who cannot defend themselves?
FRANCIS: It appears that Proust later realized that he had been
mistaken in pairing Montaigne with Socrates.
LANGLEY: What the young Proust said about wishing to remain
pure shows the force of social pressure. This had a similar effect,
and often a more lasting one, on others besides Proust. Perhaps
the gentle skeptic Santayana might recognize himself here. At a
rather advanced age, he wrote to a friend that he had begun to
realize that he was basically homosexual. Could it have been
Proust's book that opened his eyes, eyes that had so many times
and through so many years pored over the pages of Plato? He
read A la recherche du temps perdu in the 1920s, when he was about
sixty. The three dialogues he later added to his Dialogues in Limbo
present aspects of the relationship between Socrates and AIcibiades not emphasized in the earlier writings. His Platonism and
the Spiritual Life fits well in the idealizing tradition that includes
Emerson and Walter Pater. John Jay Chapman made fun of the
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Loeb translation of Lucian, which reenforces that tradition. For
example, where Socrates calls himself a pederast in Greek, in .
English he calls himself simply a lover. A brain-washed reader
will take that to mean a lover of the Ideal, of Absolute Beauty
and all that! One suspects, however, more ambiguity if not
equivocation, in the case of Pater.
FRANCIS: Reminding us again of Boileau's satire Sur l'equivoque!
TEDESCO: There has always been that contrary tradition, though
much weaker, a tradition that made mock of Plato. Your allusion
suggests we might add more about Lucian, whom Chapman regarded as a more wholesome teacher than Plato. This is Lucian
as the satirist of boy-love and of the Greek philosophers. A typical passage occurs in his Dialogues of Courtesans: "This Aristenaitos loves boys. Under scientific pretexts, he lives with the
prettiest youths. He has already held strange conversations with
Clinias and promised to make him equal with the Gods. And he
even reads with him the dialogues of love of the old philosophers
with their disciples."
FRANCIS: A friend of Gide, Pierre Louys, translated that dialogue.
Perhaps he belongs in that minor tradition. The author of Aphrodite knew which sex was the fair one. Gide, in fact, reproached
him on this score.
LANGLEY: One feature of Plato's dialogues, and indeed of almost
all dialogues ever since, becomes a glaring lack today. It is the
absence of women.
FRANCIS: I don't see any here either!
TEDESCO: We are following a perhaps regrettable precedent.
LANGLEY: Let me finish my point! Lucian's segregation of the
Dialogues of Courtesans highlights the sexual discrimination involved. If Socrates quotes Diotima, it is not like having a woman
participate directly.
TEDESCO: Who was it who said of the highly vaunted ancient
Greek civilization: It produced only three famous women:-a
courtesan, a lesbian, and a shrew? Certainly Socrates did not
accept Xanthippe as an equal, even on the eve of his death. He
consigned her to the kitchen, even then.
LANGLEY: I know of Sappho, but who was the famous courtesan?
TEDESCO: I suppose it was Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles.
FRANCIS: It must be conceded that the French eighteenth century,
despite the importance of the salons, was hardly more guiltless in
that respect. And in the preceding century, Mademoiselle de
Scudery had to write her own conversations. There was, of
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Diderot's Reve de D'Alembert.
TEDESCO: Isn't the reason a perfectly simple one, that doesn't require invoking sex discrimination? The presence of women will
inevitably change the dialogue into drama. Perhaps Landor's
"Epicurus, Leontion and Ternissa" is an exception to this rule.
Usually the genre cannot support the tensions which are bound
to develop.
FRANCIS: It will split apart, if not explode into violence like lonesco's Les;on! But if that were all, how could these tensions not have
distorted the Platonic dialogues, for there the sensual factor was
present, at least potentially? In fact, it does introduce a certain
degree of tension in The Symposium.
TEDESCO: There Socrates remains the master of the situation
throughout and doesn't allow the tension to get out of hand.
FRANCIS: At the beginning of the eighteenth century, a dialogue
was produced which brought together Agathon and Aspasia in a
discussion of love. It's by Remond Ie Grec, entitled Agathon
dialogue sur la volupte. A special meaning is given to volupte by
Aspasia, who tells Agathon that it is "ce gout de l'esprit, c'est cette
rHlexion qui distingue la volupte d'avec la debauche." In
another place, Remond distinguishes volupte from plaisir. The
former belongs to the soul, the latter only to the senses. A soul
capable of volupte must have purified itself from the passions
which involve pleasure alone. Most startling, perhaps, is the
proposition stated by Aspasia that "Provided the reason maintains control, anything is permitted." Of course, Aspasia is rather
umque.
TEDESCO: As for women in dialogues, didn't you, Francis, mention
Margaret of Scotland, in Fontenelle?
FRANCIS: That's true, I did. And one can find several others in his
Dialogues des morts. They're all historical personages, usually
members of royalty, except for the Marchioness of his Entretiens
sur la pluralite des mondes. She is like Julie in Diderot's Reve de
D'Alembert, there to be instructed, not like Aspasia in Remond Ie
Grec, who was a professor herself. In any case, none of Fontenelle's ladies entered in upon any profound analysis of ideas like
the protagonists of the Socratic dialogues.
LANGLEY: You might say that there was no Socratic irony involved,
only the irony of the salon.
TEDESCO: And there was certainly no philosophical midwifery.
FRANCIS: Renan thought that philosophical dialogue had declined
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because there were too many women around. He had but recently left his seminary.
TEDESCO: Yet we exaggerated when we said that sexual tensions
are bound to arise if women take part in dialogue. Certainly,
Francis, you were overdramatizing with your reference to Ionesco's play, where a tutorial session ends in the sadistic murder of
the girl student at the hands of her teacher. What you said about
Aspasia brings one back to the Lyonese Renaissance, when
Louise Labe wrote sensual sonnets and a dialogue entitled Debat
de folie et d'amour. One also recalls the women who discuss the
tales told in the Heptameron, as well as the ladies who have the
functions of hostess or mistress of ceremonies in Castiglione's
Cortegiano. I also think we were too hasty in dismissing Plato's
Diotima. Langley's remark should have reminded me of the role
of women given this name in German literature. Diotima is more
than a symbol for Hemsterhuis, for Friedrich Schlegel, and for
Holderlin in his novel Hyperion. The Dutch Hemsterhuis wrote
dialogues in French, which were read by Novalis, F. Jacobi, and
Schlegel. For Hemsterhuis, Diotima represents, not that of Plato,
but the friend of Hemsterhuis and Jacobi, Princess Gallitzin.
Jacobi translated Hemsterhuis's dialogue Alexis. Incidentally,
Schlegel presents women in prominent speaking roles in his
Dialogue on Poetry. There is also Schelling's philosophical
dialogue Clara, perhaps a tribute to his wife, Caroline. In an
essay on Diotima, Schlegel celebrated the woman who is neither
courtesan nor housewife, in other words, neither Aspasia nor
Mme Jourdain of Moliere's Bourgeois-Gentilhomme. Schlegel declared: "Women are treated as unjustly in poetry as in life. The
feminine ones are not idealistic, and the idealistic, not feminine."
FRANCIS: Quite so, women are not found discussing high philosophy. Their subject is not metaphysics nor epistemology, but love
and marriage. In Castiglione, the topics discussed are courtesy
and behavior, except for Bembo's disquisition on Platonism.
LANGLEY: Speaking of women engaged in philosophical dialogue,
I wonder why Francis didn't mention Moliere's Femmes savantes.
As I recall, they are made the butts of satire. Henriette is the only
one who is not made fun of by the playwright for she accepts her
traditional role of future wife and mother and doesn't aspire like
her sister and the other women to be an intellectual.
FRANCIS: That is true enough, although Moliere also makes fun of
masculine pedants and snobs. I suppose Fontenelle marks some
progress toward enlightenment, in this regard, in his Entretiens
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sur fa pluralite des mondes. But he is perhaps a little condescending,
nevertheless. Fontenelle thinks a garden under a starry sky is just
the place for gallant converse with the attractive marquise. His
explanations of Copernicus and his speculations on inhabited
worlds beyond are put forth as lightheartedly as is his comparison of the charms of blondes and brunettes. Incidentally, the
gentleman, Fontenelle, also prefers blondes. Here is a typical
example of his wit. The lady begs to be reassured regarding the
movement of the Earth: Is there nothing to fear on this pirouetting top? "Well," replies her friend, "let's have the Earth borne by
four elephants as they think in India." She approves of the idea:
"I'll wager that if they thought that the Earth was in the least
danger of moving, they'd double the elephants." Her friend
agrees: "One should not spare the elephants if one wishes to
sleep insecurity." The second evening they discuss the Moon. In
a striking comparison, he evokes the amazement of the American
natives upon seeing the Spaniards arrive. How with their frail
canoes could they imagine ships able to cross the ocean? "Then
one fine day there appear huge hulks flying over the sea, that
vomit flame and throw onto the shore unknown beings, armored
in iron and brandishing lightning in their hands. Where could
they have come from? Who placed fire at their command? Are
they children of the Sun? For assuredly they are not men. After
that, one cannot swear that there won't some day be travel between the Moon and the Earth. It's true one will have to cross
that great expanse of air and sky. But did the wide ocean seem
easier to cross to the American natives? ... And now people are
already beginning to fly a little." She counters, with some vexation: "So, might the Moon-folk have already been here?" In their
conversations, the fanciful, otherworldly aspect sometimes prevails over the presumably scientific aspect. At one point the pastoral world of Honore d'Urfe's L'Astree looms into view as seen
from Jupiter or Mars. Amorous persiflage comes in naturally
when Venus is considered: "No doubt the little nations of Venus
are made up only of Celadons and Silvandres." At other times
the reader may imagine he has strayed into Cyrano's book of
fantastic travels, only to return again to factual topics. The subglacial cold of Saturn makes the marquise shiver after the fierce
heat of Mercury. With preciosity, Fontenelle draws a parallel
between mathematics and love. "A fixed star is self-luminous like
the Sun; therefore it must be the center and heart of a world and
have planets circling around it." The marquise questions the
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necessity, and her friend replies: "The steps of mathematical
reasoning are like those of love. You cannot concede ever so little
to a lover without his requiring more, and that can lead pretty
far. Likewise, grant a mathematician the slightest postulate, and
he will derive from it a consequence that you must allow, and
from this still another and another to a result that will amaze you .
. . . the Moon must be inhabited because it resembles the Earth,
and the other planets because they resemble the Moon."
TEDESCO: If our wives were here, they'd teach you soon enough
that that sort of gallantry doesn't work any more, if it ever did!
FRANCIS: Oh, I doubt that Fontenelle's speaker had any such designs. His astronomy lessons were fittingly described by Auguste
Comte to the lady listener in the Catechisme positiviste: "One of the
most eminent precursors of positivism, the wise Fontenelle, explained admirably to your sex the philosophical bearing of the
movements of the Earth to the extent suitable for that time, in his
charming little work. Its apparent frivolity did not deprive it of
its just immortality."
I will admit, as I think back on Fontenelle, that putting women
into philosophical dialogue will not necessarily cause it to break
up. For there are the other possibilities: the way of Moliere and
also the way of Fontenelle and Marivaux, the way of refined
coquetry.
LANGLEY: Or The Way of the World of William Congreve. I expect
we'll be off to that matinee when our wives get here.
TEDESCO: Here they come now. (Enter Mrs. Tedesco and Mrs.
Langley.)
HELEN TEDESCO: Jane Francis will meet us at the college theater.

4. The Dialogue of Controversy
After dinner at Francis's house.
Present, the Francises, the Tedescos, and the Castles.
FRANCIS: It's too bad that the Langleys couldn't be here.
JANE FRANCIS: They had to go to that reception at the Saxons'
place. You know it's for Professor Norman and his wife.
HELEN TEDESCO: Oh yes, the man that's expected to head the English department.
TEDESCO: We had agreed to discuss the dialogue in religious and
political controversy. I wonder if Langley, after all, was glad to
stay away out of fear of pedantry.
FRANCIS: No, I'm sure that was not the case. When he told us about
the conflict in dates, he offered to take part by proxy, as it were.
To be exact, he was going to prepare a little essay on the topic for
us to read, to start off the discussion. But he didn't deliver it to
me. Did he perhaps give it to one of you?
TEDESCO: He gave it to the Castles, I believe, to bring over. He was
not reluctant, apparently, to submit us to pedantry, while being
safe from retaliation.
ISABEL CASTLE: I don't think his essay is too pedantic at all. I even
enjoyed looking it over and was glad to have an opportunity to
see what you people, or rather you men, have been up to while
we've been away in Spain. If you don't mind, then, I'll read it to
you.

Langley's Essay
Since we won't be enjoying dinner with you at this time, I
thought I at least might be able to share it vicariously if I began
by recalling the long-standing relationship between dinner and
dialogue, from the Table Talks of Plutarch to those of Martin
45
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Luther and since, down to those of Immanuel Kant and beyond.
No doubt the Table Talk of George Sedley is not in dialogue,
while the talk at Oliver Wendell Holmes's Breakfast Table is
mostly monologue, whether by the Autocrat or the Professor.
The title is used by Archibald Henderson for his "conversations
on things in general between George Bernard Shaw and his
biographer." But no dinner is ever served. Even the celebrated
wit of GBS fails to raise these conversations much above the
ephemeral level. Such, and worse, will be the fate of all those
recorded conversations that radio and television have been providing for us in recent decades.
For all that, the connection with the table supplies a handy way
of separating the type called dialogues of the dead, for the
speakers there are no longer distracted by thoughts of dinner,
whether just consumed or yet to come. Despite all the leisure
they presumably enjoy, most of their conversations are mercifully brief. The Lucianic convention of brevity was too strongly
established. Such is not, to be sure, the attribute of the Imaginary
Conversations of Walter Savage Landor, where most of the speakers are presented as still living. Rudolf Hirzel showed that ever
since the Symposiums of Plato and Xenophon, dinner and afterdinner conversations have formed almost a literary genre in
themselves. Hirzel also pointed out their normal place as a part
of early Jewish and Christian customs, in which eating together
included planned and guided religious conversations. The polar
opposites, no doubt, are provided by the salons and literary cafes,
and perhaps by our own gathering here tonight, where I expect
that there will be very little piety displayed.
One might think of the Cena trimalchionis of Petronius as
deriving from the Symposium, not to mention the satires of Juvenal or the Saturnalia of Macrobius, or that endless stag party in
Le Moyen de parvenir of Beroalde de Verville. Some of these productions have been simply listed as miscellanies. Northrop Frye
surveys the territory along different lines, assigning such works
to the type of the Menippean satire, with many compositions
having little or no dialogue at all. It is noteworthy that he sees
Shaw's comedy tending toward a symposium form. He finds a
modern development in the country-house weekends of the
novels of Thomas Love Peacock and Aldous Huxley. I would
include The New Republic of W. H. Mallock.
In our conversations I have been cast as the skeptic, if not the
scoffer, in regard to the importance to be accorded to the
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dialogue form in literature, and especially in regard to the viability of the maieutic method. And I am not going to step out of
character now. The references I have made to symposia and
table talk indicate that we are dealing with a false genre, or at best
an intermediate one. Unless the writer is someone like Plato or
Lucian, someone original and resourceful, the lines of force tend
to throw these productions into the adjacent, more magnetic
genres of social comedy or novel. I take the statement of Northrop Frye as lending support to my opinion. If there is a genre
here it is the Menippean satire, which overlaps dialogue and
envelops it as merely a subordinate procedure. Perhaps Francis
would agree that Boileau's Third Satire is another proof of the
point I wish to make. Another example is the Satire Menippee, a
collection of separate speeches or harangues without interplay
among themselves. These discourses express the viewpoint of the
"politicals" who strove to find a middle position in the religious
strife of the late sixteenth century between the Holy League, led
by the House of Guise, and the Huguenots, under Henry of
Navarre. Clearly the collection is an important historical document, but it is not a dialogue. The same might be said of most of
the Martin Marprelate papers of a corresponding period in England.
If you wish to document political, social, or religious history by
means of dialogues, you will find them insufficient. They serve to
supplement other documents, often to dramatize them, but more
than that they cannot do. Elizabeth Merrill's survey of the
dialogue in English literature is revealing. Her chapter on
polemic dialogue would afford a highly fragmentary view of English history, and it is not her fault. It is for lack of dialogues to
represent the adversaries in the crucial issues that divided the
nation during the various periods. Neither in Britain nor in
America can we discover enough significant examples to illuminate the march of history even by flickering fits and starts.
There is, however, one juncture in which dialogue played an
important part, and it is in the realm of thought rather than that
of action. It is the philosophical controversy which brought Berkeley, the third earl of Shaftesbury, and Bernard Mandeville into
conflict. Here we can indeed speak of a battle of dialogues involving profound ethical questions. Admittedly, it lacked the heroics
that Tedesco noted in the case of Bruno, or the tragic aspect
under which he saw Galileo'sDialoghi or Pascal's Provincial Letters.
Shaftesbury's dialogue The Moralists was the first, appearing in
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1709 as part of his Characteristics. Berkeley's Three Dialogues of
Hylas and Philonous, published in 1713, don't belong to this story.
Mandeville, the author of The Fable of the Bees (1714), added six
dialogues in 1729 to this work attacking Shaftesbury's optimistic
doctrines. The illustrious Berkeley satirized both Shaftesbury
and Mandeville in his lengthy Alciphron. Mandeville replied with
his Letter to Dion, in which he protested that Berkeley's dialogue
was an unjust caricature. Shaftesbury, the target of both these
writers, could not defend himself, for he had died in 1713.
We have already touched on Shaftesbury's espousal of innate
ideas. Despite being tutored by Locke, he was close to the Cambridge Platonists in this respect. In his Characteristics, he appeals
to readers of various schools of opinion, including freethinkers,
but excepting Hobbesians, and offends only the orthodox believers in revelation. It is not merely in The Moralists that this enthusiast sets forth his belief in an inborn sense of justice. So when
I speak of a battle of dialogues, I am stretching the point. The
replies of Mandeville and Berkeley are addressed to the Characteristics as a whole.
There is no doubt about the main topic of Mandeville's
dialogues. It is the views of Shaftesbury. What contributes to the
suspense is the question of just what is the author's own position.
Before that becomes clear, the reader is kept guessing. By the
way, harking back to what we said about the rarity of women in
philosophical dialogue, there is one in the first dialogue. The
manner in which the author disposes of her is significant. Fulvia
engages briefly in conversation with Cleomenes and Horatio, but
she becomes impatient with their intellectual debate, which she
pretends to be above her head. So she leaves them to seek people
on her own level. She never rejoins their oversubtle discussions.
(How over-subtle may be seen from the following.) Cleomenes,
who really agrees with The Fable of the Bees, affects to outdo
Shaftesbury in altruistic optimism, by this means reducing him to
absurdity. But at what point does Mandeville leave satire behind?
Cleomenes is made to be too devious by far in his parody of the
excesses of Shaftesbury's rhetoric. It has been said that Mandeville was to the optimism of Shaftesbury what Voltaire was to
that of Leibniz. However, we know what to make of Pangloss and
Candide; we don't always know where we are with Cleomenes.
Nor indeed does Horatio, who declares at one point: "He talks so
diametrically opposite to the opinion which he is known
everywhere to defend of late that I don't know what to make of
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him. Cleomenes must have some Design in overacting the part he
pretends to have chosen." Previously, Cleomenes had believed
no man really virtuous. Now he affects to have come around to
Shaftesbury's benevolent view of mankind. It's as if he had been
converted from Mandeville to Shaftesbury. In fact, all along he
has been maneuvering to lead Horatio into a discussion with him
on a subject Horatio finds repugnant. And what is this subject?
Nothing less than The Fable of the Bees, which he had understood
to be an odious book, one no gentleman would wish to read.
Cleomenes, by his stratagem, involves Horatio in a discussion
that before the end of the sixth dialogue has won Horatio over to
the doctrine propounded in the Fable.
Horatio concedes: "I am your Convert, and shall henceforth
look upon the Fable of the Bees very differently from what I did;
for tho' in the Characteristicks the Language and the Diction are
better, the system of Man's Sociableness is more lovely and more
plausible, and Things are set off with more Art and Learning;
yet in the other there is certainly more Truth, and Nature is
more faithfully copied in it, almost everywhere." Cleomenes pursues the lesson he has been teaching Horatio: "My Friend, the
Author of the Fable, to engage and keep his Readers in good
Humour, seems to be very merry, and to do something else,
whilst he detects the Corruption of our Nature; and points indirectly at the Necessity, not only of Revelation and Believing, but
likewise of the Practice of Christianity." This puzzles Horatio
who says: "I have not observ'd that: Which Way has he done it
indirectly?" Cleomenes explains: "By exposing ... the Vanity of
the World ... and the Insufficiency of Human Reason and
Heathen Virtue to procure real Felicity." He summarizes his
judgment of Shaftesbury: "I agree with you, that he was a Man of
Erudition, and a very polite Writer; he has display'd a copious
Imagination, and a fine Turn of Thinking ... But the Ideas he
had form'd of the Goodness and Excellency of our Nature, were
as romantick and chimerical as they are beautiful and amiable;
that he labour'd hard to unite two Contraries that can never be
reconciled together, Innocence of Manners and worldly Greatness; that to compass this End he favour'd Deism, and under
Pretence of lashing Priestcraft and Supersitition, attack'd the
Bible itself; and lastly, that by ridiculing many Passages of Holy
Writ, he seems to have endeavour'd to sap the Foundation of all
Reveal'd Religion, with Design of establishing Heathen Virtue
on the Ruins of Christianity."
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A reader of Mandeville is already too well-schooled in his
paradoxical methods, in what in our day has been called, in
another connection, Aesopian language, to take at full value the
last statement of Cleomenes. It sounds rather too much like the
attacks of orthodox churchmen on his own Fable of the Bees. Two
words may epitomize Mandeville's procedure: paradox and
parody. To thread one's way through them may be as intriguing
as finding one's way through the subtleties of that play of Congreve's we saw, nearly contemporary indeed. Perhaps Francis
may allow me to allude also to another near contemporary:
Marivaux.
After Berkeley's Alciphron came out, Mandeville wrote in his
Letter to Dion: "Your Crito and Euphranor are very good Characters, but what I admire most in them, is the consummate patience
in keeping Company and bearing for a whole Week together,
with two such insupportable, out of the way Rascals, as you have
represented Alciphron and Lysicles to be." The character of
Alciphron is more kindly presented than that of Lysicles, who
appears as an arrant cynic. Some readers might have felt that the
mocking style of the Fable was not very different from Lysicles's
cocky immoralism. Shaftesbury would perhaps have had more
reason to complain, despite the gentlemanly demeanor attributed to Alciphron by the author. Not only because Alciphron
represents a caricature of his thought, but also because Alciphron's atheism or agnosticism is remote from Shaftesbury's enthusiastic deism and belief in an inner moral sense. Shaftesbury
might also have decried being made into a boon companion of
the "rascal" Lysicles.
If we can forget that Alciphron and Lysicles were designed as
satires of Shaftesbury and Mandeville, we can sincerely admire
the art with which Berkeley put together the elaborate structure
of argument and counter argument of the seven dialogues of
which the work is composed. Euphranor and Crito are country
gentlemen who receive the visit of the big-city wits Alciphron and
Lysicles. The opening somewhat resembles that of Pascal's Provincial Letters. Euphranor expresses curiosity about the "new" sect
of freethinkers in the same way that Louis de Montalte does in
respect to the Jesuits. The reader rather expects that Alciphron
will serve a function like that of the Jesuit Father. But Berkeley's
dialogues proceed quite otherwise. The subtitle of the work is
The Minute Philosopher. It refers to a type of superficial "philoso-
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pher" Berkeley saw spreading as a result of the writings of Anthony Collins, Shaftesbury, and Mandeville.
The freethinkers are forced to yield step-by-step, and Anglican Christianity triumphs completely. A reader may object that
Crito and Euphranor are on the same side, although of different
temperaments, and that it might not be entirely sportsmanlike to
pit them against Alciphron and Lysicles separately. For the latter
do not cooperate effectively, in fact they could hardly do so, since
their views do not coincide. (See the fifth dialogue, for an example of dramatic conflict provoked between them by Crito.) Instead of answering Crito, Lysicles turns upon Alciphron, whom
he thinks too conciliatory. At this moment Crito smilingly glances
at Euphranor and the silent narrator, obviously soliciting the
connivance of the reader. In the same dialogue, Crito retorts to a
bantering remark of Lysicles: "If you have a mind to argue we
will argue; if you have more mind to jest, we will laugh with you."
The rejoinder is typical of Crito's caustic temper. The four interlocu'tors are clearly delineated: Euphranor, courteous and a little
naive; Crito, critical and aggressive; Lysicles, presumptuous and
superficial; Alciphron, well-meaning and inclined to yield, not
always because he is refuted, but in order, it seems, to avoid
acrimony. Berkeley deserves credit for presenting him thus.
Lysicles, on the other hand, qualifies for the role of the
philosophical alazon. Euphranor is not exactly an eiron. Crito
comes the closest to this role, but he is not consistent.
A modern reader will remember such curious matters as one
that is offered in the sixth dialogue. Euphranor and Crito scoff at
the claims of the Egyptians and the Chinese to great antiquity,
while failing to apply the same critical standards to the Hebrews.
To be sure, the future Bishop of Cloyne accepts Bishop Usher's
date of 4004 B.C. for the Creation.
In the conclusion, the spokesman for orthodox doctrine summarizes cogently the course and upshot of the discussion: "Sceptic as you are, you own it probable there is a God, certain that the
Christian Religion is useful, possible it may be true, certain that,
if it be, the Minute Philosophers are in a bad way .... A Minute
Philosopher, therefore, that would act a consistent part, should
have the Diffidence, the Modesty ... as well as the Doubts of a
Sceptic; not pretend to an Ocean of Light, and then lead us to an
Abyss of Darkness." The lesson here is not very different from
that of Pascal in some of his Pensees. Moreover, it prefigures,

52 / Conversations on Dialogue

though in another spirit, what Hume will write in a passage of his
Dialogues on Natural Religion on the value of skepticism as preparation for embracing religion. It is the passage I quoted in our
second conversation: "To be a philosophical Sceptic, is, in a man
of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound,
believing Christian." Hume's work was much too late, of course,
to be part of the battle of the dialogues.
One cannot dispute the importance of the dialogue form for
philosophical controversy in the English Enlightenment. It is
true that the thoughts of Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Berkeley, and
Hume were also set forth in essay and treatise. Only a part of the
Characteristics is in dialogue, hardly any of The Fable of the Bees as
such. Berkeley's and Hume's other works were enough to establish their place in English philosophy, but neither thinker would
have been so attractive to the common reader had they not written their dialogues.
FRANCIS: Thank you, Mrs. Castle, from all of us, for reading
Langley's essay so graciously and gracefully.
JANE FRANCIS: Before you begin your discussion, I'll bring in
some more tea and coffee.
ISABEL CASTLE: Oh, excuse me! There is something written here
that I had not noticed before. It is a note Langley must have
intended to insert somewhere in his essay. It reads like this:
Although Hume's dialogue is later than the others, I cannot help
but think that it is closely related to them, not only in subject, the
question of deism, but also in regard to the point we were discussing earlier. The problem of the dialogue form itself, its appropriateness and validity for modern times, these are topics that
concerned both Shaftesbury and Hume. And it is perhaps not
out of place to mention that David Hume acquired his copy of
the Characteristics at the susceptible age of fifteen. I examined this
copy when I was visiting the University of Nebraska library recently. Unfortunately, except for a cross or an underlined word
here and there, I detected no trace of feedback. But that he read
it seems evident. The last printed page is missing from the
dialogue The Moralists, and the same hand that inscribed the
signature "David Home" [sic] on the backs of the front covers of
the three volumes seems to have supplied the missing sentence.
TEDESCO: I'm glad you read that note. It is an indication of a
certain degree of continuity preserved by the dialogue form
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through time. We can even trace this thread into eighteenth
century Germany. Students of the German AuJkliirung are aware
of Shaftesbury's influence on the Grecian hedonism of Wieland,
himself a dialogue writer. Shaftesbury's notion of the poet as
Prometheus will inspire the thoughts on genius of pre-romantics
such as Herder. Schiller will combine Kant's concept of moral
duty with Shaftesbury's concept of moral beauty,-if you will
excuse my rhyme! But for dialogue in the controversial mode we
must look to others. We do find Herder, along with Jacobi and
Moses Mendelssohn, using the form but not so much to further
the Enlightenment as to combat it, at least in respect to
freethinkers and agnostics. In his Conversations on God, Herder
forcefully expresses his dissatisfaction with simple deism, while
Jacobi takes issue with Hume's skepticism in his David Hume on
Belief or Idealism and Realism. Indeed Jacobi's dialogue is a little
like Leibniz's against Locke. Jacobi's epigraph is taken from Pascal: "La nature confond les Pyrrhoniens, et la raison confond les
Dogmatistes. Nous avons une impuissance a prouver, invincible a
tout Ie Dogmatisme. Nous avons une idee de la verite, invincible
a tout Ie Pyrrhonisme." The example of Moses Mendelssohn is
even more relevant to our discussion. It is related that he was
inspired to select the dialogue form by a reading of Shaftesbury's
Moralists, which Lessing lent to him. Lessing asked him how he
liked it, and he replied: "Very much, but this sort of thing I can
do myself." Lessing's response was: "So, go ahead and do it!" The
result was Mendelssohn's first book, his Philosophical Dialogues. It
is a defense of Spinoza and a critique of Leibniz. Mendelssohn's
unfinished translation of The Moralists was another result. It is
almost as if Shaftesbury brought him back to Plato. As he said to
a friend: "Plato has a manner of writing that combines all the
merits of Shaftesbury's style with an inimitable ease of phrasing .
. . . I never read Plato without feeling ashamed at ever having
put pen to paper." Nevertheless, he was not satisfied with Plato's
proofs to immortality and tried to supply better ones in his own
Phaedon. Mendelssohn wanted to write in Hebrew to escape
completely from the sway of Plato.
The story of Socrates in eighteenth-century literature beyond
the Rhine is an extremely interesting one. It apparently even
involves the myth of the transmigration of souls, for it is alleged
that the Dutch writer Hemsterhuis imagined himself to be a reincarnation of Plato's teacher. However, let's leave aside such eccentricities! Following the guidance of various scholars, we can
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see how the model of rationalist enlightenment was transformed,
in a process that led from Hemsterhuis through Hamann and
Herder, into an exemplar of religious mysticism. Thus, a renewed meaning was given to Erasmus's famous invocation:
"Saint Socrates, pray for us!"
FRANCIS: Perhaps the Germans were more convincing than Jean
Louis Guez de Balzac in his Socrate chretien over a century earlier,
or than Lamartine in his Mort de Socrate, in which the French
romantic poet seeks to make of Socrates a precursor of Christianity. Considering only the form, Balzac's Socrate chretien is certainly
less Socratic than Pascal's Entretien avec M. de Saci and the first ten
of the Provincial Letters. Balzac's series of discourses are hardly
different from sermons delivered by a lay preacher. Otherwise,
Balzac might be mentioned as one who prepared the way to the
Entretien avec M. de Saci, with his assertion of the superiority of
Christianity over pagan thought. In a minor way, Balzac anticipated a famous remark of Pascal concerning the Eleventh Letter.
Pascal apologized for its length, explaining that he had lacked
the time to make it shorter. Balzac had written: "It was said at
Paris when I was there that a certain man wrote a big book
because he didn't have the leisure to write a little one." So it was
doubtless a common expression that Pascal made his own.
Having read Balzac's work, we willingly agree with SainteBeuve, who referred in Port-Royal to this "Socrate ou plutat a cet
Isocrate chretien." Sainte-Beuve found there "pure declamations
in which the rhetorician insists again and again that one must not
be rhetorical." The critic considered Balzac's Christianity to be
shallow. How narrow-minded and cruel-spirited a Christian he
was can be judged from his callous, if not gleeful, report of the
death of Vanini at the stake, which is included in this same Socrate
chretien.
One turns with pleasure, if not always approval, to Pascal's
Provincial Letters. Here one may quote Sainte-Beuve again, in his
eulogy of the first part of the work: "If Pascal seems to revive the
form of the Socratic dialogues, he recalls them also in his aim and
in his effect. He serves as a genuine Christian Socrates, reestablishing and avenging true morality to the shame of the casuists,
these modern Sophists who falsify it." What Sainte-Beuve does
not say here is that like the Greek Sophists, the Jesuits anticipated
the modern liberalism and relativism of which he himself was
really a follower.
TEDESCO: Before you go on with Pascal, I'd like to introduce Her-
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der's passage on Vanini, in his Conversations on God. Theophron
quotes Vanini's Latin poem Deo, marveling that it could have
been composed by an atheist who was burned at the stake:
"When he was at the place of execution, he took up a straw and
said that if he was so unfortunate as to have no other proof of the
existence of God than this straw, then it would be enough for
him.-Philolaus: And he was burned nevertheless? Perhaps it
was for some other heresy?-Theophron: He was a vain young
man of many abilities and with a great passion for glory. He
wanted to become a Julius Caesar in philosophy and became its
tragic victim."
FRANCIS: Apparently his real name was Julio Cesare, although
people called him Lucilio. Perhaps he did suffer from delusions
of grandeur. The persecution was not a delusion. As for that
vainglory, consider this passage from the dialogue quoted last
week: "I shall not do as did Thomas More, who, upon hearing
Erasmus speak but not knowing who he was, exclaimed: 'Either
you are a demon, or you are Erasmus!' But I'll say in regard to
your wisdom: Either you are a God, or you are Vanini!" Pierre
Bayle cited Vanini as one of atheism's martyrs. If that was true, it
was in spite of such statements as this one from Vanini's Amphitheatre de l'eternelle providence: "Of all the philosophers of antiquity, Diagoras of Melos alone was called an atheist by common
agreement, and rightly so, for he dared, infected by some stupid
and hollow notion, to deny divine providence, as Cicero informs
us in his treatise on the Nature of the Gods." It's as if Vanini's
judges and executioners took him for Diagoras!
HELEN TEDESCO: Whereas it would seem that Vanini took himself
for a god!
JANE FRANCIS: Like Nietzsche's Zarathustra, who proclaimed: "If
there were gods, how could I endure not being one!"
CASTLE: Clearly J. C. Vanini was a victim of hubris as well as injustice.
TEDESCO: Didn't we concur earlier that Montalte's maneuvers in
the Provincial Letters are not exactly Socratic? The Letters are indictments, if not exposes in the journalistic sense of today. Do
you really agree, Francis, with Sainte-Beuve when he compares
them with Plato's Dialogues?
FRANCIS: I'd agree with you that the Letters are not exercises in
maieutics, but they do display the Socratic irony noted by
Sainte-Beuve, the skillful performance of the eiron at the expence
of the alazon, as today's scholars would have it.
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Just about every kind of stratagem, of debater's trick, can be
found in the Letters. There is a progression from the First to the
Fifth Letter. In the first, the issue is not yet joined; the adversaries do not yet confront each other. In the Fourth, the contest
really starts, and the adversary procedure begins to take form.
The Fifth Letter is outstanding for its brilliance, quickness of
repartee, and brio. The comic element prominent here continues
to prevail in the Sixth, less so in the Seventh. The affected naivete of Montalte is displaced by indignation; the irony turns into
sarcasm. After the Tenth, the Letters are no longer in dialogue,
but are directly addressed to the Jesuit Fathers.
Montalte is clearly the eiron in the exchanges, the Jesuit being
the alazon. Perhaps Pascal even has Montalte overstep the bounds
of what Socrates allowed himself with the Sophists. For in the
First Letter Montalte declares outright: "I pretended to be very
much on their side." This in order to be welcomed by the Jesuits.
In the Fifth Letter, within the space of a few pages, the Jesuit
Father falls repeatedly into the traps set by his visitor, notably on
the question of what were called "probable opinions." For example, Ponce and Sanchez have contrary opinions on certain moral
issues, but because they are both learned doctors each renders
his opinion probable. Not only that, the ingenuous Jesuit is led to
assert that it may be permitted to follow the less probable alternative in certain cases. The irony depends here, in part, on a play
on words. Toward the end of the letter, the long list of authorities cited by the Jesuit provides a note of high burlesque,
calling to mind not Plato but some of those comic catalogues of
words and names in Rabelais. Montalte can well wonder if the
bearers of these barbarous-sounding appellatives could really be
Christians!
Some readers have found Pascal superior even to Plato in vivacity and concision. If this is true, it is because their aims and
methods differed. The key to the difference is precisely that
presence or absence of the maieutic procedure. I concede Tedesco's point on this. Socrates does not only try to defeat his opponent, he hopes to persuade him. To persuade his adversary was
not possible for Pascal-things had gone too far.
ISABEL CASTLE: Did the Jesuits reply to Pascal in dialogues?
FRANCIS: Pascal was not answered with dialogues; he was answered
with the Index! Only much later, when Port-Royal had been destroyed as an institution, did Pere Gabriel Daniel reply in his
Entretiens de Cleandre et d'Eudoxe. Pere Daniel protested against
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the caricature of the Jesuit Father: "But gradually this Jesuit,
who is presented at first as merely naive, is made into a fool, an
idiot of the last degree; one laughs in his face, one makes fun of
him, one mocks him in the most obvious manner, without his
noticing it; he falls into the crudest traps: the greatest nonsense is
put into his mouth. And with all that, he is a man who speaks in
the name of the whole Society." The Pyrrhic victory of the defeated Jansenists stuck in his craw! But one who was not a partisan of either side was Fenelon, who wrote in 1714 in his Instruction pastorale en forme de dialogues: "If one doubts the great power
of the art of dialogue over men, one has only to recall the profound and dangerous impression made on the public by the
Provincial Letters. The author used the give-and-take of dialogue
to convey the gravest bias to the reader. He gave to an appalling
error a kind of charm and grace."
ISABEL CASTLE: Weren't there any other controversial dialogues
produced during the seventeenth century in France? It was, after
all, the Age of Reason.
FRANCIS: It was the Age of Reason; it was not perhaps the Age of
Argument, a term that could be applied to both the preceding
and the succeeding century.
HELEN TEDESCO: I have heard about the so-called libertins of the
mid-seventeenth century, Cyrano de Bergerac and La Mothe Le
Vayer. Didn't they go in for this genre in the defence of their
opinions?
FRANCIS: One can discover some interesting conversations in
Cyrano's L'Autre Monde ou les etats et empires de la lune et du soleil.
These philosophical conversations are hardly detachable from
the narrative and descriptive structure of the imaginary voyages.
Many of the more audaciously subversive passages were omitted
from the edition published after the author's death and were
only rediscovered over two centuries later. Even Charles Nodier
did not know the work in its entirety and was able to write in
1831 that Cyrano never offended religion or moral conventions
in his writings. Moreover, the second voyage was left incomplete
by the author, thus depriving us of what might have been a
memorable meeting between Campanella and Descartes, promised for us in the "Kingdom of Philosphers," which is Cyrano's
destination in the Empire of the Sun.
La Mothe Le Vayer might better qualify as a writer of controversial dialogues, for his dialogues do deal with controversial
concepts, but they lack the bite of Cyrano's work. It's as if La
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Mothe Le Vayer had himself pulled their teeth. His style is one
that defuses his ideas before they can have any explosive effect.
The most erudite of the historians, who have bent over the mass
of pages compiled by the erudite libertin, came to this conclusion:
"So as not to rouse persecutors, Le Vayer warded off disciples."
An American scholar differs strongly from general French opinion and considers him a Christian fideist, not an atheist or much
of a freethinker. This judgment is founded on passages that
remind us of what Langley quoted from Berkeley and Hume.
Nevertheless, La Mothe was certainly closer to the skepticism of
Hume than to the religion of Berkeley, despite what we read in
his defence of Socrates: "It seems that one may in some sense call
Socrates the first martyr of the Messiah to come, as we know that
Saint Stephen was gloriously the first martyr of the same Messiah
already come." He goes on to blame Erasmus for the invocation
to Socrates: Sancte Socrate, ora pro nobis. Le Vayer regards these
words as too bold. In his Dialogue on Divinity, there is a declaration which anticipates Hume: "Skepticism can be called a perfect
introduction to Christianity." His spokesman Orasius Tubero
expatiates on the theme at length in lectures. He is approved
admiringly by his listener, Orontes, who never really contests his
statements. Orontes acknowledges that not only does skepticism
bring no prejudice to holy theology, but also suspension of
judgment properly understood can serve as a happy evangelical
preparation. The knowledge of God cannot come from
rationalist arguments. Except for the absence of vigor in Le Vayer's style, the reader might imagine himself back in Montaigne's
essay on Raymond de Sebonde. Then the reader may wonder
whether the pages on atheism which follow are included merely
as curious examples of the multiplicity of opinions and customs
related to the subject of religion. The speaker describes the
mandarins who govern China and maintain the populace in the
religion of the country without believing for their part in any
God but Nature, any life but this one, any hell but prison, or any
Paradise but that of having the office of mandarin. Le Vayer
borrowed all this humor from Joseph Acosta. Another passage on
atheism is referred to Bacon's Essays: "Atheism leaves to mankind sense, philosophy, natural piety, laws, reputation, and everything that may serve as guide to virtue: but superstition destroys all these things and erects for itself an absolute tyranny
over human understanding." But most representative, perhaps,
of the skeptical spirit of Le Vayer is his use of the allegory of
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Icarus: "That foolhardy Icarus, because he tried to rise too high
toward heaven, was shamefully and calamitously thrown down
into a sea of confusion and error, that immense Ocean of the
sciences." The dialogue closes with these words from the
Spanish: "De la cosas mas seguras La mas segura es dudar." The
dialogue of controversy requires conviction, and Le Vayer appears to take pride in lacking it. I should not, for all that, wish to
cite Yeats in his behalf: "The best lack all conviction, while the
worst are full of passionate intensity." The first part of this may
not apply to Le Vayer, but there were plenty of persecutors on
the watch to whom the second part could, such as the ineffable
Pere Garasse, the pursuer of Theophile de Viau. And Le Vayer
was old enough to hear of Bruno, Vanini, and Galileo, whose
tragedies occurred during his youth and early manhood.
ISABEL CASTLE: If the subject of this evening is the dialogue of
controversy, La Mothe Le Vayer seems to be a rather negative
example of it. I had likewise gained the impression from Tedesco's speech that the dialogue in the hands of the Germans lost
something of the spirit of combat that was displayed by Shaftesbury, Berkeley, and Mandeville, and also by Pascal.
JANE FRANCIS: As well as by Voltaire and Diderot!
TEDESCO: One could find plenty of belligerence if one went back
to the German Reformation period, whether in the Karsthans, the
works of Hans Sachs, or Ulrich von Hutten. It is said that von
Hutten's Gespriichbiichlein was almost as important in the campaign against the Pope as Luther's treatises of 1520. But apparently the spate of Protestant satirical dialogues ended in a few
years.
CASTLE: I believe that the situation in the so-called Latin countries
was quite different. The sixteenth century has been called the
century of dialogue par excellence. It was by no means concerned
only with religious controversy, there were also the language
controversies. Think of all those dialogues on language in Italian: Machiavelli, Pietro Bembo, Sperone Speroni, and Torquato
Tasso; in Spanish: Juan de Valdes; in French: Etienne Dolet,
Henri Estienne, and Peletier du Mans. Except for Peletier du
Mans, who wanted to simplify French spelling, all argued on
behalf of their vernaculars.
The Dialogo de la lengua of Juan de Valdes is not limited to an
affirmation of the values of Castilian. The conversation on the
distinction between ingenio and juicio, genius and judgment,
might suggest a transition to the eighteenth-century discussions
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of genius, and the comments on the expression no se que might
prelude the French seventeenth-century reflections on the je ne
sais quoi like those of the Abbe Bouhours in his Entretiens d'Ariste
et d'Eugene. But no doubt you would prefer something more vital
than these bloodless armchair controversies. Like the Coloquios
satiricos of Antonio de Torquemada. This was not the inquisitor
Tomas de Torquemada, of course, who belongs to the fifteenth
century. The Coloquios Satiricos attack the conventional notion of
honor, a thing of show and a snare of Satan, contrasting it with
true honor, which is Christian virtue and humility.
Or you might appreciate the two dialogues by Alfonso, the
brother of Juan de Valdes. Marcel Bataillon presented them both
as outstanding Spanish Erasmians. Alfonso's works were more
controversial than a dialogue on Christian doctrine composed by
his brother. The Didlogo de las cosas ocurridas en Roma took the
part of Emperor Charles V against Pope Clement VII, blaming
the latter for the Sack of Rome. The piece is an indictment of a
war-making pope, unfaithful to his divine mission. By the way, it
was Castiglione who tried to get Alfonso to keep it out of circulation and later to get it consigned to the flames! Alfonso's second
dialogue presents Mercury and Charon and takes the part of
Charles V against Francis I. It is more than an ephemeral political pamphlet; it is inspired by Erasmus's Charon, the eloquent
denunciation of war. Mercurio speaks as an advocate of evangelical Christianity against the ecclesiastical institutions given over to
the service of Mars and Mammon. He speaks also in support of a
rather subversive ideal of a perfect Christian sovereign. Take
these words addressed to a ruler: "If you don't do as you should
to your subjects, they are no longer obliged to do their duty
towards you." In a few years the current political relevance of the
two dialogues faded away as events, and policy brought pope and
emperor closer together. Both dialogues were placed on the
Index much later for obscure reasons.
FRANCIS: You say that Mercurio is made out to be an Erasmian in
Valdes's dialogue. Evidently the wing-shoed god was utilized for
a very different purpose in the Cymbalum mundi of Bonaventure
des Periers. This came about a decade later than Valdes's Mercury
and Charon. Its real meaning has been the subject of much speculation. Writings on it exceed many times the number of pages,
less than fifty, making up the four little dialogues. Yet its significance has remained a bone of contention. The author assumes
the name of Thomas du Clevier and addresses his work to Pierre
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Tryocan. These are anagrams for Thomas l'Incn~~dule and Pierre
Croyant. It is an audacious work in the Lucian manner, that has
been read as a satire of the Gospel in the guise of the Book of
Fate, Jesus as Mercury, true religion as the philosopher's stone,
sought by men in vain. The nineteenth-century edition of the
"bibliophile Jacob" refers to the second dialogue as "perhaps the
most remarkable of the four, considering its boldness and violence of tone. The author ridicules all the known creeds of his
time: Christ is presented as a rogue. Luther under the name of
Rhetulus is satirized as is his rival Bucer under the name of Cubercus. Another target, Drarig, is taken to be Erasmus. "Catholics
and Protestants fall into the same sack." There are those commentators who deny that it was intended as a broad attack on
religion. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. It was condemned by the Parlement, and the publisher was jailed. Calvin,
Henri Estienne, and Etienne Pasquier denounced it as impious.
TEDESCO: I wonder if the commentators who deny the Cymbalum
mundi as an attack on religion are not victims of overcompensation. Fearing to fall into the error of perspective of supposing
writers like Bonaventure des Pehers had modern radical views,
they go to the opposite extreme of denying those writers were
radicals even for their own period. A strange way of combatting
the historian's malady of "precursoritis."
If I may change the subject.-I didn't catch your implication
when you said the other day that my reference to Ramus reminded you of Guy de Brues. Could you explain it, since we are
after all considering the sixteenth century at the moment?
FRANCIS: I was thinking of one of the more amusing moments in
the first dialogue, where Ronsard is made to play Socrates to
BaH's Meno. It is an exchange of repartee parodying the maieutic procedure. Later BaiT will complain that Plato was inconsistent on the doctrine of reminiscence. It should be noted that they
have nothing but their names in common with the famous members of the Pleiade. "Ronsard" represents a dogmatic position
and his adversary a skeptical one, with respect to the powers of
reason to attain knowledge. The wording of the title and the
epigraph promises a controversial work: Les Dialogues de Guy de
Brues, contre les nouveaux academiciens. "Que tout ne consiste point
en opinion." The new Academicians suggest the skeptics. Brues
was rather important as a source for Montaigne. Although Brues
pretends to give the palm of victory to the rationalist side against
the skeptics, the skeptical arguments are cogent and copious
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enough to have contributed substantially to the Pyrrhonist element in Montaigne. There is a statement by his modern editor
which I consider very meaningful, and I hope I may quote it
here: "Even if Brues was not a crypto-sceptic trying by indirection to suggest a point of view, which, if expressed openly, would
mean persecution and death for him, even if he actually sided in
intention with the dogmatists, one suspects that he had been
seriously troubled by this problem."
CASTLE: You leave me at a loss, and no doubt our ladies too, for we
did not enjoy the benefit of your earlier discussion.
TEDESCO: Excuse me, it was about Socrates the midwife and about
the doctrine of knowledge being a form of recollection. We managed to go on about these topics at quite some length, though I
suspect Langley, for one, remained doubtful about the value of
the discussion.
CASTLE: Perhaps there will be an opportunity to return to the topic
another time when Langley is with us.
ISABEL CASTLE: Are we ever going to get on to the eighteenth
century and the philosophes? Or must we remain in the sixteenth
indefinitel y?
FRANCIS: One of the most curious sixteenth-century dialogues still
remains to be described. It is a Latin manuscript entitled Heptaplomeres, written by Jean Bodin.
CASTLE: The author of The Republic?
FRANCIS: Exactly. A subtitle calls it a "Colloquy by seven learned
men of varying opinions concerning hidden secrets of sublime
matters." Out of prudence no doubt, this long dialogue was
never printed, although Bodin published another less subversive
dialogue, Universal Theatre of Nature, which was placed on the
Index. The Heptaplomeres contains enough arguments against orthodox Christian dogmas to satisfy any philosophe buff, if you can
excuse the expression. But you must look for them either in the
manuscript of nearly seven hundred pages in the Bibliotheque
Nationale or in the partial French translation published early in
our century. Not that the original was not passed from hand to
hand, among those who handled it were Gabriel Naude, Grotius,
Menage, and Leibniz.
The participants in the colloquium are a conforming Catholic,
a Lutheran, a Calvinist, a former Christian converted to Islam, a
Jew, a believer in natural religion, and a skeptic. The last two, the
deist Toralba and the irreverent Senamus, offer some of the
most telling arguments. The Protestant and Catholic defenders
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of Christianity are more than once unhorsed in this gruelling
tournament of doctrines. If Senamus and Toralba seem to be the
most persuasive speakers, the Jew is also accorded some effective
lines. Among the sallies of Senamus are such questions as "How
can angels suffer if they are without nerves or cerebra?" Toralba
perhaps speaks most often for the author. Thus he exclaims at
one point: "Christ crucified to absolve the greatest sinners, and
Aristides ... Socrates ... Plato ... the Scipios and the Catos ...
should now burn in Hell like villains!" At another point he asks:
"Who can believe that the Eternal God, after 600,000 centuries,
indeed, after an infinite expanse of time, should but lately have
thought of descending from heaven and remain nine months in
the womb . . . and at the end of a few years be shamefully
crucified and after being buried be resurrected and bear aloft
into the skies that corporal substance?" The dialogue has been
compared by modern readers to the Cymbalum mundi and to a
dialogue of Voltaire Le Diner de Boulainvilliers.
It would be interesting to trace the evolution of skepticism while
restricting ourselves to writings in the form of dialogue. The
history of the skeptic as a character might take account of Jean
F ernel's Brutus, the "Curieux" of Pontus de Tyard, and the "BaiT
of Brues, Jacques Tahureau's Democritic, Bodin's Senamus, Vanini'sJulio Cesare, and La Mothe Le Vayer's almost interchangeable Oratius Tubero and Tubertus Ocella. Several of them I have
had to skip. The importance of the dialogue form in this connection becomes no less as the seventeenth century turns into the
eighteenth.
HELEN TEDESCO: Before I forget to ask, what was all that about in
Langley's essay where he refers to the rarity of women in
philosophical dialogue?
TEDESCO: Helen, we were talking about it just the other day. It was
before you joined us to go the theatre.
JANE FRANCIS: There aren't any women either as authors or as
participants in the dialogues you have been talking about, that's
very plain. The closest thing to it is perhaps in the females discussing the stories related to the Heptameron and that was by a
woman.
HELEN TEDESCO: It's as if the men were relegating us to the
dialogue of the gossips in the Caquets de l'accouchee!
ISABEL CASTLE: Besides the Heptameron, Margaret of Navarre
composed a sort of allegory in dialogue, her Comedie jouee au
Mont de Marsan. The only characters are women, and the main
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topic is love. The speakers are La Mondaine, La Superstitieuse,
La Sage, and a shepherdess. La Sage reproaches the first for her
sensuality, the second for her bigotry and prudishness. Thus La
Sage reminds us of Parlamente. The shepherdess expresses a
simple but mystical love of God that may reflect another aspect of
the author.
FRANCIS: It seems that just as men excluded women from their
dialogues, Margaret excluded men from hers!
CASTLE: There were exceptions, however, such as Castiglione's
dialogue on courtesy. Still, the women there did not deliver long
discourses. And as for Leon Ebreo's "Dialogue on Love," although the subject is love and the manner is erotic casuistry, the
speakers Philo and Sophia are nearly sexless, or perhaps asexual.
But I believe Isabel wanted to say something.
ISABEL CASTLE: Yes, women are partners in the debates on love
composed by Loys Le Caron, Claire, ou La beaute and by Pontus de
Tyard, Le Solitaire. Both women are adepts in the Platonic philosophy, the idealism of love.
HELEN TEDESCO: But apparently women were not allowed in the
more serious areas where men discussed metaphysics and religion! When they ventured there, Moliere and Boileau made fun
of them!
ISABEL CASTLE: That's one reason I'd like to get on to the
eighteenth century, when even women could talk about religion
and free thought, without being treated as precieuses or as bluestockings.
JANE FRANCIS: When they were accepted as almost equals by Voltaire and Diderot!
FRANCIS: Around the turn of the century, some Englishmen apparently imagined that Frenchwomen had become adepts at philosophy. I have found a work entitled A Voyage to the World of
Descartes, allegedly translated by no less than Daniel Defoe. But
the dedicatory epistle is signed T. Taylor. It reads: "The Author
seems still to have kept his Eye on those two main ends, Pleasing
and Instructing. Philosophy by this Method is become a la mode
amongst the Women of greatest Quality in France, who pride
themselves more in being accounted Partisans of a Sect, than
Leaders in Dress and Fashion. And we may presume that the
Power and Force of Imitation will reach the Minds of our English
Ladies, when Learning shall be set off with the Allurements and
Delight they meet in reading a Romance. To provoke them
therefore I have adventur'd upon this Translation, notwithstand-

The Dialogue of Controversy / 65

ing the Prohibition of French Commodities." This was during
one of those wars between Louis XIV and England. The author
is Pere Gabriel Daniel, whom we have met already. He wrote that
dialogue against Pascal's Provincial Letters. Here, by the way, are a
few bits from his Voyage to the World of Descartes. From a conversation of the author with an old Cartesian, we learn that Descartes
is not dead but retired into the indefinite Spaces and making
preparations for the building of a world there like this one of
ours. The author meets Father Mersenne, as well as Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle. There is on behalf of Aristotle a refutation
of The Discourse on Method and the Meditations of Descartes. Socrates banters Cyrano de Bergerac. Accompanied by Mersenne
and two followers of Aristotle, the author arrives at his awaited
meeting with Descartes, who receives him more cordially than
the Aristotelians had done.
JANE FRANCIS: But there are evidently no female speakers.
FRANCIS: Undoubtedly the Entretiens spirituels of Saint Fran<;:ois de
Sales would lend further support to your argument. The work is
based on conversations with the nuns under his guidance. Two
centuries later, Auguste Comte's Catechisme positiviste will not be
so very different. The priest in this catechism is never contradicted by his female disciple, any more than in the case of
Saint Francis, and this despite Comte's peculiar form of
Mariolatry.
CASTLE: Have we forgotten those colloquies of Erasmus in which
women take the floor? The Spaniard Lujan was indebted to him
for his Coloquios matrimoniales, in which the speakers are largely
women. By the way, Helen Tedesco's allusion to the Caquets de
l'accouchee calls to mind Erasmus's dialogue on pregnancy. There
is a vigorous exchange between the woman and the male interlocutor, who tries to extol his sex by invoking men's services in
war. Her rebuff of his militarist machismo is worthy of the Lysistrata of Aristophanes: "There isn't a single one of you who
wouldn't prefer the risks of battle many times over the risks and
pains we suffer in childbirth!"
ISABEL CASTLE: That's all very well deserved, but nevertheless the
topic is still maternity and not lofty philosophy.
HELEN TEDESCO: If you think Voltaire and Diderot were so free
from prejudice, you are easily satisfied! How important are the
speaking roles of women in their dialogues? No more than in
Fontenelle's Entretiens sur la pluralite des mondes. Naturally I am
not concerned with the ladies in their lives, whether Mme du
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Chatelet or Sophie Volland, nor with the women in their novels,
whether Cunegonde or Suzanne Simonin. All that would be
another story! I challenge someone to answer.
CASTLE: In Erasmus, a learned lady comes off pretty well in her
dispute with an abbot. But I'll let Erasmus bow to Voltaire and
Diderot.
FRANCIS: Should I take part of that assignment? We have mentioned Voltaire's D'iner de Boulainvilliers in connection with Bodin's Heptaplomeres. There are four characters, the Count, the
Countess, a philosophe named Freret, and the Abbe. All but the
last are deists. The countess is by no means left out of the conversation, which is a free-for-all with the three against the Abbe. He
tries patiently to ward off their attacks on such dogmas as Eternal
Punishment. At the end he agrees he had been of their opinion
all along! The piece is a late one in Voltaire's career. As early as
1751, he produced one on Mme de Maintenon and Ninon de
I'Enclos. The former regrets the days before her elevation when
she had lived with Ninon. Mme de Maintenon tries to persuade
Ninon to come to stay with her at Versailles to relieve her boredom, but Ninon turns down the invitation since it would entail
her becoming a hypocrite too. And Mme de Maintenon cannot
bring herself to accept Ninon's invitation to come to stay at her
house. Ninon surmises that it is not only disenchantment with
grandeur but also advancing old age that concerns her friend. As
for her, she finds contentment in her freedom, her friends, and
her philosophy. A few years later, Voltaire produced a short
dialogue favoring education for girls, a stand set forth by a
young woman named Sophronie. Her position is a fairly moderate one. Voltaire produced another dialogue on a visit by Cicero's
daughter Tullia to Mme de Pompadour's dressing room. They
compare their dress and other customs, but Mme de Pompadour
doesn't have much to say. A cultivated nobleman does most of
the talking. His argument turns out to be in favor of a middle
position in the Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns.
CASTLE: Wasn't this rather late in time for that?
FRANCIS: It certainly was. But it serves to remind us that dialogues
played a part in that Quarrel. There was Fontenelle's dialogue des
morts between Socrates and Montaigne. Moreover, there are the
long-winded conversations of Charles Perrault's Parallele des anciens et des modernes en ce qui regarde les arts et les sciences. Gabriel
Daniel's criticism of the Provincial Letters took off from Perrault's
eulogy of Pascal in the Paralfele; I quoted from Daniel's Entretiens
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de Cleandre et d'Eudoxe in that connection. Women are absent,
however, from all of these.
TEDESCO: Women are more prominent in Diderot's dialogues.
And I believe that those on D'Alembert and Julie de Lespinasse,
and also the Entretien avec La marechaLe are more important in
Diderot's work than those dialogues you cited from Voltaire are
in his. In fact, I'd call these mere bagatelles.
FRANCIS: The bagatelle on Ninon de I'Enclos I find charming, if
superficial. But I'd be interested in hearing what you have to say
about Diderot.
TEDESCO: I want to limit myself to those dialogues which fall
clearly into the sphere of the polemic type. As you remember,
that's what we had 'proposed to concentrate on during this evening. Since it's getting late, you'll all be glad to hear that. You
recall what I said about Socrates and Diotima. Hemsterhuis was
called the Dutch Plato. Well, Diderot also felt personally close to
Socrates, without thinking he was Socrates reincarnate! He was
fairly close to Hemsterhuis and Shaftesbury too, for he translated some of their work, though not their dialogues. It is said
that Voltaire called him "Socrates." Yet it was also reported that
toward the end of his life Voltaire, having met Diderot for the
last time, declared: "One talent alone nature has refused him,
and that is an essential one, that of dialogue." We don't know
whether the story is true. Voltaire remained the deist he had
almost always been, whereas Diderot had, in the course of a
decade or more, moved from deism to atheism and materialism.
In 1756, Voltaire's DiaLog;ues with Posidonius and Lucretius pitted
the deist Posidonius against Lucretius, thus anticipating the position he would take in his A, B, C a dozen years later. Diderot's
Entretiens with D'Alembert is, in part, a reply to theA, B, C. The
exchange takes the form of a philosophical debate that with only
a little exaggeration could be called the Battle of Dialogues between Voltaire and Diderot, that is, if we can assume that A is
Voltaire and C is Diderot and that D' Alembert in the Entretiens
could stand for Voltaire.
FRANCIS: Only a little exaggeration, you think? I'd say your idea
requires quite a lot. The battle was not so clear-cut between the
two phiLosophes. Even if it were, the dialogues, while a necessary
part, are hardly sufficient to express their views. Too many other
writings, not in dialogue, would have to be included in order to
give a complete picture. For example, Voltaire's reply to the
"modern atheists" was in his Questions added to his Dictionnaire
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philosophique. And Diderot wasn't the only one of them; in fact,
Voltaire names only Maupertuis.
HELEN TEDESCO: Say! this promises to be exciting,-Voltaire versus my husband, and Diderot versus yours!
ISABEL CASTLE: Do you realize how late it is! We are not like Socrates,-we cannot stay up all night!
CASTLE: We certainly wouldn't wish to break up the symposium.
TEDESCO: Perhaps we can take up the battle another time?
FRANCIS: Especially because we haven't come near to even the last
episode, that is, of the survey we had planned, down to our own
time.
JANE FRANCIS: How about a little medianoche now?
ISABEL CASTLE: While we discuss getting together at our house,
perhaps next week?

5. The Dialogue of Controversy (Sequel)
Evening at the Castles'.
Present, the Castles, the Tedescos, and Francis.

ISABEL CASTLE: I'm sorry Jane Francis and the Langleys could not
be here. That leaves Helen and me facing you gentlemen.
HELEN TEDESCO: Oh, I don't think it'll come to a confrontation.
They still have some issues to settle among themselves, at least
Francis and my husband do.
TEDESCO: That's so. We left the Voltaire-Diderot debate up in the
aIr.
FRANCIS: You were perhaps drawn by Langley's chain of dialogues
to try the same thing with the philosophes. The debates of the
French Enlightenment were not always duels so much as battles
royal, not only Voltaire versus Diderot, but also Voltaire versus
Rousseau, Rousseau versus Diderot and Hume, though these two
did not retaliate, - when they all were not warding off Palissot,
Freron, or the Journal de Trevoux. But I agree with you to this
extent: the dialogue was a weapon often wielded in the
philosophical combats of this age. Thus the eighteenth century is
indeed like the sixteenth, a real century of controversial
dialogue, much more than the seventeenth, which had only one
great example, the Provincial Letters.
CASTLE: This whole comparison evidently applies much more to
France and Germany, judging from what you both said the other
day, than to Spain and Italy. In the peninsulas, the sixteenth
century was certainly outstanding in this respect, while the
eighteenth suffered impoverishment. Besides, Galileo belonged
to the early seventeenth.
TEDESCO: The analogy of the battle royal is no less farfetched than
that of the duel. You yourself conceded that Diderot and Hume
forbore answering Rousseau's charges in kind. And, as I recall,
the playwright Palissot exempted Voltaire from his satire of the
philosophes, of Diderot, Rousseau, and so forth.
69
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FRANCIS: That's true enough.
ISABEL CASTLE: I was struck by the story that Voltaire found Diderot lacking in the talent for dialogue. If that remark is authentic, what on earth could he have meant by it?
TEDESCO: I cannot conceive what possible foundation there could
be for such an allegation. Diderot, if anyone, was the exemplary
man of dialogue. Think of the moi and the lui of his Neveu de
Rameau, both so convincing and so different, the dialogues on
drama and acting, and Jacques Ie fataliste, that philosophical
picaresque novel. We've already mentioned the D'Alembert cycle
and the Entretien avec la marechale.
CASTLE: Voltaire could have meant that it was hard to get a word
in edgewise when Diderot was in eruption.
HELEN TEDESCO: I imagine that could have been the case with
V oltaire at times.
ISABEL CASTLE: And Diderot the talker was one thing, Diderot the
writer something else.
CASTLE: Well, they were both remarkable dialogue writers. We
haven't even touched on Voltaire's dozen dialogues of
Euhemerus, or all those philosophical conversations dispersed
throughout his tales and essays, such as the meeting with Socrates and then with Jesus in the Questions attached to his Dictionnaire philosophique. If anyone still reads Remy de Gourmont's Une
Nuit au Luxembourg, Gourmont's debt to that scene with Jesus will
not go unnoticed. But, about Diderot, weren't his dialogues usually between the halves of himself? The other interlocutor had to
accept playing the part of one of these.
ISABEL CASTLE: The other two of the Big Four did not do so much
in the genre, did they? Montesquieu and Rousseau, that is?
TEDESCO: If Diderot talked with himself, it was about subjects outside of himself; whereas Rousseau's dialogues with himself were
exclusively about himself. I'm referring, of course, to Dialogues:
Rousseau Judge ofJean-Jacques.
FRANCIS: Montesquieu's dialogues des morts of Sulla and Eucrates and
of Xanthippus and Xenocrates are political portraits. They are neglected but not negligible. His advanced ideas are more memorably presented in his better-known writings. In the area of controversial dialogue, Fenelon's Socrate et Alcibiade is eloquent
against wars of conquest. It was written for the Duc de Bourgogne, who did not live long enough to have an opportunity to
apply its lessons. Different in nature were Fenelon's interminable
dialogues on Jansenism, from which I quoted the criticism of
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Pascal's Provincial Letters. Few are the readers who have remained
through to the end of Fenelon's imaginary visit to the Jansenist
M. Fremont.
HELEN TEDESCO: I take it that you are not one of the few.
FRANCIS: I confess I am not, though I did stay for quite a while.
But Fenelon did not carry out his promise, which he stated in this
comment: "I am preparing seven or eight short letters, in the
same form as the first letters of Pascal. I recount the disputes that
I had with a Jansenist." There is a dialogue des morts by Vauvenargues which brings together Pascal and Fenelon. Apparently
Vauvenargues did not know of Fenelon's criticism of Pascal, for
his dialogue shows Fenelon praising him. The piece is related to
the Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns. Vauvenargues's Fenelon cites Boileau: "Despreaux said that you were equally above
the ancients and the moderns, and many people of good judgment are persuaded that you had more genius for eloquence
than Demosthenes." As for a dialogue that can be favorably
compared with the portrait of the Jesuit in the Provincial Letters, I
think the best example is by a freethinker, Saint-Evremond's
Conversation de M. le Marechal d'Hocquincourt avec le Pere Canaye.
The portrait of the marshal is even more striking than that of the
ingenuous Jesuit. I translate one of his principal remarks: "I
have loved philosophy only too much, but I've got over it and I'll
never go back to it. A certain devil of a philosopher addled my
brain so much with talk of our first parents, of apple, serpent,
earthly paradise, and cherubim, that I had reached the point of
not believing anything at all. The devil take me if I believed
anything! But since that time, I'd let myself be crucified for religion. It's not that I see any more reason for it; on the contrary,
less than ever: but all I can tell you is,-I'd let myself be crucified
without knowing why!" It is a little masterpiece of satire and
presents in short compass not just one character, like Pascal's
work, but two. Actually, the Jesuit is not as ingenuous as I said,
but he remains a comic figure with the martial pretensions he
displays to the narrator: "I speak to you quite differently from
the way I would to the marshal. I was purely the Jesuit with him,
and I have the frankness of a military man with you." His frankness consisted in admitting that the controversy between the
Jesuits and the Jansenists was not really one of principle: "What
folly to imagine that we hate each other because we disagree on
Grace! It's neither Grace nor the Five Propositions that have set
us against each other: jealousy over the governance of con-
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sciences is behind it all." Composed about 1656, the dialogue
seems to belong to the eighteenth century in spirit. As a dialogue
of character, it ranks with Diderot's Neveu de Rameau and the
better Imaginary Conversations of Landor.
TEDESCO: When we were discussing women in dialogues that first
time, you referred to Remond Ie Grec's Agathon. It is interesting
that Diderot's defense of the natural passions in his Pensees
philosophiques and in the D' Alembert cycle was anticipated by Remond Ie Grec, as well as by his brother, Remond de Saint-Mard,
who affirmed the same defense in his own Nouveaux Dialogues des
dieux. Your Epicurean Saint-Evremond and his friends, Ninon
de L'Enclos, the Earl of Hamilton, and the Count of Gramont,
could probably be found in this background, as well as Shaftesbury, although I shouldn't imply that he was an Epicurean!
FRANCIS: At the opening of the century there was published a
dialogue on the subject of pleasure that placed on opposite sides
two well-known figures of the preceding period, Patru, a learned
friend of La Fontaine and Boileau, and D'Ablancourt, the translator. They discuss a sermon they have heard that violently condemned all pleasure. Patru agrees that pleasures are pernicious,
while his partner defends certain innocent forms. Patru indeed
condems them all in such extreme terms as to suggest a reduction
to the absurd of the entire argument. "Christians shouldn't eat
for enjoyment but only in order not to die of starvation." Even to
enjoy the beauty of nature is frivolous. The dialogue is fictitious.
It came under censorship and was suppressed, harmless though
it seem to us.
HELEN TEDESCO: The establishment must have been very touchy!
TEDESCO: It is worth noting that dialogues give expression to one
of the principal ideas of the age, that of the goodness of man in a
"state of nature." The notion that natural passions are good is
related to the primitivism set forth in Diderot's Supplement au
voyage de Bougainville. There was a dialogue very early in the
century which expressed similar views, that of the Baron de
Lahontan. No doubt Voltaire remembered it when he wrote l'Ingenu. After the Huron Adario of Lahontan, Diderot introduced
the Tahitian Orou as another example of the good savage. There
is much on sexual customs in both works. There is no double
standard of morality, nor a cult of virginity, and marriage is not a
business transaction. Neither society is based on private property. The Huron states that there is no distinction of thine and
mine, but he is reminded by Lahontan that he possesses slaves,
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captured in war which contradicts somewhat his supposed simplicity of customs. Diderot's savages are freer from war. They are
innocent and gentle wherever nothing troubles their repose and
security. War is born of rival claims to the same property, the
rules of sexual morality of civilized peoples are contrary to nature, and the tyranny of man has converted the possession of
women into property. These are the lessons taught by Orou to
the missionary.
Throughout the century, the contrast between the savage and
the civilized was exploited, or should I say, rhetorically abused.
An example of this is a dialogue by an anonymous Anglophobe
entitled Les Sauvages de l'Europe. And who are these savages? The
English, of course! In another Anglophobe satire, there is a conversation between a young Frenchman and an Englishman which
becomes so acrimonious that the reader is almost disappointed
that the altercation does not turn into a scuffle. The date of
publication is, to be sure, 1780. The book is really something
between a novel and a dialogue and mediocre wherever you
place it. It is by a certain Robert Martin Lesuire, and it is called
Les Amants franfois a Londres, or Les Delices de l'Angleterre. Yet its
place of publication seems to be London!
FRANCIS: Many dialogues hardly superior to your Lesuire's or to
my La Dixmerie's must have been produced during the century.
There are several volumes to Le Spectacle de la nature by Abbe
Pluche, that naive believer in Final Causes, who might have
posed for Voltaire's Pangloss better than Leibniz or Rousseau.
His work is more didactic than polemic. Perhaps a place should
be kept for Condillac's brother, Mably, who published his Entretiens de Phocion in 1763. The five discourses extol a rather
hackneyed ideal of ancient virtue, which Mably found
exemplified in Plutarch's Life of this Athenian general. Here are
a few of the lessons taught by Phocion to his disciple Aristias:
Politics is a science. Passions must be subordinated to reason. The
main object of politics is to regulate morals and cultivate the
virtues of temperance, love of work, and love of country. Toward
the opening of the discussion, we learn that young Aristias had
been in danger of becoming a complete cynic. Phocion remarks
to the reporter: "You see with what teachings the minds of our
youth are being poisoned. Hardly have they discovered that everything is not true than they laughably conclude that everything
is false." Aristias soon learns better, exclaiming: "How wise Phocion is! His words have revived in my heart a taste for virtue
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which wretchedly I had been striving to destroy."
Whom could Mably have been aiming at here? It could not
have been Rousseau, although there was bad blood between
them. In a letter on Rousseau's Lettre de la Montagne, Mably offended Rousseau with words like "seditious" and "demagogue."
Rousseau wrote in this connection in his Confessions: "A little later
appeared the Dialogues of Phocion, where I saw a mere compilation of my writings, put together without reserve or shame."
Apparently Mably did not forgive the author of The Social Contract. As for the Entretiens de Phocion, their style was too vague and
stereotyped to compete with more vigorous works for the attention of the public.
CASTLE: Could we get down a little from that high-sounding level?
A good example of getting down to earth is the Abbe Galiani's
Dialogues on the Corn Trade, if I may translate the title into English. It certainly caused as much commotion as some of Voltaire's or Diderot's dialogues. This witty diplomat from Naples
was the friend of many of your circle of philosophes. Diderot and
Grimm helped him with the manuscript. He tried to conceal his
authorship from all but close friends. The work is in nine parts
and presents three speakers, the Chevalier Zanobi, the President,
and the Marquis, all having real-life models, and Galiani speaking through the Chevalier. The main speaker opposes the
French government's policy of allowing wheat to be exported
freely and without duty. The publication in 1770 coincided with
a critical situation. Bread riots resulting from high prices had
occurred in places like Rouen in 1768, and in 1770 the government reimposed restrictions on the grain trade. Turgot pleaded
in vain against the new policy, which ran counter to the Physiocratic doctrine he favored. He and another encyclopediste, the
Abbe Morellet, argued that no book had caused more harm. To
hear them, it was the sole cause of riots in Guyenne and Languedoc. But Galiani felt vindicated by the government's change
of policy.
Having left Paris with much regret, Galiani continued to follow
French economic developments. Writing to his good friend Mme
d'Epinay, he explained the kind of information he wanted her to
send him. I found this amusing passage, but I won't translate it
because the plays on words cannot be retained in English: ')e
veux savoir, en gros aussi, si ron exporte, ou si ron importe, ou si
ron transporte, et si ron supporte, et si ron s'emporte, et a qui ron
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rapporte la cause du malheur: voila tout. Vos tableaux
economiques me donnent Ie spleen et emporte une demi-page
precieuse."
Turgot found the dialogues hard to refute because they were
so witty. The opposition was outmatched. There was praise from
Frederick the Great and from Catherine the Great. Voltaire
added his own clever eulogy, telling Diderot: "It seems that Plato
and Moliere have joined to compose this work." Here is a typical
exchange: One speaker objects to the other's light treatment of
serious subjects. The latter replies: "That's precisely what one
must do in Paris. One must weigh down on minor things to give
them emphasis and an importance they wouldn't otherwise have.
The serious matters must be made lighter, else they will be unmanageably heavy."
ISABEL CASTLE: Wasn't there another dialogue mentioned in Galiani's letters?
CASTLE: There's a rather superficial one joshing women.
ISABEL CASTLE: Oh, I don't think that is worth bringing up! I
mean Mme d'Epinay's Conversations d'Emilie, a book on female
education that even received an Academy prize. Emilie was the
daughter of another of the Abbe's correspondents and not, as
one might suppose, a female counterpart to Rousseau's Emile.
FRANCIS: It's true that Rousseau had already groomed "Sophie"
for that part.
CASTLE: Another pertinent fact about the witty abate is that he
wrote in Italian the words to a comic opera called The Imaginary
Socrates. It satirizes a contemporary, who imagines himself to be
Socrates born again. To his misfortune, his Xanthippe is also
reincarnated.
HELEN TEDESCO: Well, we've heard about many dialogues before
the revolution. I should think that a tumultuous period like the
revolution would have seen many polemic dialogues produced.
FRANCIS: Actually, it was not very productive in this respect, although, I can think of one dialogue des morts by the famed Condorcet. It is between Diogenes and Aristippus. In a manner that
has become a conventional part of his legend, the Cynic represents honesty in opposition to the cynical opportunism of Aristippus, condemning his flattery of the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse. He defends himself by saying that he only flatters the tyrant
for the good of men: "I oppose to his natural ferocity his selfinterest and his glory, and I cause happy and just laws to issue
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from tyranny's womb." In conclusion, Aristippus tells Diogenes:
"Yes, in spite of my love of food and drink, I like your witty
sayings better than all the wines of Sicily."
I wonder, Tedesco, if you know of any German dialogues on
politics written in the period just prior to the French Revolution?
TEDESCO: No, except perhaps for Lessing's Masonic dialogues.
Ernst und Falk belongs to his very last years. He published the
first three of them in 1778, the others are posthumous. They
have one qualification that justifies their being mentioned here.
There was some difficulty with the censorship. Ostensibly dealing with Freemasonry, the work transcends those sectarian confines for the discussion focusses on the evils of discrimination by
rank, nationality, and religion. I would like to quote a passage of
the second conversation, if I can lay my hands on it. Oh, here it
is: "It is the total sum added together of the individual well-being
of all members that constitutes the well-being of the State. Outside of this, there is none at all. Any other kind of well-being of
the State that causes an individual member to suffer ever so little
is a mantle for tyranny." To this speech by Falk, Ernst demurs as
if out of prudence: "I wouldn't say that so loud." But then he
agrees with Falk: "As if Nature valued more the welfare of any
abstract concept-such as State, Fatherland, and so forththan the welfare of the actual individual person." Ernst becomes
somewhat disillusioned with the order of Masonry when he
learns that the Freemasons do not practice complete equality.
Thus he sighs in the fourth (posthumous) conversation: "If only
that equality existed!" Ernst goes on: Let an enlightened Jew
come and introduce himself. 'Oh,' they say, 'aJew? A Freemason
should at least be a Christian. It doesn't matter what kind." We
recognize here the author of Nathan der Weise, do we not?
In the fifth dialogue there is a curious and ambiguous allusion to the American Revolution then in progress. Ernst has been
shocked by the uncouth behavior of a Freemason he met at a
social gathering. Falk informs him that the man is one of those
who fight in Europe for the American cause to which Ernst replies that would not be the worst thing about him. Falk explains
that the man fancies that the Continental Congress is a Lodge
and that the Freemasons will finally establish their own regime in
America. Can there be such dreamers asks Ernst. When Falk
disavows such plans in the name of the Masons, Ernst responds:
"That's what I think also. Whatever costs bloodshed is certainly
not worth bloodshed!"
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ISABEL CASTLE: Evidently Lessing would not have agreed with
Thomas Paine! I mean in regard to summer soldiers and sunshine patriots.
HELEN TEDESCO: Perhaps not with Benjamin Franklin either! I
don't really know whether Lessing was hinting at Franklin, who
was a member of the Nine Sisters, or Nine Muses, Lodge in
Passy. Other American leaders, including Washington, Samuel
Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Patrick Henry, John Marshall, and
James Monroe were said to be Masons. In 1778, Franklin assisted
at the initiation of Voltaire into his lodge and in the same year
officiated at the Masonic funeral service for the famous man.
About this time, Franklin wrote a brief "Dialogue between Britain, France, Spain, Holland, Saxony, and America." Britain
pleads in vain to the European states not to supply arms to
America. As a piece of art it is surpassed by the utterly unpolitical
"Dialogue between Franklin and the Gout," an amusing
bagatelle, written in French in 1780 for one of the French ladies
he was trying to flirt with.
Since I am talking about Franklin, I may as well bring out the
rest of my homework. Evidently Langley did not think it worth
mentioning in his essay that as a young man, Franklin met Mandeville in London back in 1725. Having returned to Philadelphia
in 1730, he composed two slight dialogues between Philocles and
Horatio concerning virtue and pleasure. Philocles is the apostle
of prudence in the enjoyment of pleasures, Horatio, the rake,
who accepts his friend's advice with surprising promptness.
There is nothing else here to surprise anyone who already knows
Poor Richard's Almanack, but it is curious that the name, Philocles,
comes from Shaftesbury's Moralists and the name Horatio from
Mandeville's dialogues appended to The Fable of the Bees.
Well, to move a little closer to the historical period we were in;
I'll also mention that in 1755 Franklin composed "A Dialogue
between X, Y, and Z, concerning the present state of affairs in
Pennsylvania." The object was to enlighten the public mind on
his Militia Act and to promote the association necessary to form a
militia. In his opinion it had "great effect." Typical of the
dialogue is an exchange between Z, the strongest opponent, and
X, the author's mouthpiece. Z declares: "For my part, I am no
coward, but hang me if I'll fight to save the Quakers." X replies:
"That is to say, you won't jump ship, because 'twill save the rats,
as well as yourself."
CASTLE: Judging from that sample, it is a pity that Franklin didn't
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write more dialogues!
FRANCIS: Isabel, your reference to Thomas Paine,-did that
mean that you had something more to say about him? Did he
write dialogues?
ISABEL CASTLE: Oh, I know of only one. It is "A Dialogue between
the Ghost of General Montgomery Just Arrived from the Elysian
Fields; and an American Delegate, in a Wood near Philadelphia,"
published in 1776. It begins with the delegate welcoming the
ghost; "If I mistake not, I now see the ghost of the brave General
Montgomery." The latter replies: "I am glad to see you. I still
love liberty and America, and the contemplation of the future
greatness of this Continent now forms a large share of my present happiness. I am sent here upon an important errand, to warn
you against listening to terms of accommodations from the court
of Britain." The delegate is one of those inclined to accommodation with the King. The general calls the king a royal criminal
who should be resisted by armed action by the colonists. The
delegate fears the destruction brought by war, as well as the ruin
of trade overseas. The general answers his objections. The destructive consequences of slavery would be worse than those of
war, and more lasting. With independence, trade will flourish:
"As I know that Divine Providence intends this Country to be the
asylum of persecuted virtue from all quarters of the globe, so I
think your trade will be the vehicle that will convey it to you." As
for the British people themselves, he argues: "Your dependance
upon the crown is no advantage, but rather an injury, to the
people of Britain, as it encreases the power and influence of the
King." The American asks: "Will not a declaration of independence lessen the number of our friends and encrease the rage of
our enemies in Britain?" The answer is: "Your friends are ... too
few ... your enemies have done their worst. Go then and awaken
the Congress. You have no time to lose. France waits for nothing
but a declaration of your independence to revenge the injuries
they sustained from Britain in the last war." Then he clears up
the mystery of why he has come back to earth from the Elysian
Fields: "The inhabitants of Heaven long to see the ark finished,
in which all the liberty and true religion of the world are to be
deposited." He continues, "The day in which the Colonies declare their independence will be a jubilee to Hampden, Sidney
... and all the other heroes who have offered themselves as
sacrifices upon the altar ofliberty." The general's personal interest in the outcome remains, however, somewhat obscure: "It was
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Wolfe, in the arms of victory. But I no longer envy him his glory.
I would rather die in attempting to obtain permanent freedom for
a handful of people, than survive a conquest which would serve
only to extend the empire of despotism. A band of heroes now
beckon to me. I can only add that America is the theatre where
human nature will soon receive its greatest military---civil and
literary honors,-Finis." Don't you find, as I do, that Paine's use
of these last two words, literary honors, is rather interesting?
Literary honors have not been associated with the outcome of
any of the subsequent military conflicts in which our country has
engaged, on a level with the other honors!
CASTLE: Has Paine himself been accorded the literary honors he
deserved? There seems to be a tradition in the United States to
deny him the standing given to other revolutionary figures of
less importance. Is it because this patriot was too much the cosmopolitan?
TEDESCO: People for whom patriotism meant conformism must
have been irritated by his statement: "The world is my country
and to do good is my religion." He was one of the early dogooders.
FRANCIS: In our earlier conversation on philosophical dialogue, we
referred to certain famous last scenes, the death of Socrates, the
death of the fictional character, Meursault, in Camus's L'Etranger. I wonder if this is not a more common theme than has
been recognized by literary scholars, a sort of dialogue in extremis.
Something that takes place, for example, between a dying unbeliever and a chaplain who comes to administer the last sacrament.
Such a dialogue can be a special form of the controversial
dialogue-one situated precisely in a Grenzsituation, as Tedesco
might say.
CASTLE: For that very reason the theme is not suitable for
dialogue,-it is too dramatic, too emotional.
TEDESCO: Aren't you thinking of moving narratives like Tolstoy'S
Death of Ivan Ilyich? Aren't there more purely intellectual treatments of the theme?
FRANCIS: There is the danger of falling into melodramatic propaganda like Victor Hugo's Dernier Jour d'un condamne. Hugo was
writing against capital punishment. For a more successful, a
richer, portrayal, one may take the last days of Julien Sorel in Le
Rouge et le noir by Stendhal. But I have just the example Tedesco
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wanted, an almost purely intellectual treatment. It is the Marquis
de Sade's Dialogue entre un pretre et un moribond. Since the man is
not condemned to die by the criminal code, that is, by a dominant
social class, the dialogue with the priest is not as fraught with
emotion, and shall I say, partisan feeling, as the similar scenes
with Julien Sorel or Meursault.
ISABEL CASTLE: If you were looking for the opposite of a dogooder, someone very different from Thomas Paine, you could
hardly have found a better example than this contemporary of
his.
HELEN TEDESCO: And someone almost as far from Mandeville,
with his motto, Private Vices, Public Benefits. Couldn't the Divine Marquis's motto have been: Private Vices, Private Benefits,
and the Devil take the Public?
FRANCIS: Sade's utter cynicism and his unabashed defense of the
ego's rights over other egos develop in the various dialogues
interspersed through the erotic scenes of his narratives, such as
La Philosophie dans Ie boudoir. One might say that this insolent,
sexual egotist stops short of solipsism only because the pleasures
of cruelty would be impossible if solipsism were true. The
dialogue I cite focuses on other topics pertinent to the controversial mode that we have been discussing. Written in Vincennes
prison in 1782, it was not published until our century, so it could
not have the contemporary impact of the breviary of atheism
inserted in the Histoire de juliette, published in 1797. The little
work has the same merits of clarity and elegance of style that
mark his stories. When the priest summons the dying man to
repentance, he replies that his only regret is that he had let many
pleasures slip by him: he had harvested only flowers when he
could have reaped an ample harvest of fruits. As for the priest's
argument that a God is needed to explain the world, he answers
that it is possible that nature alone had made what is attributed to
God, so why look for a second difficulty to explain the first?
"Perfect your knowledge of nature ... clear your reason, banish
your prejudices, and you won't have need of your God." What
seems out of character for the Marquis is the speech on crime he
ascribes to his interlocutor: "God forbid that I should wish to
encourage crime .... Reason itself and not false fears must teach
us to shun crime. Reason, my friend, yes reason alone must warn
us that harming our fellowmen can never make us happy, and
our hearts must advise us that contributing to their happiness is
the greatest felicity nature has granted us on earth. All human
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happy as we wish to be ourselves, and never cause them more
pain than we would wish to receive." The last phrase is perhaps
suggestive of sado-masochism! But let's skip that! Toward the
end of the conversation, the speaker exhorts the priest: "Give up
the idea of another world, there is none; but don't give up the
pleasure of being happy, and making others so." The reader can
only be impressed by the intellectual vigor of a dying man. And
the reader is even more amazed at his announcement that he has
arranged for a half-dozen women to help him pass his final
hours pleasantly. Cynically he invites the priest to share the joys.
And like Diderot's reluctant missionary in Supplement au voyage de
Bougainville, the priest succumbs. "The preacher became in the
arms of the women a man corrupted by nature, for not having
been able to explain what corrupted nature is."
HELEN TEDESCO: There's a male chauvinist for you!
FRANCIS: I have often thought that the Marquis de Sade does not
really represent the cutting edge of the advancement of free
thought that some modern readers seem to take him for. He has
done little more than pick up the sword dropped ages before by
Gilles de Retz, accompanying his gesture with some remarks
picked up from the philosophes-not so much a figure of the
Enlightenment as a spoiled aristocrat, like Don Juan, who was
miscast by the Zeitgeist.
CASTLE: I'm sure you mean it was the marquis who was miscast and
not Don Juan! The Burlador of the Bastille, the play director of
Charenton, should not be confused with the Burlador of Seville!
FRANCIS: You have me there!
HELEN TEDESCO: There is a dialogue by the early American
novelist Charles Brockden Brown urging equal rights for women. It was called Alcuin and published, in part, in 1798. In a
section then left unpublished, there is a visit to an imaginary
society where unisex clothing is the custom. I wish Brown's style
were more vigorous. It is so genteel.
ISABEL CASTLE: I imagine the great age of dialogue is over with
the end of the eighteenth century.
TEDESCO: Once we have crossed the divide to the nineteenth century, we face a long period of sterility as far as the dialogue is
concerned, for with the coming of romanticism the leading writers will mostly be monologists. They will cultivate self-expression
rather than persuasion. A recent German writer on the genre
discovered that, unlike the French with their penchant for
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dialogue, the Germans tend toward monologue. Citing Lichtenberg, Kleist, Holderlin, he affirms: "Dialogue is the fate of the
French. Monologue is the destiny of the Germans." Well, the
Germans placed a stronger stamp on the European movement of
romanticism than did the French, hence the lesser importance of
dialogue. Thus it is significant that in the Conversations with Eckermann, the reporter stands out much less than did Boswell, for
example, with Johnson. Goethe holds the floor all the time. Still,
we have already noted that the romantic philosopher Schelling
composed dialogues, as did Fichte.
ISABEL CASTLE: I believe that George Santayana's wartime tract
Egoism in German Philosophy expounds a view that is similar to
your recent German writer's.
CASTLE: Wasn't the greatest writer of dialogues at that time an
Italian, Leopardi? Of course, his Operette morali are disenchanted
and philosophical, rather than polemical.
FRANCIS: Once a weapon of polemic in favor of progress, the
dialogue in French fell into the hands of the reactionary Joseph
de Maistre. We have already noted certain philosophical doctrines in his Soirees de Saint-Petersbourg. The subtitle indicates its
political tendency: Entretiens sur Ie gouvernement tempore I de la providence. His work is a sustained attack on the eighteenth-century
philosophers in the light of the alleged consequences of their
ideas in the revolution and its aftermath. Sainte-Beuve remarks,
referring to his birth at Chambery in 1753, that Voltaire at Ferney could not suspect that his formidable enemy, his sharpest
mocker, was to come from not far away. De Maistre repudiates
those optimistic views on the natural goodness of man and on the
possibility of progress through reason. On the so-called noble
savage, he insists that savages are degenerate forms of mankind,
not primitives at all. Man was more perfect at the beginning; the
myth of the Golden Age proves that. It is curious how he takes
the opposite stand from Rousseau, while using some of Rousseau's own language. Discussing the origin of evil, he writes, "It is
one of my favorite ideas that the upright man [l'homme droit] is
commonly ad vised by an inner feeling of the falseness or tru th of
certain propositions before any examination, often without having carried out studies to prepare him to examine them in fullness of knowledge." No doubt this notion is related to his concept
of Platonic recollection. He argues that, on the question of evil,
one should not ask: Why does the just man suffer? but simply:
Why does man suffer? It is self-evident and fitting that evil
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should exist in the world, but God is not its author. Following
Saint Thomas Aquinas, de Maistre believes that God is the author of the pain that punishes, not of the evil that corrupts. Like
his admirers, the Action Fran~aise of a century later, he was
more Catholic than the pope, and more royalist than the king.
CASTLE: It occurs to me that de Maistre's notion that savages are a
degenerate variety of mankind could supply a rationalization for
genocide.
FRANCIS: That is true. The Black Legend does not seem so legendary if you read de Maistre. He thinks the missionaries were too
kind. His characterization of savages is really a caricature, a
crude and cruel one. I must admit it is presented in a style of
great vigor and pungency. Let me quote a rather long extract:
[Besides the reports of the missionaries] "another source of false
judgments of them is found in the philosophy of our age, which
has used savages to support its vain and guilty declamations
against social order, but the slightest attention suffices to make us
beware of the errors of charity and of bad faith. One could not
look for a moment at the savage without reading the curse written, I won't say only in his soul, but even on the external form of
his body. He is a child, deformed, robust and fierce, in whom the
flame of intelligence casts now no more than a pale and intermittent gleam. A formidable hand weighing down on these cursed
races rubs out in them the two distinguishing marks of our
greatness, foresight and capacity for improvement. The savage
cuts the tree to pick its fruit; he unharnesses the ox that the
missionaries have given him and cooks it over a fire made with
the wood of the plough. For over three centuries he has not
wanted to receive anything from us except the powder to kill his
fellows and the alcohol to kill himself." I must skip the most
heartless phrases of his diatribe.
HELEN TEDESCO: So much for Montaigne, Lahontan, and Diderot!
ISABEL CASTLE: Did Joseph de Maistre have any followers outside
of that counterrevolutionary stream leading to the Action Fran~aise? Isn't there a connection between him and the positivist
Auguste Comte?
TEDESCO: Would it not seem strange to find the messiah of the
"religion of humanity" in the spiritual company of that last-ditch
defender of the divine right of kings!
FRANCIS: It appears that Comte esteemed de Maistre's book Du
Pape. In the Catechisme positiviste he claims among his ancestors
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Fontenelle, Diderot, Condorcet, and de Maistre. There's a gene
pool for you! Whose genes were dominant and whose recessive
would be an interesting question, but it would take us too far
away from our theme. No doubt there is one side of Comte that
could respond to de Maistre. It is the side indicated by the first
word in his slogan Order and Progress. His other ancestors line
up with the second of the two words. The philosopher Leon
Brunschvicg put it concisely: "By creating the positivist religion
on his own authority, in order to combat the Occidental malady . ..
the revolutionary principle that recognizes no other authority but the individual reason, Comte remains faithful to the impulsion that was
communicated to him by Joseph de Maistre. Through positivism
as much as through catholicism, the pontifical spirit tended
toward the complete possession of the nineteenth century."
Against that pontifical spirit resistance took various forms.
One form is illustrated by a fairly long work in dialogue by a
forgotten opponent of the Second Empire. Maurice Joly's
Dialogue aux enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu was published
anonymously in Brussels in 1864 and smuggled into France. The
author could not get it published in his homeland for it was too
obviously an attack on the regime of Napoleon III. The imperial
police seized the contraband shipments, and the work was pretty
successfully suppressed. The Machiavelli of the dialogue is inspired not only by the author of The Prince but also by Joseph de
Maistre, as Montesquieu does not fail to remark. The work turns
upon a remarkable literary device. Machiavelli takes up the challenge presented by Montesquieu's writings and expounds a system of governmental despotism which he dares Montesquieu to
refute. The hypothetical description of this government gradually begins to seem more and more real and soon becomes almost
identical with the political reality of 1864, in France, a fact recognizable to the reader but not to Montesquieu, who had ceased to
follow events in France since 1847. The device is extremely effective, except at times when Machiavelli almost becomes his own
dupe and speaks as if he actually were in the seat of government.
The dialogue begins well, gets bogged down in detail in midcourse, but ends quite powerfully. The political mixture of violence and cunning described by Machiavelli is exactly the political
mixture displayed by Louis Napoleon in his coup d'etat and his
establishment of power afterwards.
The author's foreword begins: "This book has features that
may apply to all governments, but it has a precise aim: it per-
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sonifies in particular a political system that has not varied a single
day in its applications, since the fateful and already, alas, too long
past date of its enthronement." The work is divided into twentyfive dialogues, without definite breaks between them in many
cases. The two great minds meet in the realm of shades. Their
discussion concerns the fate of their respective doctrines in the
present world. Machiavelli addresses his colleague: "Your political principles reign over nearly half of Europe, and if anyone can
be freed from fear in the somber passage leading to Hell or
Heaven, who better than he who presents himself with such pure
titles of glory before the Eternal Judge?" As for himself, he laments that despite his services to his country, he died poor and
neglected and that his book was held responsible in the eyes of
posterity for all tyranny. "Such was my life and such the crimes
that brought me the ingratitude of my homeland and the hatred
of posterity. Heaven perhaps will be more just toward me." Montesquieu is more content: "The division of powers has solved the
problem of free societies, and if anything can lighten for me the
anxiety preceding the Day of Judgment, it is the thought that my
stay on earth had something to do with this great emancipation."
They naturally choose France as the object of their attention,
"that consecrated field of experimentation for political theories."
Machiavelli announces that within a century the age of despotisms will return. He proceeds to explain how he would go
about it to establish such a despotism in France: "Nowadays it is
less a question of doing violence to men than disarming them, of
suppressing their political passions than erasing them, of combating their instincts than fooling them, of outlawing their ideas
than throwing them off the trail by appropriating these ideas."
He envisions a state of affairs in which we might recognize Nazi
Germany: "It must come about that there will be in the country
only proletarians, a few millionaires, and some soldiers."
Another sentence refers to France, but could with some alterations apply to Germany: "I won't ask you for more than twenty
years to transform thoroughly the most intractable national
character in Europe and make it as docile to tyranny as the
merest Asiatic people." At one point Montesquieu objects that
Machiavelli's procedures would come into conflict with the very
charter he had instituted. Machiavelli retorts: "I'll just make
another constitution, that's all." We can understand why such an
anti-Gaullist as Jean-Fran<;ois Revel took pleasure in sponsoring
the recent republication of the book.
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Machiavelli specifies many other measures he would take in
establishing his autocratic regime. I'll mention only one here.
Throwing a sop to his people, he will maintain the suffrage, but
to limit its risks, to avoid surprises, he will gerrymander the electoral districts.
ISABEL CASTLE: Like in the United States at one time!
FRANCIS: He hardly ever mentions the United States at all.
HELEN TEDESCO: Perhaps because mentioning it in 1864 might
lead him way off the track. There was that Civil War!
TEDESCO: If you have a copy of that book, I'd like to read it!
FRANCIS: Well, I'll try to conclude my review with just a few more
references. I remarked earlier that Machiavelli tends to become
the dupe of his own visions. However, he also carries Montesquieu away, toward the end. Montesquieu cannot contain his
indignation: "May my shade never meet you again, and may God
erase from my memory the last trace of what I have heard!" In
an allusion to the so-called liberal empire, Machiavelli propounds
he has disarmed the hatred of factions. Montesquieu replies in
disgust: "Ah! So you won't drop the mask of hypocrisy with
which you have disguised crimes never described by human
tongue. So you want me to come out of eternal night to denounce
you! Ah! Machiavelli, you yourself had not taught how to degrade mankind to this point! You did not then conspire against
conscience, you had not conceived the idea of making the human
soul into a slime in which the Divine Creator Himself would no
longer recognize anything .... Finish your speech, it will be the
expiation for the rash act I committed in accepting this sacrilegious wager!"
ISABEL CASTLE: That sounds like an echo of Victor Hugo's poem
Expiation, denouncing Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat.
FRANCIS: The parallel with that poem becomes more striking a
little later. The author ascribes delusions of grandeur to the tyrant, and Montesquieu sighs: "Will this frightful dream never
end?" But it is not a dream. Machiavelli explains: "What I have
just described to you exists and prospers." Montesquieu asks
where, and Machiavelli hesitates to answer him as it would impose on him a second death. The whirlwind carries Machiavelli
away, but Montesquieu has guessed. The final words pronounced by him and the final words ofthe dialogue are: "Eternal
God, what have you permitted ... !"
HELEN TEDESCO: That's a pretty bombastic piece of writting. I
suppose that in French that passes for eloquence.
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FRANCIS: Perhaps it's partly the fault of my translation. But it was
a period when a grandiloquent style was common. MauriceJoly's
manner of expression was not original with him.
TEDESCO: We can still be glad that his dialogue was rediscovered.
And I still want to read it.
FRANCIS: The work is a curious instance of the phrase: Habent sua
Jata libelli. It seems that one copy of the original edition was
rescued. Can you imagine what happened to it? It was used in the
composition of the famous forgery The Protocols oj Zion. Some
passages in which Machiavelli describes how he will carry out his
seizure of power were plagiarized by the forgers and attributed
to the imaginary leaders of the alleged conspiracy!
CASTLE: The shade of Maurice Joly could hardly have rejoiced at
that!
ISABEL CASTLE: Evidently he received amends in the republication
of his work in the late Gaullist era!
FRANCIS: A contemporary, somewhat less forgotten than Maurice
Joly, composed dialogues, of which at least one is comparable to
his Machiavel et Montesquieu. A liberal and a Parnassian of sorts,
Louis Menard sets Socrates into a dialogue des morts. Socrates arrives before Minos, expecting to have his unjust indictment reversed. But Minos is not there to judge, he seeks to reconcile
those who have hated each other during life. Socrates will be able
to accuse his accusers; both he and they will be permitted to call
the Future to witness. The one who admits to being wrong will
submit himself to the Eumenides to be purified. But Socrates is
appalled when he discovers the evils awaiting mankind in the
ages to come, evils which would grow out of his teaching.
Another dialogue is entitled "Le gouvernement gratuit." It is
an allegory in which Jacques Bonhomme represents the French
people, and La Fee represents revolution. The time is after the
Franco-Prussian War. The question at issue concerns the remuneration of government officials. Jacques Bonhomme is almost
crushed under the burden. La Fee adduces the example of the
Athenian democracy in which the executive gave services free
out of duty. Since it is not possible to return to the example of the
first democratic government, La Fee proposes at least a limitation on official salaries. This is, of course, a trifling proposal to
come from the Spirit of Revolution. If the author wished to make
the point that the nation feared to take the course of revolution,
La Fee's suggestion is anticlimactic. The level of official salaries
was certainly not the most crucial problem facing France in those
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early years of the Third Republic. The confusion of Menard's
political liberalism was to bring him into the Boulangist camp
along with anti parliamentarians, who did not share his democratic opinions.
A dialogue of greater merit is "Eschatologie," a conversation
between man and a divinity of a nature somewhere between that
of a guardian angel and a pagan god. Their topic is immortality.
The god suggests various possibilities which have their drawbacks. Man agrees that it is better not to know what, if anything,
comes after death. The discussion then proceeds to the question
of evil. The god points out that without suffering there would be
no heroes. What merit is there in being good if one is assured of
reward? Does this bring to mind Joseph de Maistre's argument?
Menard lays a different emphasis upon it. Man agrees with the
god that evil has its place in the universal scheme. The inquietude of hope is better than the security of faith. There is
here a touch of heroic humanism that Camus, the author of The
Myth of Sisyphus, might concur with. Menard's philosophical
dialogues, unlike his political one, possess qualities of richness of
thought without heaviness that perhaps warrant according them
a place between those of Ernest Renan and Anatole France.
TEDESCO: Yet it does appear that the nineteenth century was not a
great one for dialogue, at least of the controversial type that we
have been tracing through the ages.
ISABEL CASTLE: What's the title of Menard's collection?
FRANCIS: Reveries d'un palen mystique.
HELEN TEDESCO: I took the opportunity to look him up in the Petit
Larousse. It says he was also a chemist, who invented collodion.
This must have been some later application of the substance, for
he was born in 1822. What kind of scientist was he?
FRANCIS: As for that, all I know is that he wrote in the book I have
cited these sentimental words: "Claude Bernard's widow has
opened a home for dogs to make amends for the crimes of experimental physiology. On Judgment Day, this offering will
weigh more in the awesome balance than all the discoveries of
her husband."
ISABEL CASTLE: Why did you mention Renan and Anatole
France? I don't recall any militant dialogues by these skeptics. I
do recall William James's review of Renan's Dialogues et fragments
philosophiques. I thought we might talk about Renan, so I brought
along this quotation: "This last production of a writer who at one
time seemed, to say the least, the most exquisite literary genius of
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France, is really sad reading for anyone who would gladly be
assured that that country is robust and fertile still. [It is] ... an
example of mental ruin ... insincerity and foppishness ... priggishness rampant, an indescribable unmanliness of tone compounded of a sort of histrionically sentimental self-conceit, and a
nerveless and loveless fear of what will become of the universe if
'l'homme vulgaire' is allowed to go on."
FRANCIS: William James was being rather tough-minded at the expense of that tender-minded Renan, wasn't he?
TEDESCO: I'd agree that the Dialogues philosophiques are, as people
used to say, redolent of disenchantment. It's in certain of his
Drames philosophiques that we find a more robust discussion of
political issues. As for "l'homme vulgaire," the first title he
planned for Caliban was "La rehabilitation de Caliban ou la suite
de la tempete." And L'Eau de jouvence, suite de Caliban, is clearly
optimistic as regards the potential political maturity of Caliban.
The nature of the theme required that he depart from the
Platonic genre to undertake something in the adjacent genre of
the philosophical drama. He had difficulty making the transition
since as he noted in a preface to his Pretre de Nemi: "The essence
of the dialogue being to put into play different opinions, and the
essence of drama to oppose different types." Renan remained
caught between Plato and Shakespeare.
FRANCIS: Now if I may put in a word in defense of Anatole France?
Readers of Ernest Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises perhaps remember only the slogan about Irony and Pity. Anatole France set
some of his stimulating philosophical dialogues in novels like
Thais and some of his most militant political dialogues in the
chronicles of the contemporary history ending with M. Bergeret a
Paris. Just as Maurice Barres, who wrote a preface for Menard's
book, by the way, placed more vigorous dialogues in Les
Deracines than in Huit Jours chez M. Renan.
CASTLE: They were on opposite sides in the Dreyfus Case, were
they not?
FRANCIS: Barres composed polemics on the affair, but no
dialogues like those of M. Bergeret. On the side of Dreyfus,
Julien Benda composed Dialogues aByzance. Remy de Gourmont
was coldly neutral in his Epilogues, sequels to his Dialogues des
amateurs. The cause cHebre may have made a socialist of the young
literary critic Leon Blum, yet his Nouvelles Conversations de Goethe
avec Eckermann are not, on the whole, Dreyfusard dialogues.
They reflect other preoccupations. They are modern interviews
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where there is little play of dialogue. As in the model, it is Goethe
who discourses and Eckermann who approves, even where
Goethe says that he is busy with a Third Faust in which Mephistopheles and Faust confront each other like Jules Guesde and
Jean J aures, rival socialist leaders of that epoch. J aures had
sought to rally socialists to the Dreyfus cause, while Guesde
wished a plague on both the Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards,
or rather on the bourgeois salons in which they assembled. Leon
Blum took Jaures's side against Guesde. One wishes he had pursued the idea of a Third Faust along these lines, so that it could
be compared with what Paul Valery did much later. There is,
however, one brief conversation dealing with Dreyfus which I
wish to summarize since it shows how anti-Dreyfusards invoked
Goethe in the debate. The conversation is dated June 7, 1898.
Goethe had been surprised by finding himself quoted by a newspaper opposed to reviewing the trial of Dreyfus. The newspaper
article describes the tragic state of the country: "business at a
standstill, political parties in disarray, Society prey to afflictionall that just for the sake of a single individual. . . . Zola,
Scheurer-Kestner, and Picquart would have done well to reflect
on the words of Goethe: Better an injustice than disorder." Leon
Blum has Goethe correct the reference in contemporary terms:
"What was I condemning by those words? I was condemning
lynch law, which is a disorder in the sense that it omits the essential forms of justice.... But leaving Dreyfus in the prison camp,
Dreyfus whom every impartial and sensible man knows to be
innocent ... it is very clear that that is a disorder." And he
emphasizes: "Those who sent him or keep him on the island,
they alone are acting as enemies of social order."
ISABEL CASTLE: I know that Leon Blum was later the Socialist
prime minister of France. I believe that Julien Benda also became well known, did he not?
FRANCIS: Yes, as the author of the book La Trahison des clercs in the
twenties. He condemned the intellectuals who became involved
in politics. If this seems inconsistent with his stand on Dreyfus,
Benda explained that defending Dreyfus was not a compromise
with principle but an expression of principle, whereas the
"clercs" he accused in the book violated their high calling by their
partisanship. Several of these had been anti-Dreyfusards, by the
way, like Maurice Barres and Charles Maurras. Benda's position
was perhaps not too different from that famous distinction made
by Charles Peguy between the "mystique" and the "politique" of
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Dreyfusism, except that Peguy applied it to his erstwhile partisans on the Dreyfus side. In the debate between [Machiavelli]
and Montesquieu, Benda would have been with Montesquieu.
To get back to his Dialogues aByzance, the author's spokesman is
Eleuthere. I'd like to quote an eloquent statement of his: "Isn't it
sad to observe that mankind understands and acts in accordance
with its interests only if this understanding and action satisfy at
the same time its need to hate and its thirst for blood and that as
soon as one tries to show men that by doing an apparently generous deed they are really working for their own happiness, one is
immediately called a preamer and lacking in a sense for the
practical?" One of Eleuthere's antagonists is named M. Duval.
Curiously enough, in 1953, Louis Aragon published dialogues
entitled Le Neveu de M. Duval. Benda dealt with the Dreyfus case,
Aragon with the Cold War. One Duval supports the French
army, the nephew supports the American army! Aragon, of
course, also had in mind Diderot'sNeveu de Rameau. The copy of
Julien Benda's Dialogues a Byzance which I have in my hand was
presented by Benda to Robert Dreyfus, but I don't know whether
this Dreyfus was related. If he were, I should imagine that the
book would have been kept in the family. Benda was to write
other dialogues later in his career, but none as long as these.
HELEN TEDESCO: I can't imagine how we could end this conversation on a stronger note than your quotation from Leon Blum.
And since we have arrived at the end of the last century and the
beginning of our own, I propose that we stop here.
TEDESCO: I'm really glad that you were able to correct that misconception of Goethe so appropriately.
FRANCIS: I am thinking of all the miscarriages of justice that the
new century would bring, including one in which Leon Blum
himself would be in the dock, accused of contributing to the
defeat of his country by the descendants of the enemies of
Dreyfus.
ISABEL CASTLE: Those dialogues would have to be sought in court
records and not in literary compositions.

6. Dialogues as Literary Criticism
Late afternoon at Francis's. Jane Francis and Isabel Castle are
present, soon joined by Francis and Castle.
JANE FRANCIS: Should we let our husbands hear the tapes?
ISABEL CASTLE: No, let's not tell them now. We'll let Langley tell
them when they meet for their concluding session next week.
Francis and Castle enter, then Langley.
FRANCIS: What were you saying about our concluding session?
JANE FRANCIS: We were about to say that we won't be able to attend, but perhaps you'll tell us about it all later.
CASTLE: I'll have to miss it too. I'll be called away, unfortunately.
ISABEL CASTLE: With all that was said during the last conversations, there was one subject that didn't receive much attention.
FRANCIS: What was that?
ISABEL CASTLE: It's the use of the dialogue in literary criticism.
Nothing was said about John Dryden's Essay of Dramatic Poesy, or
about T. S. Eliot's Dialogue of Dramatic Poetry.
CASTLE: Francis did mention Fenelon's and Perrault's comments
on Pascal.
FRANCIS: That was in connection with religious controversy in the
case of Fenelon and with the Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns in the case of Perrault. To be sure, literary criticism enters
there too.
CASTLE: It occurs to me that the very first literary criticism appears
in several of Plato's works, in The Republic of course, but also in
Ion, where the notion of poetic inspiration is presented.
LANGLEY: Plato was not so much a critic of particular literary
works, as a critic of literature itself. I should imagine we wouldn't
want to enter into that deep subject here and now.
CASTLE: Still, I consider it of capital importance that here too, in
the subject of literary criticism, we must begin at least with the
name of Plato, if not in his name.
JANE FRANCIS: Unless you began with Aristophanes who set Aeschylus and Euripides to debating in The Frogs!
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FRANCIS: It would be better to start with modern times, when the
literary critic as such began to emerge, as distinct from the philosopher or satirist.
CASTLE: The boundaries of our topic exclude Dante, whose essay
on allegorical and other meanings of literature is called The Convivio. Only its title recalls The Symposium, not its form.
FRANCIS: A pretty fair idea of the evolution of critical attitudes in
France can be gained from works in the dialogue form.
JANE FRANCIS: As I recall, one of the first great documents was
Joachim du Bellay'sDifence et illustration de la languefranfaise. But
it is not in the dialogue form, nor are any of the later literary
manifestoes like Victor Hugo's Priface to Cromwell or Emile Zola's
Experimental Novel.
LANGLEY: Neither is Wordsworth's Preface to the Lyrical Ballads.
FRANCIS: Naturally. But I'm not thinking of prefaces or manifestoes. These are likely to be in the first person singular or plural.
CASTLE: Incidentally, du Bellay's manifesto was partly based on
the Italian dialogue of Sperone Speroni!
ISABEL CASTLE: I'd like to hear Francis attempt to demonstrate his
idea.
FRANCIS: Well, I'll start with the seventeenth century, if you will
allow me. Attitudes toward the Middle Ages are involved in the
dialogues of Jean Chapelain and Jean-Franc;ois Sarasin. Chapelain's piece La Lecture des vieux romans includes in its cast of
characters this same Sarasin allied with Chapelain against the
scholar Gilles Menage. The latter is to be the model for the
pedant Vadius in Moliere's Femmes savantes. But he had positive
qualities: Mme de Sevigne esteemed him. Chapelain's dialogue
deals with the Arthurian romance of Lancelot. Although his defense is somewhat apologetic, he stresses the philological interest
of its old language to an etymologist like Menage but agrees with
the critic that the work lacks artistic merit. He concedes that the
plot development is weak. Like Sarasin, Chapelain emphasizes
the moral virtues expressed in the story, the chivalry, courage,
and loyalty to friends. Menage is at length persuaded to grant
some value to the romance, despite his disapproval of some of
the behavior depicted. Chapelain's manuscript was addressed to
Cardinal de Retz and published only much later. His future
enemy, Boileau, does not treat Lancelot in his dialogue Les Heros
de roman. Written in 1665, not published until after his death, this
is a satire, in the style of Lucian, of Chapelain's epic La Pucelle
and of the novels of the precieuse MIle de Scudery, whose works
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present ancient warriors like Horatius and Cyrus transformed as
pining lovers, much to the disgust of Pluto and the sarcastic
amusement of Minos. Preciosite is also the target of Moliere's
Critique de l'ecole des femmes.
LANGLEY: Do you call that a dialogue?
FRANCIS: Moliere and Voltaire did so! As you know, there is rather
little dramatic action in the piece. It is more than a defence of
L'Ecole des femmes against the prudes and hyprocrites who were
attacking Moliere, for it contains a moving defence of his conception of comedy by the playwright. His critics asserted that
comedy was inferior to tragedy. Dorante, his mouthpiece, answers vigorously: "When you portray heroes, you do as you
please ... But when you depict men, you must make likenesses .
. . . You have done nothing if the people of your time do not
recognize themselves in your portraits.... And you must provide amusement; to make cultured people laugh is a difficult
undertaking."
ISABEL CASTLE: Undoubtedly Moliere was setting forth the views
of many cultured people of his age, including Boileau. He wasn't
speaking for La Fontaine, apparently, for La Fontaine's story of
Psyche and Cupid contains a contrary view. This view is expressed
in the dialogue of the four friends who have come together to
hear the story and discuss it, almost like the devisants of Margaret of Navarre's Heptameron, by the way. Gelaste observes that
there are very few good tragic poets today: "I don't mean that the
last one died with Euripides or Sophocles; I mean only that there
are hardly any. The difficulty is not so great in comedy, which is
more likely to touch us, because its incidents are of such a nature
that we can apply them to ourselves more readily."
LANGLEY: What can you say to that, Francis?
FRANCIS: Well, I'm really glad Isabel brought it up. For more than
one reason. First, it is another example of a dialogue on a topic of
literary criticism. Ariste, Acante, and Poliphile represent different shades of opinion, but all belong to the French classical age.
Second, the contrast between GeJaste and Moliere indicates that
La Fontaine could not have modeled this character on Moliere,
as was once widely assumed in France. You recall that Ariste was
supposed to be Boileau, Acante to be Racine, and Poliphile to be
La Fontaine. None of these identifications is now accepted.
But I'd like to cite another idea from Moliere's Critique. He has
the pedant Lysidas wrongheadedly accuse him of violating the
rules in his play. Dorante answers for him: "You amuse me with
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your rules, with which you embarrass the ignorant and deafen us
all the time. To listen to you, one would suppose the rules of the
art to be the greatest mysteries in the world, and yet they are but
natural observations of common sense . . . . I'd like to know
whether the great rule of all rules is not to please." That is an
aspect of French classicism that joins Moliere to Boileau and
Racine.
A contemporary, Gabriel Gueret, in La Promenade de SaintCloud, has Oronte and Cleante carryon interesting chats on
Chapelain, Sarasin, Menage, and others. Oronte favors Boileau;
Cleante is critical of him, as is the first-person speaker. There are
many pages pro and con on Tartuffe. The speakers also criticize
sundry dialogues of the period. Another contemporary, Ie pere
Bouhours, composed two volumes of dialogues, including some
on literary topics. The most famous is one on "Le je ne sais quoi,"
that mysterious quality that Boileau's rationalist doctrine perhaps
failed to account for. Bouhours presents two interlocutors:
Ariste offers a comparison between magnetism and the ')e ne
sais quoi," and Eugene adds learned references to Italian and
Spanish usages.
CASTLE: Mentioning, I trust, Juan de Valdes's Dialogo de la lengua!
FRANCIS: Well, Bouhours is more interested in psychology, in the
phenomena of sympathy and antipathy. In another piece on "Le
Bel Esprit," he tries to clarify such things as enthusiasm, inspiration, and genius by means of a humoristic psychology. One critic
is reminded of a diagnosis by a Moliere doctor! In his second
volume, Bouhours presents two friends in amiable conversation
on the question of the Ancients versus the Moderns. Philanthe
favors the modern Spaniards and Italians over the Greeks and
Romans, but is gradually led toward Eudoxe's view. As his name
implies, Eudoxe places good sense over the "faux bel esprit,"
exemplified by such writers as Tasso. Eudoxe is not quite as
doctrinaire as Boileau, however. One of the significant notions
attributed to him is this: "The figurative is not false, and the
metaphor has its truth just as fiction has." Eudoxe and Philanthe
really represent different points of view, although their differences generate no sparks. The interlocutors of the first volume,
Les Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eugene, on the other hand, are virtually
interchangeable, so little do they differ. Even for Eudoxe and
Philanthe, we have to look elsewhere for more exciting episodes
in the Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns. I am thinking of
Perrault's presentation of his poem at the French Academy and
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Boileau's protest. There was no dialogue between Perrault and
Boileau!
LANGLEY: The Battle of the Books by Swift has more exciting
episodes. Of course, it's a burlesque combat and not a debate.
The most important dialogue produced in England dealing with
the controversy was certainly John Dryden's Essay of Dramatic
Poesie. Four men take a sail on the Thames and engage in discussion of contemporary events and literature. Their first topic is
the Ancients and Moderns, and they pass from this to a comparison of French and English drama. With all Dryden's respect for
Corneille, his mouthpiece Neander joins the majority against one
speaker defending the French theatre. It is here that we read
that famous praise of Shakespeare: "He was the man who of all
Modern, and perhaps Ancient Poets, had the largest and most
comprehensive soul." As they continue their ride, they move on
to another topic, the question of rhyme versus blank verse for
tragedy. Neander expresses the author's preference for rhyme.
Their conversation is interrupted by th~ir arrival at SomersetStairs. No one can deny that the dialogue form is highly appropriate for the subject. In the words of one editor: "No other form
would permit so much of the fictional give-and-take which
mimes the theme of the discussion, drama." He notes, by the
way, that T. S. Eliot's "Dialogue on Dramatic Poetry," imitating
Dryden, "fails precisely because it lacks dramatic force."
JANE FRANCIS: What was Dryden's criticism of seventeenth-century French drama?
LANGLEY: He objected, for one thing, to the awkward way in which
French dramatists handled their unities, notably the unity of
place. They would have done better to abandon the artifice. Insistence on the liaison des scenes led to some pretty ridiculous
situations. "If the act begins in a chamber, all the persons in the
play must have some business or other to come hither, or else
they are not to be shown in that act, and sometimes their characters are very unfitting to appear there: as, suppose it were the
king's bed-chamber; yet the meanest man in the tragedy must
come and dispatch his business there, rather than in the lobby or
courtyard (which is fitter for him) for fear the stage should be
cleared and the scenes broken." Other absurd situations are
mentioned.
FRANCIS: On the topic of the Ancients and Moderns, Dryden's
discussion dates a couple of decades before the issue was really
joined, at least as far as Boileau and Perrault were involved.
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Before taking up Perrault's Paralleles, one may cite Louis Petit's
Dialogues satyriques et moraux. Among many others on other subjects, there is a curious piece in which the debaters are "La Prose"
and "La Poesie." The humorous note is struck at the opening:
"La Poesie" exclaims at the presumption that men might be the
fathers of the gods. "La Prose" replies: "You cannot deny that,
since the gods issued from the heads of poets, like Pallas from the
head of Jupiter and Bacchus from his calf. What! don't you remember having been the midwife of them all?" Of course, this
has nothing much to do with the Quarrel of the Ancients and the
Moderns. But the dialogue is relevant to the Quarrel in its depreciation of poetry. "La Prose" certainly expresses the narrow prosaist's point of view. In general "La Poesie" is not given strong
arguments to deliver. For example, she retreats when her opponent retorts: "Are you joking, when you claim to prove a truth by
a Fable?" There is already quite a distance from Bouhours to
Louis Petit.
ISABEL CASTLE: What was that poem that Perrault recited before
the Academy?
FRANCIS: It was his eulogy of the Age of Louis the Great. He celebrates the invention of the telescope and the microscope almost
in the same breath as the masterpieces of Corneille. That kind of
mixture is offered in much greater volume in his Paralleles. His
absurd partisanship in favor of the Moderns is nowhere more
evident than in the speeches he assigns to the "President," the
defender of the Ancients. For example, this magistrate is sure of
the superiority of ancient philosophy, of Aristotle to the PortRoyal Logic, for instance: "I haven't read this Logic of PortRoyal, and have no desire to read it, being very certain that is says
nothing that was not better put by Aristotle." The magistrate
rejects Descartes as a mere follower of Democritus, whom Aristotle had already refuted. Ergo, Descartes is much inferior to the
Ancients. We have already noted that the defender of the Moderns finds Pascal superior to Plato. Such a view must be placed in
the context of Perrault's belief in the superiority of Christianity
to paganism. On the more purely literary aspects of the Quarrel,
Perrault allows himself to be carried away. Not only does he
assert the superiority of the Corneilles and Racines to the Ancients, but he also includes among the exemplary Moderns some
of the victims of Boileau's satire, even the Chapelains and Scuderys! Fontenelle was more temperate in his defense of the Moderns.
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LANGLEY: I doubt that one could derive a very complete understanding of the Quarrel simply from the dialogues, but they do
serve to complete our knowledge. I suppose the more or less
contemporary dialogue, The Impartial Critic of John Dennis in
England, would be worth mentioning, on the side of Ancients.
Still, in his case, a certain national pride led him to prefer Milton
over Virgil!
JANE FRANCIS: National pride actuated Dryden in his criticism of
French drama, didn't it?
LANGLEY: Dryden was justified, I think, more than certain later
writers, like Hurd and Landor, undoubtedly. Yet it is only when
a national literature is trying to defend itself against undue influence from abroad that such things are worth bringing up in a
discussion of literary criticism.
CASTLE: If such a national culture has something promising to
protect! I take it that the Strum und Drang in Germany made such
a claim in opposition to undue French classical influence there.
ISABEL CASTLE: Lessing and Friedrich Schlegel also. But only
Schlegel argued this point in dialogue, didn't he?
FRANCIS: Tedesco could answer that, if he were here. Lessing reminds us of the discussions of Diderot concerning the drame
bourgeois. And here we find the dialogue in a salient position.
Diderot's Entretiens sur Ie fils naturel must be regarded as a primary document. It is perhaps more important, and certainly for
us more interesting, to read than the play which it was meant to
interpret.
JANE FRANCIS: In that way, like Hugo's Preface to Cromwell! Who
has ever read Hugo's Cromwell? And who has read Diderot'sFils
naturel in a hundred years? In the French course I took, it was
said that the best example of Diderot's idea of a bourgeois drama
was Sedaine's Philosophe sans Ie savior.
LANGL~Y: Diderot is famous for his enthusiasms. Well, I don't believe we feel much enthusiasm for his ideas on drama, much less
for his dramas themselves! All that stuff about presenting the
social condition instead of the character, the various occupations
of commerce and industry, and the pere de famille! That heavy
father!
FRANCIS: At least he was ahead of his time, in one way: he anticipated Alexandre Dumas fils and Emile Augier and their social
drama.
LANGLEY: If you mean that as a point in his favor ... !

Dialogues as Literary Criticism / 99

FRANCIS: One cannot deny the historical importance of Diderot's
Entretiens, but if you want an example of a Diderot dialogue on
the theatre that is still able to arouse sharp controversy, why not
look at the Paradoxe sur Ie comedien? Like his Neveu de Rameau, it
was more or less a confidential document during his lifetime, but
it received a lot of public attention since as well as the attention of
great actors and directors, such as Jacques Copeau and Louis
J ouvet. J ouvet wrote that only Diderot left a document on the art
of acting, that the Paradoxe was the first treatment that can be
called psychologically true, and that Diderot was the first to understand the dedoublement, the splitting of himself that the actor
must undergo. Still, Jouvet thought that it's not so much dedoublement as disponibilite that is required of the actor. He also questioned whether there ever existed actors of the absolute type that
Diderot conceived. J ouvet's judgment may be balanced by that of
Jean-Paul Sartre, who said in L'Idiot de la famille: "Diderot is
right: the actor does not really experience the feelings of his
character; but it would be wrong to suppose that he expresses
them in cold blood: the truth is that he experiences them in an
irreal (nonreal) mode. His real feelings,-stage fright, for
example ... serve him as analogues, he aims through them at the
passions that he must express."
ISABEL CASTLE: Oh, yes, Stanislavsky, the Method, and all that!
But isn't all that irrelevant to the subject of literary criticism?
FRANCIS: I grant that the art of acting is somewhat outside our
proper range. There is, however, another aspect to Diderot's
Paradox that is related to literature. This is the concept of genius,
so different from the picture of the inspired madman that Dorval suggests in the Entretiens, which were written years before the
Paradox. By inspired madman, I mean the Dorval of the scene
where he is transported by the spectacle of nature that he is
contemplating. There apparently was a change in Diderot's concept of genius, almost as if he were on the way to Paul Valery's
downgrading of the place of inspiration in the poetic process.
Incidentally, Valery's Fragments du Narcisse could almost be read
as a takeoff on that opening passage of the second Entretien! But
to return to the subject of genius-in the Paradox Diderot was
perhaps trying to find in the great actor the very image of genius,
as in the Reve de D'Alembert, where he says: "The great man will
... seek to be master of his impulses ... he will be a great king, a
great minister ... a great artist, especially a great actor, a great
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poet ... he will reign over himself and all around him."
LANGLEY: That's certainly not the Diderot, or the Dorval, of the
Entretiens!

FRANCIS: Tedesco told me of the influence of the Paradox on a
dialogue on the theatre in Martin Buber's Daniel-just another
instance of Diderot's impact. But maybe we should go on. I recall
that we left Rousseau somewhat outside the realm of dialogue
when we mentioned him previously. Nevertheless, even Rousseau may be cited in support of our efforts to use examples from
that genre to illustrate important steps in the evolution of literature. I refer to his second preface to La Nouvelle Helo"ise. Rousseau calls it "ce Dialogue ou cet Entretien suppose." Its subtitle is
Entretien sur les romans entre l'editeur et un homme de leures. There is
a curious contradiction between this subtitle and the insistence by
the "editor" that the work is not a roman but a recueil de lettres, not
a novel but a mere collection of letters. That is one of the main
arguments of the dialogue carried on with himself by that
novelist-in-spite-of-himself, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
LANGLEY: How is his little argument with himself an important
step in the evolution of literature?
FRANCIS: Of course his preface had no influence independent of
the book itself. In fact, few readers seem to have noticed it down
to our own times. The preface shows how the genre of the novel
was still looked down upon around 1760. Rousseau had his own
doubts concerning the form, doubts having to do with its moral
effects and its verisimilitude. By answering his own doubts he
was answering the objections of others.
LANGLEY: But it is with his book that he won over the public, not
with his dialogue.
FRANCIS: I don't mind conceding that. Rousseau's Entretien is still
worthy of a place in the series leading from Chapelain and
Boileau.
CASTLE: Are you implying that the series does not stop with Rousseau?
FRANCIS: Perhaps we'll have to go outside of France for the continuation, say, to Schlegel's Dialogue on Poetry.
LANGLEY: Tedesco mentioned a dialogue on poetry by Friedrich
Schlegel when we were discussing philosophy. I looked it up and
discovered that it is hardly a dialogue at all, but a set of essays
followed by snatches of conversation. I did find there a "Letter
on the Novel," which I presume is what Francis is referring to. I
was amazed to read that the author despised the novels of Field-
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ing and La Fontaine. His opinion had something to do with his
distaste for realism. The footnote in the translation I read identified La Fontaine as the French fabulist. I could not believe my
eyes until I realized that Schlegel was not alluding to the author
of Psyche but to a German novelist named August Lafontaine!
Another curious remark in the "Letter on the Novel" is that the
writer regards Rousseau's Confessions to be an excellent novel, but
La Nouvelle Helo'ise a mediocre one. The most valuable point
made in the work is on the novel as the principal genre of modern literature as the epic was of ancient literature. Schlegel also
says that the novel, Roman in German, must be romantic. I don't
know whether he carried out his own prescriptions in his Lucinde.
I imagine that this dialogue, being an early work, supplies only a
small part of his ideas on literature, and it doesn't contain a
couple of quotations which I find interesting in his Fragments. In
one, he called novels the Socratic dialogues of our time. In
another, we read: "A dialogue is a chain or wreath of aphorisms,
a correspondence is a dialogue expanded."
FRANCIS: I need say no more on the novel. You have touched on all
that I had in mind, in that respect. There is another thing that
sticks in my memory. It is the disparaging way Schlegel refers to
French classical poetry. One of his speakers calls it a false poetry,
an example of how a great nation can exist without poetry. Thus,
the little book has significance for the German reaction against
French classicism which started with Lessing and continued in a
different form with the Sturm und Drang. However, it is perhaps
the only dialogue that can be cited as a document for that reaction.
LANGLEY: And as I said, it's not exactly a dialogue.
CASTLE: Perhaps Schlegel should have strung together some more
of his aphorisms.
JANE FRANCIS: I think it's about time that someone brought up
dialogues in which the talents of women writers are discussed,
and so, I'll throw in the Noctes ambrosianae. Two of the speakers
express admiration for Mme de Stael and for a number of British
novelists, such as Maria Edgeworth and Jane Austen. This part is
dated 1826.
ISABEL CASTLE: And apparently none of them had to call herself
George to get her novels published!
JANE FRANCIS: Out of justice to John Wilson and James Hogg,
they never complained about "hordes of scribbling women" like
another male writer I could name!
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LANGLEY: Yet I do recall that there are no women present at those
conversations, as these are set forth in Blackwood's Magazine.
FRANCIS: I am reminded of the "Dinners at Magny's" reported in
the GoncourtJournal. George Sand was the only woman who was
ever invited.
CASTLE: This is an intriguing subject that has come up before. I
wondered whether the Noctes ambrosianae may have any other
claim upon our attention. I had never heard of the work.
JANE FRANCIS: There is praise for the Lake Poets. There is also
praise for Voltaire and Goethe. North says of Voltaire:
"Heavens! what a genius was Voltaire's! So grave, so gay, so
profound, so brilliant - his name is worth all the rest in the
French literature." Another speaker interjects: "Always excepting my dear Rabelais." And North agrees: "A glorious old fellow,
to be sure! Once get into his stream, and try if you can land
again! He is the only ll}an whose mirth exerts the sway of uncontrollable vehemence. His coffi'ic is as strong as the tragic of
"£schylus himself."
CASTLE: Why is the work not so well known as Landor's?
JANE FRANCIS: I believe Landor's conversations have more unity
and are more finished works of art. Those Ambrosian nights
went on for years and years. The conversations ramble so much
that nobody would have the patience to read them all nowadays.
And I myself read only a few for an English paper I wrote as a
student. My old notes happened to come in handy for our conversation today.
CASTLE: I'm glad that you kept them.
LANGLEY: Since you have referred to Landor, we may mention a
couple of his Imaginary Conversations dealing with literature. His
judgments of French classicism might have pleased the speakers
in Schlegel's little work. For example, here is what he had to say
about Boileau: having quoted some lines from an "Epistle," "The
man must have been born in a sawmill, or in France, or under the
falls of Niagara, whose ear can suffer them" and then about
Racine: "Racine has stolen many things from Euripides: he has
spoilt most of them, and injured all." This is in the conversation
between the Abbe Delille and Walter Landor. Since he put his
own name to them, they must be taken for his own opinions. He
does praise Voltaire's style "where eloquence is not called for."
Landor's preference for writers of the Italian Renaissance is implicit in conversations in which Petrarch and Boccaccio are the
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stars. Did he not call Boccaccio the most creative genius that the
continent has produced since the creation?
CASTLE: The only piece of Landor's that I know is the one that
presents Achilles and Helen, who are literary figures no doubt,
but not given to discussing literature. The only reason why I
know this one is that the Mexican essayist Alfonso Reyes had
some fun with it in his parody, "Dialogo de Aquiles y Elena."
Here is a passage from Landor: Achilles tells Helen: "[There is]
about me only one place vulnerable: I have at last found where
it is. Farewell!" Although Helen pleads for him to stay, he insists
on leaving her. Alfonso Reyes is amused by Achilles's romantic
confession that his vulnerable place is his heart! My own confession is the prosaic one that my knowledge of English dialogues
comes mostly from references in Spanish. Thus, I learned about
Walton's Compleat Angler from Miguel de Unamuno and about
Oliver Wendell Holmes's Breakfast Table series from a dialogue by
the same Unamuno. I must further confess that these references
do not involve crucial questions of literary theory.
LANGLEY: As I have argued before, dialogues by their very nature,
at least in recent times, can only reflect, not fully represent, the
crucial questions because their nature is too informal.
FRANCIS: Fully or not, they do often reflect the crucial questions.
For example, the conflict between science and poetry that was
discussed a few years ago by C. P. Snow in The Two Cultures is the
topic of a dialogue dated 1883 by the novelist Paul Bourget. It is
made up of a long speech by a "positivist" followed by a long
reply by the defender of poetry. Formally speaking it is not a
very exemplary dialogue. There are no rebuttals or interruptions. Bourget was a political reactionary, and consequently his
piece fails to present the issues clearly. The "positivist" is really
only a bon vivant, a young marquis, who, like his sentimental
young friend, disapproves of modern democracy. The marquis
argues that poetry has no place in today's civilization, for both
science and democracy are antagonistic to it, but he is resigned
and determined to make the best of it. He admits that science
contains an incurable and basic pessimism and declares that
bankruptcy is the final word of this immense hope of their generation. Thus, Bourget anticipates the cry that will be raised a
few years later by the traditionalist critic Ferdinand Brunetiere.
The marquis finds an element of despair in the very definition of
the experimental method for by condemning itself to reach only
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for facts it condemns itself finally to nihilism. It is probable,
moreover, that democracy makes civilization lose in depth what it
gains in breadth. The effect of democracy is unfavorable to
poetry, and this effect is aggravated by science. Science substitutes the idea of ignorance for mystery. Poetry is not useful, and
scientific facts are too technical to be suitable for poetry. With the
evolution of genres, epic and tragedy are becoming extinct.
Literary species, like living species, are subject to the law of competition.
His friend answers that the original part of poetry does not
derive from the environment. "Poetic creation needs solitude.
Democratic America did not prevent the rise of Edgar Allan Poe.
Science drives mystery from the domain of reason but not from
the domain of emotion. Poetry is not definable scientifically. It
will provide solace, an ideal refuge from the odious violence of
the barbarians and far from the obsessive tyranny of facts." Thus
science is assigned the domain of the intelligence and poetry that
of the sensibility. In conclusion, Bourget reports that the speakers separated without either being convinced by the other.
Perhaps they were both right, for there is no theory absolutely
true. Bourget will be much more dogmatic in his later career on
moral and political issues, but the issue between poetry and science he never really resolves. Of course, C. P. Snow does not
seem to have resolved it either, judging from what adversaries
like F. R. Leavis have said. That response is indeed an instance of
what the French call "un dialogue des sourds!"
CASTLE: Wouldn't it be tedious if such disputes really came to a
conclusion? We would lose the fun.
LANGLEY: That being your attitude, you would enjoy the two
dialogues of Oscar Wilde published in Intentions. What Wilde
thought about the form is stated by his mouthpiece Gilbert in The
Critic as Artist: "The critic ... may use dialogue, as he did who set
Milton talking to Marvel on the nature of comedy and tragedy,
and made Sidney and Lord Brooke discourse on letters beneath
the Penshurst oaks .... Dialogue, certainly, that wonderful literary form which, from Plato to Lucian, and from Lucian to Giordano Bruno, and from Bruno to that grand old Pagan ... the
creative critics of the world have always employed, can never lose
for the thinker its attraction as a mode of expression. By its
means he can both reveal and conceal himself, and give form to
every fancy, and reality to every mood. By its means he can
exhibit the object from each point of view, as a sculptor shows us
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things, gammg in this manner all the richness and reality of
effect that comes from those side issues that are suddenly
suggested by the central idea in its progress and really illumine
the idea more completely, or from those felicitous after-thoughts
that give a fuller completeness to the central idea, and yet convey
something of the delicate charm of chance." Ernest objects: "By
its means, too, he can invent an imaginary antagonist, and convert him when he chooses by some absurdly sophistical argument." This objection is countered by one of those characteristic
witticisms of Wilde: "Ah! it is so easy to convert others. It is so
difficult to convert oneself." In order to convince oneself, one
must pretend to be someone else. A reader, for his part, may
object that Wilde doesn't really do this. With all his cleverness as a
conversationalist, he doesn't trouble to give the second speaker
much to say. Neither Cyril in The Decay of Lying nor Ernest in The
Critic as Artist contributes except for brief assents or demurrals.
Their friends Vivian and Gilbert do almost all the talking. The
Decay of Lying sets forth the now familiar notion that life imitates
art, that Balzac created the nineteenth century, that the impressionists virtually invented sunsets. The essay closes with "The
final revelation ... the telling of beautiful untrue things is the
proper aim of Art."
FRANCIS: Wilde evidently anticipated Jean Cocteau, who said that
the poet is a liar that always tells the truth.
LANGLEY: That kind of gay irresponsibility pervades the considerably longer dialogue The Critic as Artist. The work is, I suppose, a
major source for the thesis that the critic is as much a creator as
the author he criticizes.
ISABEL CASTLE: If that is so, Wilde certainly has a lot to answer
for!
FRANCIS: The so-called creative criticism of Albert Thibaudet was
perhaps indebted to Wilde. I surmise, however, that Isabel is
thinking of more extreme forms of the phenomenon, common
nowadays.
LANGLEY: Wilde's work is a mixture of paradoxes tempered by
commonplaces. The paragraphs begin by shocking and often
end by compromising. But I don't wish to belittle him. I was
reminded of Mandeville while re-reading this passage: "[Men]
rage against Materialism, as they call it, forgetting that there has
been no material improvement that has not spiritualised the
world, and that there have been few, if any, spiritual awakenings
that have not wasted the world's faculties in barren hopes .... "
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CASTLE: That sounds like one of those side issues or afterthoughts
you mentioned, but it doesn't seem to illumine the central idea.
LANGLEY: Wilde could never resist the impulse to be clever, since
he knew it to be a rare talent. That statement was meant to be an
argument against conventional moralizers. What reminded me
of Mandevillle, however, was his next sentence: "What is termed
Sin is an essential element of progress." But that topic would lead
us away from literary criticism. Wilde's thesis bears a specious
appearance of truth: "I would call criticism a creation within a
creation. For just as the great artists, from Homer and 1Eschylus,
down to Shakespeare and Keats, did not go directly to life for
their subject matter, but sought for it in myth, and legend, and
ancient tale, so the critic deals with materials that others have, as
it were, purified for him .... I would say that the highest Criticism, being the purest form of personal impression, is in its way
more creative than creation ... from the soul there is no appeal.
... That is what the highest criticism really is, the record of one's
own soul."
JANE FRANCIS: Is that an echo or a source of Anatole France's
assertion that the good critic is one who recounts the adventures
of his soul among masterpieces?
ISABEL CASTLE: Perhaps Tedesco would say that it is the Zeitgeist in
both cases.
LANGLEY: Wilde quotes Walter Pater's description of the Mona
Lisa as an example of criticism of the highest kind: "It treats the
work of art simply as a starting-point for a new creation."
CASTLE: I've been puzzled by some disparagements of Leonardo's
painting that I've recently heard. Now I suspect that Pater and
Wilde may be to blame. The detractors, instead of looking at the
painting, have been reading Pater!
LANGLEY: Wilde's aestheticism often sounds far from original. We
tire of the refrain of Art only.
FRANCIS: Was Wilde only a belated Parnassian?
LANGLEY: There is more to his dialogue than that. Here is a reminiscence of Poe: "[Art] does not spring from inspiration, but it
makes others inspired."
FRANCIS: That anticipates Paul Valery.
LANGLEY: Wilde had something interesting to say about form: "the
real artist ... does not first conceive an idea, and then say to
himself, 'I will put my idea into a complex metre of fourteen
lines,' but realizing the beauty of the sonnet-scheme, he conceives
certain modes of music and methods of rhyme, and the mere
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form suggests what is to fill it and make it intellectually and
emotionally complete."
FRANCIS: Now, that certainly sounds like Valery.
CASTLE: What about the Spanish writer Unamuno? He wrote toward the very beginning of the century: "You know ... that
Carducci ... called rime generative rime. And, in fact, the necessity of placing a consonant obliges a poet, a great poet, to follow a
new association of ideas."
JANE FRANCIS: Isn't there anything new under the sun?
LANGLEY: Perhaps the writers and artists who seek originality at all
costs might see a warning in these coincidences.
CASTLE: I should explain that Unamuno's remark comes from a
dialogue in his Soliloquios y conversaciones. The point is another in
favor of Francis's position in regard to the significance of
dialogues for literary evolution.
CASTLE: When we saw the Tedescos the other day and he said they
couldn't come this afternoon, he mentioned a couple of German
dialogues involving problems of the drama. One was by the
Viennese playwright Hugo von Hofmannsthal on "Characters in
Novel and Drama," with Balzac as one of the two main speakers.
Tedesco called it a brilliant speculation based on a distorted picture of Balzac's career. Its theme is the alleged incompatibility
between the novelist's genius and the abilities needed for writing
plays. Balzac is the great creator who would not or could not
write drama.
FRANCIS: Perhaps Hofmannsthal was not aware that Balzac did
write plays, including the remarkable Mercadet, which indicates
that had he lived he might have cast Dumasfils and Emile Augier
into the shade.
CASTLE: Tedesco did cite a scholar who described Hofmannsthal's
dialogues as exemplifying a hybrid form between fiction and
criticism.
LANGLEY: As one might describe Mallock's satire on Victorian liberals and agnostics, The New Republic. But excuse me, this is not
on drama. The word hybrid reminded me of it.
CASTLE: By coincidence, the other dialogue mentioned by Tedesco
is also by an Austrian playwright. It's Hermann Bahr'sDialog vom
Tragischen. Bahr was apparently much inferior to Hofmannsthal
as a writer, but his dialogue is more suggestive, more challenging
than that of his compatriot, as well as more obscure, at least to
me! There are half a dozen speakers gathered to discuss the state
of the tragic theatre, admitted to be in decline at the start of the
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century. The ideas of the various interlocutors reflect those of
Plato on the dangers of poetry, of Aristotle on catharsis, of Diderot on the actor, of Nietzsche on the Dionysian element, even
of Freud on hysteria. A recurring theme is the need for that
Dionysian element in modern culture, an element inadequately
supplied by the theatre of the period. The Physician compares
the art of tragedy to homeopathy, and the Philologian to catharsis. The Master agrees with the Physician that modern man is
attracted by chaos, feeling a nostalgia for the slime, playing the
"Platonic sadist." Every culture, he says, has disowned vice but
has been unable to do without it. In future too, men will need the
dark arts from which to return then to sanity. The Artist points
to the achievements in music and painting, and the Master wonders how men who admire Rodin and Klimt can be content with
mere puppets in the theatre. These are the main points brought
up by Tedesco.
FRANCIS: It is really striking how those points sound like Antonin
Artaud's theatre of cruelty. I suppose Bahr was no more successful than Artaud was in embodying his theories in dramatic
works.
CASTLE: Tedesco did imply that that was the case.
LANGLEY: Since we have reached the twentieth century, it may be
appropriate to make amends to T. S. Eliot for the unfavorable
judgment I cited in connection with Dryden of Eliot's Dialogue on
Dramatic Poetry for I believe that Eliot almost succeeded in embodying his theories in his dramatic works-better, I take it,
than your Austrian or your 'jumpy Frenchman," as Tyrone
Guthrie called Artaud. The two main ideas, the value of verse for
drama and the relation between liturgy and the theatre, are both
embodied in his plays. It is true that his dialogue is not dramatic.
I should add that there are too many speakers in it and that they
are hard to distinguish from one another. One of the principals
Eliot designated by the letter B. Your Hermann Bahr might have
approved a remark of his: "In a world without Evil life would not
be worth living." He might even have approved what another
speaker says: " ... if the Elizabethan and Jacobean period was
also a period of chaos, and yet produced great poetic drama, why
cannot we?" B does not know. But he does know that "the greatest drama is poetic drama, and dramatic defects can be compensated by poetic excellence." One of his friends had already
stated: "The tendency ... of prose drama is to emphasize the
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ephemeral and superficial; if we want to get at the permanent
and universal we tend to express ourselves in verse."
ISABEL CASTLE: Although the ideas discussed are not the same, it
seems obvious that Eliot was prompted by Dryden's dialogue to
write his.
CASTLE: Eliot's defense of verse was perhaps a source for the argument in a recent work called The Blue Clown, especially the
dialogues on the theatre. The two interlocutors also debate the
value of Artaud's theory of the theatre of cruelty, which Eliot, of
course, would have considered a gross exaggeration of his idea of
liturgical elements in drama.
LANGLEY: I imagine you are right in that supposition. Our discussion seems to have brought us down to the present day.
ISABEL CASTLE: What can be more up-to-date that Artaud's theatre of cruelty?
JANE FRANCIS: How about structuralism?
LANGLEY: Maybe your husband can tell us. Francis, why don't you
fire last!
FRANCIS: I still stand by my assertion that a pretty good idea of the
history of literary concepts in France can be gained from works
in the dialogue form. I was lucky to happen upon a very amusing
parody of structuralism in the form of a dialogue entitled Les
Matinees structuralistes. It's perhaps more like a playlet than a
dialogue, however, something like the genero chico that Castle is
familiar with. It satirizes the fad insofar as this is superficial and
imitative, but the allusions to some of the leaders, like Louis
Althusser, are unmistakable. The playlet is a takeoff on a class in
a Parisian school that can only be the Ecole Normale Superieure.
It must be admitted that the piece itself is somewhat superficial.
CASTLE: If you had wagered that one could illustrate the evolution
ofliterary ideas by citing dialogues exclusively, I believe that you
would have won your bet.

7. By Way of Conclusion
At Langley's.
Langley, Tedesco, and Francis are present.
TEDESCO: Well, I've read Joly'sDialogue aux enfers entre Machiavel et
Montesquieu. It reminds me very much of the conversations between Naphta and Settembrini in Thomas Mann's Magic Mountain. Naphta is like Machiavelli, a sort of advocatus diaboli undermining the liberalism of Montesquieu and Settembrini. Oh, excuse me, Langley, you weren't there when Francis told us about
this dialogue suppressed under the Second Empire.
LANGLEY: I think I ought to tell you that I've been listening to the
tapes of the conversations you held in my absence. Jane Francis
and Isabel Castle thought it would be fun to record them.
FRANCIS: I'm glad I wasn't aware there was a tape recorder taking
down everything.
TEDESCO: So am I. It would have been inhibiting to know that.
However, at least we won't have to repeat what was said. We can
just proceed to try to draw final conclusions from it all. By the
way, I hope that this place isn't bugged too! I'm not used to
recorders and might become self-conscious. I wouldn't mind
otherwise.
LANGLEY: I assure you that it isn't!
TEDESCO: Speaking of these modern technical devices, they have
made possible that hybrid form of dialogue called the interview,
first in the nineteenth century in the newspapers, then in our
century through radio and television.
LANGLEY: Apparently you've been listening to Eric Sevareid and
Willy Brandt or to Toynbee on Toynbee. Of course, one important difference between a Socratic dialogue and a book like Toynbee on Toynbee is that Socrates asks the questions whereas Toynbee
is asked. The interview of a public figure is not a philosophical
dialogue unless the interviewer becomes more than a mere questioner, and he would do so only at the risk of being presumptu110
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ous. In Toynbee on Toynbee, G. R. Urban may expatiate on his own
views, but there is no clash of opinions for the protocol would
make it unseemly for him to push his own opinion any farther
than necessary to elicit a pronouncement from the great man.
This is true also of a recent book on Jean Piaget.
FRANCIS: The journalist's interview seems to have engendered still
another hybrid, showing that certain hybrids can be fertile. I am
thinking of Andre Gide's Interviews imaginaires, in which the author perhaps wants to teach the prospective interviewer how to
go about discussing such questions as French grammar, the
(then) new poets like Eluard, the dozen books to take with one to
a desert island, and so 'forth.
TEDESCO: But isn't that just a matter of Gide choosing a catchy title
for writing what is not really novel at all, just another descendant
of Diderot?
FRANCIS: I'll agree to that. By the way, others have associated those
two. There is a recent book in which the author imagines an
"Elysian encounter" between Diderot and Gide.
TEDESCO: Another recent writer has brought out Einstein and Beckett, A Record of an Imaginary Conversation between Albert Einstein
and Samuel Beckett. And he didn't even wait until both were dead!
FRANCIS: That reminds me of Langley's proposed touchstone for
distinguishing the dialogue des morts from other types. You said
that there the speakers are not distracted by thoughts of dinner.
Yet in Voltaire's dialogue of Lucian, Erasmus, and Rabelais they
interrupt their talk to join Swift for supper!
LANGLEY: You can't catch me with that! Obviously Voltaire was just
up to his usual tricks! In a more serious vein, couldn't we say that
the dialogue form is a genre that, long before the novel, began
questioning its own existence and excuse for being? I'm not
merely referring to the radio conversations before the war, entitledInvitation to Learning in which Huntington Cairns, Mark Van
Doren, and Allen Tate dismissed it virtually in common accord.
Cairns, for example, asked: "I have been thinking about the
twenty-seven dialogues we are publishing as a book. Isn't it interesting that of all the art forms the Greeks used, only the
dialogue has not survived?" And Van Doren concurred: "I wonder if the dialogue has not actually survived in Plato alone." More
recently a historian introducing a new edition of G. Lowes Dickinson'sA Modern Symposium commented: "It is a particular pleasure to introduce this work because it involves elements which
have been on hard times in recent decades, and to the loss of
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everyone. I refer not so much to the symposium, which has disappeared into history and is rarely identified with anybody after
Plato, but to the essayic style and content." Dickinson is praised
for his catholicity and courtesy for different viewpoints. But as I
was saying, we can go much farther back to find similar doubts
cast on the viability of the genre. Take this quotation from
Joseph Addison's Dialogues upon Ancient Medals: "Some of the
finest treatises of the most polite Latin and Greek writers are in
Dialogue, as many valued pieces of French, Italian and English
appear in the same dress. I have sometimes been very much
distasted at this way of writing, by reason of the long prefaces
and exordiums into which it often betrays an author. There is so
much time taken up in ceremony that before they enter on their
subject the Dialogue is half ended. To avoid the fault I have
found in others, I shall not trouble my self or my Reader with the
first salutes of our three friends, nor with any part of their discourse over the tea table." The speakers Cynthio, Eugenius, and
Philander proceed to display much antiquarian lore and knowledge of classical writers. The third dialogue closes with Cynthio
and Eugenius stating that they were well pleased with Philander's
discourse, but they were glad, however, to find it end. Addison's
conscience does not seem easy, to say the least about it.
Shaftesbury's uneasiness is of a different nature. In The
Moralists, Philocles declares to Palemon: "a reason I have often
sought for, why we moderns who abound so much in treatises
and essays are so sparing in the way of dialogue, which heretofore was found the politest and best way of managing even the
graver subjects. The truth is, 'twould be an abominable falsehood
and belying of the age to put so much good sense together in any
one conversation as might make it hold out steadily and with
plain coherence for an hour's time, till anyone subject had been
rationally examined .... There is a certain way of questioning and
doubting, which in no way suits the genius of our age. Men love
to take party instantly. They cannot bear being kept in suspense.
We are too lazy and effeminate, and withal a little too cowardly,
to dare doubt ... that academic discipline in which formerly the
youth were trained; when not only horsemanship and military
arts had their public places of exercise, but philosophy too had its
wrestlers in repute .... This the greatest men were not ashamed
to practise in the intervals of public affairs .... Hence that way of
dialogue, and patience of debate and reasoning, of which we
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have scarce a resemblance in any of our conversations at this
season of the world."
Shaftesbury's antagonist, Mandeville, was more confident, as it
was his manner and temperament to be. I quote from his preface: "The Reader will find, that in this Second Part I have endeavoured to illustrate and explain several Things, that were
obscure and only hinted at in the First. While I was forming this
Design, I found on the one hand, that ... the easiest way of
executing it, would be by Dialogue; but I knew, that to discuss
Opinions, and manage Controversies, it is counted the most unfair Manner of Writing. When partial Men have mind to demolish an Adversary, and triumph over him with little Expence,
it has long been a frequent Practice to attack him with Dialogues,
in which the Champion, who is to lose the Battle, appears at the
very beginning of the Engagement, to be the Victim, that is to be
sacrifised .... That this is to be said against Dialogue, is certainly
true; but it is as true, that there is no other manner of writing, by
which greater Reputation has been obtained." Mandeville mentions in particular Plato and Cicero, and then goes on: "It is
evident then, that the Fault of those, who have not succeeded in
Dialogues, was in the Management, and not in the manner of
writing; and that nothing but the ill use that has been made of it,
could ever have brought it into Disrepute .... Plato [had to bel as
great a Man as Socrates .... Man must have Cicero's capacity.
Lucian likewise .. . chose Persons of known Characters ....
When the Personages fall short of those Characters ... the Author undertook what he was not able to execute. To avoid this
Inconveniency, most Dialogue writers among the Moderns have
made use of fictitious Names." Here Mandeville makes fun of the
countless Philalethes found in dialogues these two hundred
years!
Bishop Richard Hurd was to show none of Mandeville's boldness in his rather anodyne Moral and Political Dialogues. These
could indeed be described as morally edifying and more politic
than political. It is, however, his Preface that I consider most
interesting, especially in regard to what topics he deemed to be
appropriate in dialogue and what he felt it would be better to
exclude. Here are some sentences culled from the Preface: "In
an age like this, when most men seem ambitious of turning writers, many persons may think it strange that the kind of composition, which was chiefly in use among the masters of this numer-
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ous and stirring family, hath been hitherto neglected .... It can
do no hurt, when the subject is proper for familiar discourse, to
throw it into this gracious and popular form. I have said, where
the subject is proper for familiar discourse; for all subjects, I think,
cannot, or should not be treated in this way.... We should
forbear to dispute some things, because they are such as both for
their sacredness, and certainty, no man in his senses affects to
disbelieve .... Thus much I have thought fit to say, to prevent
mistakes, and to shew of what kind the subjects are which may be
allowed to enter into modern Dialogues. They are only such, as
are either, in the strict sense of the word, not important, and yet
afford an ingenious pleasure in the discussion of them; or not so
important as to exclude the sceptical inconclusive air, which the
decorum of polite dialogue necessarily demands. And, under
these restrictions, we may treat a number of curious and useful
subjects, in this form."
TEDESCO: What you earlier quoted from Hume suggests that he
may have been taking issue with Hurd. This is more or less what
Hume wrote, isn't it? "There are some subjects to which dialogue-writing is peculiarly adapted," for example, "Any point of
doctrine which is so obvious, that it scarcely admits of dispute,
but at the same time so important, that it cannot be too often
inculcated," and, "Any question of philosophy which is so obscure
and uncertain, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to it."
LANGLEY: Certainly Hume and Hurd were not kindred spirits!
Nevertheless, let me produce a few more of Hurd's remarks. He
observed that there was a certain novelty in the use of the form at
the time, for though there were dialogues in abundance, but very
few that could be compared with the great models, Plato and
Cicero: "in our language at least (and, if I extended the observation to the other modern ones of most estimation, I should
perhaps do them no wrong) I know of nothing in the way of
Dialogue that deserves to be considered by us with such regard.
There are in English THREE Dialogues, and but Three, that are fit
to be mentioned ... well composed in their way .... Had that
way been a true one, I mean that which antiquity and good
criticism recommend to us, the Public had never been troubled
by this attempt from me, to introduce another ... I mean The
Moralists of Lord Shaftesbury; Mr. Addison's Treatise on Medals;
and the Minute Philosopher of Bishop Berkeley.... Where is the
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modesty ... to attempt the Dialogue-form, if it has not succeeded
in such hands?" The curious thing about Hurd's criticism is that
he takes for a serious fault their use of fictitious characters. Hurd
claims to do better, he presents real historical figures.
TEDESCO: That does seem to be a superficial criticism.
FRANCIS: And not much of a merit to have set out historical figures, if that's all he could pride himself upon!
LANGLEY: Moreover, the speakers in Berkeley's Alciphron were
only too easily recognizable, at least by Mandeville! In regard to
the so-called rarity of dialogues, Hume begins his with the words:
"It has been remarked ... that, though the ancient philosophers
conveyed most of their instruction in the form of dialogue, this
method of composition has been little practised in later ages; and
has seldom succeeded in the hands of those who have attempted
it." In the next century, Landor has Cicero say: "I approve of the
Dialogue for the reason you have given me ... the fewness of
settled truths, and the facility of turning the cycle of our
thoughts to what aspect we wish .... " Still, Landor was not in
accord with Hume or Renan, as we may see from hisPentameron:
"The better parts of Homer are in dialogue; and downward from
him to Galileo. The noblest works of human genius have assumed this form: among the rest I am sorry to find no few
heretics and scoffers. At the present day the fashion is over." Of
course, Landor may not have meant all that about heretics: he
assigns these words to a Monsignor. The authors I have cited
would not agree on anyone thing, except perhaps the problematic nature of the form they cultivated.
FRANCIS: A similar series of quotations could be produced from
French writers, often almost paralleling those you have set out in
array. You began with the early eighteenth century. In France,
we can start earlier with La Mothe Le Vayer, who referred to this
type of writing "which cannot displease except when badly employed by those who don't know well enough how to use it," in a
preface to some examples that are hardly models to imitate. In
another preface, this time addressed to Chancellor Seguier, he
wrote: "You want me to deal with those who, as you say, are
unable to appreciate [Plato's] Dialogues, and who speak of his
works and his eloquence with such great scorn .... I know that
many people make such unjust judgments only because of the
aversion they have for the dialogue form. They think that there is
no worse way of writing than colloquies or conversations. Proba-
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bly because they have seen only very poorly composed dialogues."
La Mothe Le Vayer offered various other explanations for the
prejudice against Plato which are not relevant for us here.
In a Discourse on the nature of dialogue which he placed
before his Nouveaux Dialogues des Dieux, Remond de St.-Mard
remarked: "The nature of the Dialogue has never been clarified.
It is the most ancient kind of writing: one may believe that the
first persons that vanity and idleness induced to write, chose this
manner." In a postscript he tried to refute those who contested
his theory, by citing, of all people, Bernard Palissy. Palissy wrote
in dialogue and styled himself an uneducated worker in clay: "he
complains in one of his Dialogues of not knowing how to read, a
fault without which our peasant adds that he would have been a
great man!" Of course, Palissy meant only that he could not read
Latin or Greek! St.-Mard's blooper is inexcusable. He'd said indeed that the Dialogue is a genre in which the writer expects that
he won't be taken literally, but his essay was serious. The notion
that the dialogue is one of the oldest literary types had been set
forth before Remond de St.-Mard, by Charles Sorel.
TEDESCO: Is it possible that they were thinking of the Book of Job?
You have a pretty ancient dialogue there.
FRANCIS: I don't recall seeing it mentioned. If I may return to the
failure to appreciate Plato that La Mothe Le Vayer found among
his contemporaries-this attitude was to be maintained by
Charles Perrault later on. With him it involved the Quarrel of the
Ancients and the Moderns. He felt Pascal in the Provincial Letters
had it all over the Ancients. Among other comments on the
genre made during the period, there is one by the author of the
Dialogues entre messieurs Patru et d'Ablancourt sur les plaisirs: "The
Dialogue is pleasant and more suitable for presenting that sort of
subjects than a methodical and coherent discourse. As for me, I
have never been able to enjoy those Dialogues full of doctrines
and excerpts; you would think that the speakers had brought
their libraries along rather than their minds."
TEDESCO: There's a warning there for us!
LANGLEY: Francis's author was apparently like Addison with his
dislike for long preliminaries.
FRANCIS: What amused me when I read that Frenchman's comments was his eulogy of two books of dialogue by Pere Bouhours,
the Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eugene and La Maniere de bien penser dans
les ouvrages d'esprit. The interlocutors of Pere Bouhours often talk
as if they had brought along their libraries, choice though these
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were, for the most part. In an antiquarian mood, Ariste and
Eugene hold one conversation on "Les Devises" that might be
compared to Addison's Dialogues on Medals. On the whole, their
conversations flow along quite pleasantly, as do the more or less
contemporary Conversations of Madeleine de Scudery. Decades
before, she had run her amorous, and moralizing, dialogues into
her interminable romances. Now she was publishing them separately. It may be pertinent to recall Joseph de Maistre's distinctions between conversations, entretiens, and dialogues. There was an
effort to establish such distinctions during the period of Pere
Bouhours. Twentieth-century French scholars have tried to distinguish a conversational type from the Platonic mode. In fact,
late in the nineteenth century, Georges Doncieux wrote as follows: "There is reason to distinguish between the artificial
dialogues directly inspired by antiquity and these other
dialogues, a spontaneous product of a literary instinct that declared itself toward the middle of the seventeenth century. The
Dialogues des morts of Boileau, Fontenelle and Fenelon are simple
imitations of Lucian, and probably Malebranche would not have
put his philosophy into dialogues without the example of Plato.
But the Entretiens sur les mondes of the same FonteneIle, the Conversations of Mere and MIle de Scudery, the Entretiens of
Bouhours, as well as the Conversation du Pere Canaye of St.Evremond, exist independently of any ancient model. Our
seventeenth century would have invented the dialogue, if the
Greeks had not already done so."
TEDESCO: Evidently it would not have been the Platonic type, in
any case.
FRANCIS: No indeed, the premium was on elegant and witty exchanges. There was no violent conflict of opinion. There was no
maieutics! Why, Bouhours's speakers are virtually interchangeable, though not quite. The socializing of the salon did not favor
too much independence of opinion, nor too many eccentricities.
No doubt, the climate would change with the eighteenth century,
with the end of the conformist reign of Louis XIV. MIle de
Scudery's Moral Conversations pleased the churchmen Mascaron
and Flechier, as well as Mme de Sevigne and Mme de Maintenon.
It seems that the model conversations were even used at Mme de
Maintenon's school for girls at Saint eyr. But a stop was put to
that! In Abbe de Gerard's book of entretiens between Theandre
and Philemon, entitled La Philosophie des gens de la cour, we learn
that the pagan philosophers took all they have that is fine and
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solid from the Scriptures. The author states: "Qu'on a dt1 retrancher de cette Philosophie des Gens de Cour, la chicane et les
termes de I'Ecole. Qu'on ne doit affecter aucun Parti, ni s'attacher a aucune Secte." I'll try to put this part into English: "It
has been necessary to excise all pettifogging and Scholastic terms
from this philosophy for people of the court."
TEDESCO: I noticed the mention of Pascal's friend, the Chevalier
de Mere. What sort of conversations did he compose?
FRANCIS: I'll just give one passage where he refers to the ancient
Greek philosophers. His attitude to Aristotle is very far this side
of idolatry, as one can see from the account of Alexander and
Aristotle: "This young conqueror, who ran everywhere after
glory, had a tutor who did not seek it any less in his own way and
if the pupil became master of the world, one can add that the
tutor, as much through his skill as through the favor of the
prince, took the lead in the sciences. He had the sort of intelligence needed to be successful in life, but as for certain more
recondite knowledge, he did not go as far as some of his predecessors. These found their happiness in knowledge and were
accustomed to say that they knew almost nothing. They were
honest people of good faith who dealt with doubt of doubtful
things, and as for those things that one can clearly understand,
though of the loftiest theoretical nature, they spoke of them
nevertheless in a manner that smacked neither of art nor of
study, but so clearly and naturally that in order to understand
them right off, one needed only a certain amount of intelligence.
He, however, whose aim was not so much to know as to get a
reputation for knowing, realized that they were above him and
that good judges of minds and sciences would never place him in
the first rank .... so he resorted to winning over those less clearsighted and to get himself admired by the multitude." Here we
have an illustration of the spirit of the honnete-homme of that age.
In the same conversation Mere declared: "I believe that the best
means for becoming skillful and learned is not to study a great
deal, but to converse often about things that open the mind." This
is what the dialectic jousts of Socrates have come to!
TEDESCO: Castle, who told us about Galiani, probably knew Diderot'sApologie de l'abbe Galiani. Diderot makes some good points
about the nature of the dialogue form. Replying to Morellet's
critique, he writes: "You don't like Abbe Galiani's skeptical procedure. So much the worse for you, for it is very acute, very
pleasing ... but it requires genius. Nothing accords better with
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the quest because while doubting one establishes each point, with
the task of persuasion because one turns aside passions." He
agrees with Bacon's view that when science has reached a high
stage of development, that procedure is not appropriate any
longer, but politics and economics had not yet reached that stage.
"Socrates treated the Athenians like children, and he was right.
In how many subjects, even important ones, are we not like his
Athenians! Socrates eluded the traps of self-pride, of stubborn
striving for personal advantage, of the sophistry of passion: he
guided you to his destination without your noticing it, and he did
well."
LANGLEY: Bertrand Russell would concur with what Diderot said
about Bacon. And apparently Diderot thought the readers of his
Reve de d'Alembert were like children too!
TEDESCO: He wrote the Apology when he was composing the
dialogue about D'Alembert, so there might be a connection.
FRANCIS: Except for Diderot, the French attitude toward Socrates
was not as favorable as that of the Germans, that Tedesco discussed earlier. Several French commentators considered that
Plato's method was too slow. Perrault and Remond de St.-Mard
were among them. Incidentally, Voltaire, great admirer of Socrates as he was, had nothing to say about the maieutic method, as
such.
TEDESCO: On the basis of the references you two have made, one
could conclude that the number of dialogue-writers who assert
the rarity of dialogues is so great as to constitute a refutation of
their assertion!
LANGLEY: They assert the rarity of good ones, and presume their
own will be the shining exceptions.
TEDESCO: Of course, you would not impute this presumption to
Diderot and Voltaire, who did write good ones.
LANGLEY: Certainly not.
FRANCIS: Perhaps you won't mind if I quote from an article on the
subject contributed by Marmontel to the Encyclopedie. After praising Plato and Cicero as protocol demands, he declares: "A
dialogue that is merely a clash of opinions, throwing off sparks
which leaves at the end only uncertainty and obscurity, is not a
philosophical dialogue: it is a sophistical dialogue." The beauty
of the philosophical type results from the importance of the subject and the weight that the reasons cited give to the opposing
sides. If the piece is less a dispute than a lesson, one of the two
speakers may be ignorant, but he should be ignorant with intelli-
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gence, even wit. Fontenelle's Plurality of Worlds is a model of this
type. It is perhaps somewhat mannered, but its ingenious manner is not that of Pluche or of Bouhours. Marmontel goes on to
define what is acceptable in historical dialogue. History all in
dialogue would be too diffuse, but dialogues on certain aspects of
history, problematic enough to justify discussion, interesting
enough to be explored, could be very useful. A model of this type
he found in Montesquieu's Sulfa and Eucrates, although the author showed too much deference for Sulla to satisfy the Encyclopedist.
LANGLEY: That type of historical dialogue includes a large number
of Landor's Imaginary Conversations. We could not appropriately
deal with these before, since in his dialogues of controversy he
judges the past and not the present. An example of this is the one
presenting Rousseau and Malesherbes. Landor's footnote is significant: "The condemnation of Malesherbes and the coronation
of Buonaparte are the two most detestable crimes committed by
the French in the whole course of their Revolution. How different the destiny of the best and the worst man among them!" In a
much lighter vein, the same volume contains the amusing confessional scene between Bishop Bossuet and one of the later mistresses of Louis XIV. To borrow the words of Marmontel, the
incident is interesting enough to be explored! Such explorations,
of course, are confined to the prurient mind of the writer. Still,
Landor brings out charmingly the girlish naivete of the Duchess
de Fontanges when she alludes to the aging king in bed as well as
the embarrassment of the prelate torn between obligatory reverence for the monarch and disapproval of his behavior. And Bossuet is not insensitive to her allure: in fact, at one point he drops
his ring.
TEDESCO: Herbert Read was quite right in placing such pieces in
the class of dialogues of character. A prize example would be Le
Neveu de Rameau. Of course it's not a historical dialogue.
FRANCIS: French scholars find it difficult to come to terms with it.
Thus one scholar insists on its subtitle: "Satire seconde."
LANGLEY: We are back to Frye's Menippean satire, to the problematic nature of the type and its marginal position among more
distinct types.
FRANCIS: How could it escape being challenged, when the more
distinguishable types are themselves being challenged, in these
days of the antinovel and the antitheatre?
TEDESCO: Its existence is debated, yet it exists!
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FRANCIS: If you add together all that have been variously praised
by estimable critics, you get a goodly sum. Just remember Pascal,
Malebranche, Voltaire, and Diderot-and Wieland and Lessing.
As for the English, we haven't even discussed one of the finest,
Berkeley's Hylas and Philonous.
LANGLEY: Well, perhaps I should grant all that. But are there
many of high quality after the eighteenth century? In English,
some of Landor or Santayana?
FRANCIS: I wonder if we should so readily have accepted William
James's opinion of Renan, that Isabel quoted. Now Charles
Peguy was not exactly a tender-minded critic, and he found Renan's dialogues admirable. Certainly there are many impressive
ideas there, even for today. To take but one example, the nightmare of Theoctiste: "an authority could have some day at its
disposal a Hell, not an imaginary one of whose existence there is
no proof, but of a real Hell."
LANGLEY: Striking ideas do not make a dialogue. I am afraid that
Renan did not have enough clash of ideas in his dialogues. The
gradation from "Certitudes" through "Probabilities" to "Dreams"
represented by the successive speakers leads to the same suspension of judgment we found so disappointing in La Mothe Le
Vayer.
TEDESCO: Perhaps it results from a certain failure of nerve in the
aftermath of the defeat of France in 1870 and of the Commune
of 1871 on the part of the once optimistic author of L'Avenir de
la science?
FRANCIS: I must admit that Renan could just as well have consigned his thoughts to essays. Though his exchanges with Marcelin Berthelot were at the source of his dialogues, the two men
thought too much alike to make for genuine debate. It may be of
interest to consider some later writers who underwent the influence of Renan, on the one hand, Pierre Lasserre and Maurice
Barres, on the other hand, Anatole France, Remy de Gourmont,
and Julien Benda. They all started from a skeptical position, and
they all composed dialogues. Lasserre and Barres reacted against
that position and moved to the political right, France and Benda
to the political left, only Gourmont persisting with suspension of
judgment. Lasserre's first book was La Crise chretienne, in
dialogue form but with little debate. Gourmont's Dialogues des
amateurs presents two speakers who hardly disagree, M. Desmaisons and M. Delarue. Andre Gide would read that and sigh
for some fresh air that a M. Deschamps or a M. Du Plein Air
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might bring. Barres reacted against Renan in his Huit Jours chez
M. Renan. An irreverent put-down is administered to the venerable subject, which will not be forgotten by Jean-Paul Sartre's
protagonist inLa Nausee. You may recall that Roquentin records
this fictitious action: "J'ai fesse Maurice Barres. Nous etions trois
soldats .... " Leaving that aside, Barres's novel Les Deracines contains some vigorous arguments pitting liberalism against
nationalism. The novel advocates the life of action against the life
of pure thought, but it is only political action. Barres's protagonists will be succeeded by those who choose physical action.
Thus Renan's own grandson, Ernest Psichari, will vindicate the
strenuous life against his grandfather's contemplative dolce far
niente. It is in the dialogues of his war-time book, Le Voyage du
centurion. Psichari had returned to the religious faith that the
author of La Vie de Jesus had renounced. Pious souls greeted the
return as a repudiation of the apostate ancestor, that notorious
freethinker.
LANGLEY: But it wasn't his dialogues that made him notorious. You
can bring forward as many dialogues by different writers as you
want; however, you have to admit that after the eighteenth century such writings would never have sufficed to make their authors famous.
TEDESCO: You are certainly right. Schelling, Schopenhauer, and
also Heidegger composed one or two, but these were not their
major works.
LANGLEY: I notice that you didn't mention Nietzsche in that list.
TEDESCO: Zarathustra was indeed a great monologist. His disciples
were scarcely ever given anything to say, whether in assent or in
dissent. Schopenhauer included a "Dialogue on Religion" among
his essays, and one on immortality. They are obiter dicta, like the
dialogue of Descartes on the search for truth, which Leibniz
owned.
FRANCIS: The fact that so many modern thinkers tried their hands
at it should not be minimized. Of the French writers born around
1870, Gide, Valery, and Claudel are notable. It is curious that
Peguy entiled two of his important works "dialogues," yet they
are really essays or monologues. The second speaker is apparently silent in his Marcel premier dialogue de la cite harmonieuse and
his Clio dialogue de l'histoire et de ['ame pa'ienne. Close reading is
required to distinguish two voices, or even two separate inflexions. On the other hand, there are writings by Peguy formed
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largely of conversations with friends or associates, for example,
his series on "La Grippe" and the following pamphlets.
We have already mentioned Andre Gide in regard to Corydon
and the Interviews imaginaires. His two friends Valery and Claudel
call for some comment here. Paul Claudel's Conversations dans Ie
Loir-et-Cher cannot be called one of his major works, as may be
done in the case of Paul Valery's dialogues. Claudel's poems and
dramas throw the Conversations into the shade. The fluvial setting
may remind one of Dryden's Essay of Dramatic Poesie with the sail
on the Thames, but there seems to be no straight progress here
toward a destination. Rather do we find lyrical flights of thought
that subside in succession without advancing any precise thesis.
Recherche is the word applied by one speaker to their conversations because they are not so much dialogues as alternating meditations. Four men with Latin names are accompanied by an actress and a woman musician. An otherworldly note is contributed
by the fact that the boat ride takes place on the Loir-et-Cher, a
nonexistent stream that sounds real because it is the name of the
department where the Loir and the Cher have their separate
channels. The first conversation unfolds on a terrace above this
stream one Thursday in July. A speaker states the right to contradict himself and to repeat himself. The others add that it will
be a rotating argument in quest of the idea, like a dog chasing its
tail, not only stoutly following a straight line between milestones
but proceeding in spirals, in leaps and circuits in the void, a
discussion not only in two dimensions but in three. The boat ride
takes place on a Sunday in August. On the third occasion the
friends have arrived at the castle of Amboise. Their conversations turn on the architecture of cathedrals and of skyscrapers,
the growth of modern cities, and the future of industrial civilization. The speaker called Civilis remarks: "When man tries to
imagine a Paradise on earth, that makes immediately a very
proper Hell." Later one of the women rebukes the men for eluding the question of what the future will be like. Civilis replies:
"Perhaps we advance toward the future backwards only, without
seeing it, like oarsmen facing the past?" The setting of the fourth
conversation is the deck of a Japanese ship bound for San Francisco. The two world travelers speaking there are new to the
reader. They are engaged in discussing the unfinished message
left by Civilis, now no longer alive, a message out of the conversations on the Loir-et-Cher. What will tomorrow be like? They
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trust it won't be on the model of the Soviets. We should note that
Claudel was writing in the twenties. The topic of the nature of
dialogue as conceived by Claudel comes up in this context. One
speaker opines: "The Soviets supposed themselves inspired by
the West, but in reality they were obeying the profound law of
Asia which never attains form without compression. Nothing
helps to explain the communist regime as well as the castes of
India and the Chinese family." His friend responds: "It's amusing to sense our thoughts being born from one another. Playwrights are wont to set antagonists clashing against the opposing
views without really comprehending them. Why not instead show
the idea passing like a flame from one mind to the other and
evolving in a series of alternating propositions that gain support
from each like the eclogues of Virgil or Theocritus? Like the
shuttle in a loom." A reader might object that Claudel's speakers
are all kindred spirits. There are no genuine antagonists here.
Typical of Claudel's self-assurance is an exchange between
Saint-Maurice and Gregoire: "Have you noticed that as soon as
the first Christian missionaries appeared, the sages of Asia were
reduced to silence? There was an end to the philosophers' researches." "That is true," agreed his friend. After more movements of the shuttle of their reflexions, these come to a close.
The last word is accorded to Saint Athanasius, and it is: "the
Almighty, Perfect, and Holy Word of the Father."
LANGLEY: Evidently these conversations are hardly Socratic.
Claudel's description amounts to an admission of this. I wonder
if Valery's dialogues come any closer to the Socratic type, even
though Socrates figures in them as the leader of the discussion.
FRANCIS: Socrates figures in three of them. Eupalinos ou l'architecte
is a dialogue des morts, in which he looks back with his disciple
Phaedrus on their earthly state. "Alas!" he laments, "I applied a
truth and a sincerity more deceptive than are myths and revealed
words. I taught what I invented ... I fathered children on
seduced souls and delivered them skillfully." He regrets passing
his former days in pure thought, unlike the architect, Eupalinos
and the shipbuilder, Tridon. These two practical men appear in
the rather long stories Phaedrus relates to him. In Valery'S
dialogue, both Phaedrus and Socrates question Plato's Eternal
Ideas. Phaedrus exclaims: "Oh, by what a contrast I am possessed! There is perhaps for memories a kind of second death that I
have not yet undergone. Yet do I live again, yet do I see again the
ephemeral skies! The most beautiful does not figure in the Eter-
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naIl" Valery neglects a central element of the historical Socrates,
his role of ethical teacher. This makes possible Valery's contrast
between thought and action, between Socrates and AntiSocrates. The latter does not find his ease in the Elysian Fields.
Here I would like to digress briefly. There is in a biography of
Fenelon an interesting distinction set up between Fenelon and
Malebranche: The former "could never have repeated the noble
words in which Malebranche reminds men that they make on
earth the same use of their Reason that they will in heaven, for
Faith must pass away, but Reason will abide forever." Now Valery's speakers would evidently not have agreed with Malebranche entirely. Even though one of them does anticipate Mallarme's "Cloire du long desir, Idees!" We might wish that Malebranche had written dialogues des morts, in the spirit of those noble
words.
Valery's second important dialogue is not a dialogue des morts.
L'Ame et la danse is about living men commenting on the dancing of
a living girl. Here also Socrates extols the value of action and
celebrates bodily existence as realized at its supreme level in the
art of the dance. The function of the interlocutors hardly goes
beyond that of giving cues to the main speaker's epigrams and
witticisms. And in another of Valery's works, L'Ideefixe, the Doctor is the foil to his friend Edmond T. This talkative reincarnation of the taciturn M. Teste makes the big speeches and the
Doctor provides clever repartee. Julien Benda criticized the work
for lacking method and leading nowhere. Valery's purpose was
indeed precisely that of demonstrating that thought cannot be
fixed. This dialogue therefore could not come to a conclusion; it
could only come to a stop. If they are not Socratic, Valery's
dialogues are dazzling achievements in the art of conversation.
They mark a high point in the sequence from Fontenelle
through Voltaire, Diderot, and Renan.
A distinguished contemporary example is a little book by the
critic Jean Paulhan, Entretien sur des faits divers. Here the delight
in clear ideas is effectively conveyed to the reader. The protagonist, Rene Martin, is a paragon of lucid thinking, another in
the French series which includes Valery's Teste.
LANGLEY: Whether Platonic or not, the dialogues of Valery certainly seem to be worth reading. I am not sure that the English
language has any to compare with them, aside from Santayana's
Dialogues in Limbo. I'm thinking only of the twentieth century, of
course. Santayana's are hardly more Platonic than Valery's.
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Maieutics is renounced by both of these writers. Elizabeth Merrill's pious hope, expressed in 1911, that English may yet produce a great dialogue has not been realized in the sixty years
since then. Nevertheless, Santayana's "Vortex of Dialectic" in
Dialogues in Limbo is a remarkable accomplishment. The AntiSocrates of this dialogue is identified only as The Stranger. Socrates claims that his method is useful because he must prod
people with questions in order to make them think. The Stranger
replies that dialectic is futile: it tells us nothing about reality. "On
the contrary the order of nature is disguised or reversed by
dialectic." I consider this an important admission by the Platonistic Santayana, supporting Russell's negative verdict on the validity of philosophical dialogue in our time.
TEDESCO: It is the debate between Calogero and Spirito. May
Calogero never give in!
FRANCIS: More power to Calogero, I also say! The other side is
already dominant enough, even affecting to ignore that it has an
adversary at all.
TEDESCO: I sometimes wonder whether Plato's doctrine of reminiscence itself, which we have more or less dismissed as archaic,
does not continue to survive in varying forms, notwithstanding
what critics like Russell have said. In a chapter on cognitive
capacity, Noam Chomsky quotes Russell's query: How can
human beings know as much as they do, despite their limited and
brief contacts with the world? Chomsky'S answer is extremely
interesting. You recall my fanciful remarks about the evolution
of intelligence. Well, here is what Chomsky writes: "We can know
so much because in a sense we already knew it, though the data
of sense were necessary to evoke and elicit this knowledge. Or to
put it less paradoxically, our systems of belief are those that the
mind, as a biological structure, is designed to construct."
FRANCIS: And incidentally, designed to reconstruct again and
again that old Platonic idea!
LANGLEY: You must admit that if there are such reconstructions,
they are no longer cast in the dialogue form. The climate is not
favorable.
FRANCIS: The decline of philosophical dialogue is a fact. But how
much richer and more impressive would it not be if we could
include chapters of D'Urfe'sL'Astree, the Glubdubdrub episode
of Gulliver, pages from Camus's novel La Peste, I mean the
dialogues between Dr. Rieux and Tarrou, as well as the colloquium of the scholars in Malraux's Les Noyers de I'Altenburg!
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Seen from this angle, it intersects several areas from religious
polemic to novels both pastoral and picaresque. If Brunetiere
could trace the evolution of lyrical poetry in France and its absorption in the pulpit oratory of Bishop Bossuet, using this as an
explanation of the decline of lyric in the French classical age, why
can't we do likewise with the philosophical dialogue and trace its
absorption in novels and plays?
LANGLEY: But Brunetiere was wrong, wasn't he? He was misled by
a deceptive analogy with biological evolution. And we should be
even more so if we followed his example. The impulse to write
dialogue is not like the lyrical impulse. Is it an impulse at all?
TEDESCO: Remember that Lukacs felt the impulse to write a
dialogue at the outset of World War I and wrote an essay on The
Theory of the Novel instead.
FRANCIS: And Proust started to compose imaginary conversations
with his mother which turned into his A La recherche du temps
perdu.
LANGLEY: Aren't you making too much of that?
FRANCIS: Well, the intermediate form was published posthumously under the title Contre Sainte-Beuve. But I have another
example of that impulse. Valery declares at the beginning of his
Faust: "On a certain day in 1940, I caught myself talking to myself in two voices, and I proceeded to write down what came."
One is reminded of the two lobes of Ernest Renan and Andre
Maurois.
LANGLEY: Didn't they know that there is a division of labor, of
functions, between the cerebral hemispheres? To talk of a
dialogue between the lobes of the brain is not scientific. Why not
admit that the dialogue is a rather antiquarian, backward-looking
genre? It appears from the examples I listened to on the tapes
that after the Age of the Enlightenment extremely few forwardlooking authors have used it, in the fields of religious or political
polemic. I say this without forgetting the flippant Heavenly Discourse of Charles Erskine Scott Wood, and I make an exception
for Maurice Joly's Machiavel et Montesquieu, which impressed me
very much, in fact.
TEDESCO: Someone who heard of our conversations suggested we
should look beyond the European tradition, to Asia, for example, as was done by Ninian Smart in his World Religions: A
Dialogue. It brings together two different Buddhists, a Christian,
a Hindu, a Jew, and a Muslim. There's more variety there than
even in Jean Bodin's Heptaplomeres!
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FRANCIS: We do find dialogues between Europeans and Asians
written by authors we've mentioned, Valery and Gide, for example. Still, why look that far, when we have probably overlooked
things within our own horizon? For example, we have neglected
both the Alains! I have in mind the Quadrilogue invectif of Alain
Chartier, and the various entretiens published by the modern
Alain, Emile Chartier, that is. They could have furnished us with
chronological boundaries, the Hundred Years War, and our
world wars since their writings deal with these subjects. Of
course, Alain's entretiens concern philosophy and sculpture, not
history. As a lycee professor, he had as students Andre Maurois
and Simone Weil, to name only the most famous of them. I must
admit that the young nowadays have hardly heard of him.
LANGLEY: Apparently you aren't proposing him for the role of a
modern Socrates, or a Plato either.
TEDESCO: But think of all those TV roundtables and panels on
every subject under the sun. The symposium is certainly thriving
there, with or without potations.
FRANCIS: Andre Malraux hailed in the colloquium a modern
genre, or literary art form. The colloquium in question dealt with
himself.
LANGLEY: At best, you have in those symposia only the raw materials. It's perhaps possible that some new Plato or Diderot will take
the raw materials and whip them into artistic shape. If that ever
happens, I'll be as delighted as either of you.
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